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Abstract 
 This work is an investigation into the recent political crisis in Algeria, with a 
focus on the Islamist party at its heart—the Front islamique du salut. It provides a 
theoretical and contextual framework by which we can understand the party‘s 
emergence and subsequent decline, arguing for greater acceptance of alternative, 
non-secular politics where there is a clear public appetite for such change. In 
particular, it emphasises the ways in which the FIS sought to establish a legitimate 
mandate through a blend of continuity and change. This, I argue, is evident in the 
party‘s religio-nationalist modes of expression, which built on yet offered a crucial 
distinction from the FLN‘s relationship to nationalism and Islam. It is also evident in 
the FIS‘ interaction with the state both during and after the period of its legalisation. 
My analysis shows how the party evolved towards political maturity and moderation, 
seeking to engage with rather than subvert the state institutions, albeit from an 
adversarial position. That this was ultimately unsuccessful is most clearly evident 
from the military-led campaign to rid Algeria of any real Islamist opposition, despite 
the legitimacy of the FIS‘ electoral success. My conclusion that the FIS was denied 
this legitimacy is based on a reading of contemporary political theory as well as an 
assessment of political developments on the ground. 
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 The political sphere in Algeria was very nearly transformed at the beginning of 
the 1990s, when the country‘s first multi-party elections allowed a new force to 
emerge: the Front islamique du salut (FIS). This development was cut short in 
January 1992, when the second round of parliamentary elections was cancelled and 
an emergency interim committee was established to run the state. This thesis 
considers the nature of the political force that was thereby rejected, arguing that it 
offered a balanced and legitimate form of political opposition and that its exclusion 
was therefore unjust. As such it is not a history of the FIS or of contemporary 
Algerian politics, and although I will refer in detail to the key events during the 
period under analysis, a summary of these events would be useful at this stage. 
 It was under Algeria‘s third President, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, that real 
political reform first took place. When riots broke out in October 1988, Chadli, who 
had already begun to reverse some of his predecessor‘s policies (notably by slowing 
down the country‘s industrialisation and favouring increased economic 
liberalisation), promised to introduce a new constitution that would allow for multi-
party politics. This led to the formation of dozens of new parties, including the FIS, 
which was founded in February 1989 under the leadership of Abassi Madani and Ali 
Belhadj.
1
 A highly successful message combining nationalism and a moral critique 
of the state was spread via political exploitation of mosques around the country. This, 
combined with a highly effective organisational capacity (as demonstrated by its 
success in providing aid in the aftermath of the October 1989 earthquake), ensured 
popular appeal and saw the FIS secure an emphatic victory in the municipal elections 
of June 1990. Although this did not threaten the real seat of power, the party‘s 
continued strength appeared to provoke the military authorities in June 1991, when 
                                                     
1
 A word about names and spelling is necessary here. Many Algerian names are customarily written 
with the surname first: Abassi Madani and Chadli Bendjedid are two such examples. Where I refer to 
them with just one name, it will therefore be as Abassi and Chadli. With regard to spelling, one finds 
several variations of many names. An example is Benhadj and Belhadj (I have chosen the latter). 
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mass demonstrations organised by the FIS were violently repressed. Then, when the 
FIS secured a massive victory in the first round of parliamentary elections six months 
later, the President resigned, most likely under pressure from senior military officers, 
a state of emergency was called, and the FIS was dissolved by state decree. The 
violence that ensued was the product of the Islamist backlash, but also of the military 
crackdown on this movement. Hundreds of FIS officials were placed in detention 
camps, along with thousands of other prisoners suspected of Islamist involvement.
2
 
The conflict steadily worsened as diverse and nebulous militant groups emerged, 
fighting the authorities and one another to harness the momentum of the FIS‘ success 
at the polls. Militarily, the war was chaotic, with uncertainty surrounding the bloody 
violence. As we will see in Chapter IV, questions were asked about who was behind 
the attacks on civilians. Politically, the conflict proved unproductive: after several 
years of violence, various attempts at negotiations had failed (see Chapter III), and a 
pro-military leader emerged in the form of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, first elected 
President in 1999. It was his concorde civile (an amnesty for guerrilla fighters 
willing to give up arms)
3
 in July of that year that effectively led to the end of the 
conflict, which had killed somewhere between 100,000 and more than 200,000 
people.
4
  
                                                     
2
 Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l‘homme (FIDH), ‗La levée du voile : l‘Algérie de 
l‘extrajudiciaire et de la manipulation‘, p. 6, available at 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/dz_femmes1997f.pdf [last accessed 21 April 2010]. 
3
 The full text of this legislation is available at 
http://www.el-mouradia.dz/francais/algerie/histoire/Dossier/loi_sur_la_concorde_civile.htm [last 
accessed 21 April 2010]. 
4
 These figures are disputed; see Salima Mellah, ‗Comité justice pour l‘Algérie : Les massacres en 
Algérie 1992–2004‘, p. 6, available at www.algerie-tpp.org/tpp/pdf/dossier_2_massacres.pdf [last 
accessed 21 April 2010]. 
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Locating my research: bibliographical choices and research 
contributions 
 The sources I have used in this work are an indication of its intended location 
within the academic work so far available on this tragic period of Algerian political 
history. I had two priorities in my selection of research material. First, I wanted to 
privilege sources that have contributed to our political understanding, whether 
through broad theory or specific contextual analysis. All of the work referred to 
therefore deals with politics in one way or another. For example, part of Chapter I is 
devoted to nation-building, nationalism and independence. This work is theoretical in 
nature, as it offers a broad insight into the difficulties, both for the state and its 
opponents, of identifying and promoting national characteristics, particularly in the 
aftermath of colonial occupation. The reader will note, however, that my focus is 
political: there is little or no discussion of cultural manifestations of nationalism, as 
can be found in literature or music, for example. Nor is there any discussion in this 
thesis of the wider ethical or philosophical questions that a radical change in political 
representation would imply. And even where I refer to religion, which is of course an 
essential strand in the rise of Islamism, I emphasise its relationship with politics 
rather than attempting to offer any theological insight. This is not to say that the FIS 
(and Islamists more generally) have no spiritual foundation; indeed Chapter II argues 
that such a view is unhelpful, as it obscures the potential for modern democratic 
politics to be redefined by legitimate, non-secular groups like the FIS (see Section 
2.3). My emphasis, however, remains political: I am more interested in the ways in 
which the FIS interacted with the state and what it might have offered the wider 
political system than in the theological basis that motivated its supporters. 
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 The second priority in selecting my sources was to privilege French-language 
material as much as possible in order to reflect my position as a researcher in French 
Studies. This was possible to a large extent because the historic links between France 
and Algeria have meant that a greater body of relevant material has emerged in 
French (from both countries) than in English. A further advantage is that a wider 
diversity of styles is available: with the exception of media reports, work on Algeria 
from the Anglophone world tends to be almost exclusively academic, such as the 
major contribution made by Hugh Roberts, whereas the material available in French 
covers not only academia, but also popular history, journalistic investigation, 
extensive online debates and polemics, and, crucially, testimonial publications from 
Algerians involved in the conflict (see Chapter IV). Needless to say, there is also a 
great body of work available on cultural and transcultural, ethical and philosophical 
issues, although for the reasons already outlined I have focused on those publications 
that offer political insight. I should also say that my preference for French-language 
sources was in no way absolute. The advantage of reading both English and French 
allowed me to access a wider body of material, and it would have been artificial to 
overlook this. Furthermore, as this thesis is written in English, it will primarily be of 
interest to academics, students and other readers from the Anglophone world. This is 
all the more relevant given the relative paucity of material on contemporary Algerian 
politics that is available in English. 
Review of the literature 
 Let us now take a closer look at the sources used herein via a review of the 
literature. Broadly speaking, I have used three types of material: theory that is 
unrelated to Islamism as such, but which I have invoked in order to outline my 
position in relation to it; theory that deals with the question of Islamism as a global 
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phenomenon; and contextual analysis of the specific case of the FIS in Algeria. 
Before outlining some of the literature on Islamism and the FIS, I would like to 
explain the ways in which I have used peripheral sources. Section 1 of Chapter I, for 
example, studies nationalism and nation-building as theorised by Anthony Smith, 
who makes no reference to Islamism. I chose this work because Smith offers a wide 
reading of nationhood that does not rely exclusively on modern phenomena such as 
the nation-state; this allows me to emphasise that nationalism as expressed by the FIS 
can challenge (although not totally reject) the FLN‘s portrayal of the Algerian nation 
by seeking to tap into a more long-standing legacy than the 1954 revolution—Islamic 
heritage. Similarly, Section 1 of Chapter II examines sources that do not refer to 
Islamism, but which I have used to make a central point. By examining political 
theory on democracy and some competing models, I seek to encourage an open 
definition that would not obstruct the inclusion of groups like the FIS in modern 
democratic politics. Notably, by invoking the debate on communitarianism and 
liberalism, two competing models of democratic theory, I wish to show that the 
Western democratic paradigm can accommodate at least some of the challenges it 
faces from emerging political forces (the isolation and individualism of liberalist 
Western society is a common target for Islamist thinkers).  
 Of course, most of my sources relate to Islamism generally or the FIS specifically; 
an overview of this literature would be useful at this stage. As I have said, the 
inclusion of French-language sources added considerable diversity to the nature and 
style of the material available, and I have endeavoured to reflect this diversity as 
much as possible. First, there is academic material. This is available in both 
languages, as represented in French by writers like Lahouari Addi or François Burgat 
(see Chapter II in particular), and in English by writers like Hugh Roberts or John 
Esposito. Within this category, the various sources are of course useful in different 
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ways. Some writers focus more on theories that help us understand and assess the 
phenomenon of Islamism, while others offer a close historical and/or political 
reading. Broad theoretical insights are provided by analysts like Abderrahim 
Lamchichi, Gilles Kepel, Olivier Carré, John Esposito, Olivier Roy and François 
Burgat. The main contribution of Roy and Burgat is that they evaluate the viability 
and potential weaknesses (Roy) or strengths (Burgat) of the emerging Islamist 
opposition worldwide. While they back up their analysis with specific examples, 
their primary objective appears to be broad rather than specific. I offer a close 
reading of their work, together with that of Lahouari Addi, in Chapter II. This 
provides a representative sample of the different approaches to Islamism being 
developed by political scientists in France. All three of these authors have distinct 
views, but with some inevitable cross-overs. Both Roy and Addi, for example, 
identify tensions in the relationship between Islamism and modern politics, or 
modernity more generally, although Addi‘s work offers a greater balance between 
theoretical and contextual insights. In theoretical terms, he establishes a balanced 
thesis that recognises the potential fecundity of the Islamist movement, but 
ultimately challenges its legitimacy on ideological grounds. His work is also a very 
valuable source of case-specific information on Algeria, as he offers in-depth 
knowledge of the country‘s political structures and recent historical context. Burgat 
deals with many of the same themes as Roy and Addi, such as the causes behind the 
emergence of Islamism, competing definitions of the phenomenon, or its relationship 
with democracy and modernity. It is particularly on this last question that his 
perspective differs. Burgat is one of the leading voices in France to advocate greater 
acceptance of the Islamist challenge to traditional political structures. His theoretical 
insights are therefore an essential complement to the case-specific arguments offered 
by other analysts referred to herein. These include John Ruedy, Michael Willis, Jean-
14 
 
Jacques Lavenue, Mohand Tahi, Frédéric Volpi and Hugh Roberts. The advantage 
offered by these writers is clear: well-referenced, factual analysis that cannot be 
overlooked in any serious study of contemporary Algeria. Perhaps the most nuanced 
of these sources is Roberts, whose detailed political analysis stands out as the most 
convincing, yet unbiased assessment of the FIS and its interaction with the state. He 
is interested in legality, legitimacy and political imperatives, but limits his analysis to 
what can be ascertained from the facts. This, too, is my own approach, although as 
we will see the facts are extremely hard to determine with any certainty, which is 
why I felt it was important to include sources from outside the academic world. 
 The recent Algerian conflict has produced an astonishing range of material from 
outside academic research that provides us with the essential inside perspective 
needed to challenge the hermetic store of official information. This material 
complements the sources to which I have already referred. Three further categories 
can be identified here: investigative publications, testimonies, and reports, both by 
NGOs (human rights organisations and dissident Algerian groups) and the United 
Nations. The complexity of Algeria‘s political climate, in particular since the 
beginning of political pluralism in October 1988, means it is essential to refer to the 
kind of local, investigative publications provided by writers like Amine Touati, 
Ahmed Rouadjia and Mustafa al-Ahnaf. Touati‘s day-by-day account of the June 
1991 FIS demonstrations, for example, is unparalleled in its detail and offers nuances 
that are not necessarily available in sources from outside Algeria. Similarly, his 
account of the individuals involved in the Islamist revolt post-1992 is particularly 
useful, as it avoids any dramatisation and is careful not to blur the differences 
between, say, GIA militants and FIS activists. Rouadjia‘s excellent account of the 
role of mosques in the period preceding the conflict is another extremely detailed 
insight into the nature of political life in Algeria. He also de-dramatises a 
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phenomenon that might appear unusual to Western readers: the widespread use of 
mosques for political action, and the state‘s deferential attitude towards their 
exploitation. Such a scenario is in fact common in the Maghreb, where state 
institutions are regularly by-passed by informal social structures in opposition to the 
state.
5
 
 One of the most important elements in our current understanding of the Algerian 
civil war is the testimonies to have emerged in recent years from individuals 
involved in various ways. Chapter IV in particular focuses on this material, as it most 
directly deals with the central theme of that chapter: the conduct of the state, and the 
military in particular, during the conflict. Examples of these sources include 
publications by former secret service agents, Abdelkader Tigha and Mohamed 
Samraoui, former head of cabinet at the Sécurité militaire (SM), Hichem Aboud, 
former prisoner and student activist, Lyes Laribi, and former Minister for the 
Economy, Ghazi Hidouci. However, I have chosen two sources for particular 
attention: that of a former officer, Habib Souaïdia, and that of a civilian survivor 
from a village massacre, Nesroulah Yous. These two publications have attracted the 
most media attention, and therefore led me to considerable amounts of peripheral 
information. Their value is that they reinforce the widespread view of a ‗dirty war‘, 
in which the military had as its unwavering objective the annihilation and disgrace of 
the Islamist opposition, which of course implied illegal and inhumane tactics. 
 This view is further reinforced by the many reports to have emerged in recent 
years. These are largely critical of the Algerian regime, although I endeavour to 
provide as balanced an assessment as possible by including, for example, the 
perspective of the military as per Khaled Nezzar (former Minister for Defence and 
                                                     
5
 Frédéric Volpi, ‗L‘islam, la nation et la politique : le passé de bien plus d‘une illusion‘, in Naaman 
Kessous, Christine Margerrison, Andy Stafford and Guy Dugas (eds), Algérie, vers le cinquantenaire 
de l‟Indépendance : regards critiques (Paris: L‘Harmattan, 2009), pp. 183–200, p. 183. 
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senior general involved in the coup of January 1992), and the official report made to 
the UN by the Algerian government in 1998. One of the most active Algerian bodies 
that monitor developments is Algeria-Watch, whose website (www.algeria-
watch.org) is a highly valuable store of articles and reports, although there is a clear 
bias for material that can be used to condemn the regime. This is largely 
representative of the reality reflected in most of the human rights organisations that 
have published reports on Algeria. This is not a criticism, but merely an observation: 
the fact is that reports of human rights abuses during the conflict are widespread, and 
it would appear certain that the regime was at the very least negligent in its 
protection of civilians, if not positively complicit in the atrocities committed. The 
inclusion of references to groups like Amnesty International, the Ligue algérienne de 
la défense des droits de l‟homme (LADDH), the Fédération internationale des ligues 
des droits de l‟homme (FIDH), and Human Rights Watch is not intended as a 
thorough analysis of the legal issues involved, but reinforces the very serious 
allegations made by Souaïdia, Yous and others. Furthermore, my inclusion of a final 
section detailing the relationship between the UN and the Algerian government 
offers a damning account of the regime‘s failures. The distinction between reports by 
NGOs and the UN should not be under-estimated: when the UN Human Rights 
Committee says it is ‗appalled‘ by the level of violence and ‗deeply concerned‘ by 
the state‘s negligence, this is of far more serious import than the most critical of 
NGO reports.  
Contributions to the field 
 My conclusion to this thesis offers further discussion of future research paths that 
I would like to see explored, but what contribution does the present work offer? As I 
have said, this thesis has been produced within the field of French Studies, but with a 
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clear emphasis on politics. Specifically within French studies, therefore, its 
contribution is to offer an explicitly political reading of Algeria‘s recent history. This 
is significant as there would appear to me to be a heavy bias in French Studies 
towards cultural and/or philosophical analysis, particularly where the former 
colonies—or ‗Francophone‘ world—is concerned. By this I mean that much of the 
analysis within the field either emphasises literary or other artistic contributions to 
our understanding of postcolonial life, or uses philosophical theories to express the 
complexity of postcolonial identity. This work is highly valuable; it has played an 
important role in highlighting, for example, the prolific and diverse artistic voices of 
non-Western cultures, and it has encouraged exciting new theoretical perspectives on 
issues like the distribution of world power, language and identity.
6
 My position with 
regard to this work is not critical. While I highlight the regrettable absence within 
French Studies of a political focus on the former French colonies, this is not intended 
to undermine the contribution of postcolonial studies. Rather, it is intended as an 
encouragement of parallel developments within French Studies towards a greater 
political understanding of the Francophone world. It is my belief that students of 
French are under-exposed to analysis of political life outside metropolitan France, 
and it is my hope that this work might redress this in some small way. 
 More generally, this work offers a nuanced assessment of the FIS that builds on 
the analysis already available. As my sources reveal, the view that the FIS was 
unfairly demonised is quite common, and an even more widespread view is that the 
acts of the Algerian regime were grossly negligent and determined by the selfish 
                                                     
6
 Readers may wish to refer to the following reference works: Ania Loomba, 
Colonialism/Postcolonialism, second edition (London: Routledge, 2005); Robert Young, 
Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); Charles Forsdick and David 
Murphy, Francophone Postcolonial Studies: A Critical Introduction (London: Arnold, 2003); Charles 
Forsdick and David Murphy, Postcolonial Thought in the French-Speaking World (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2009); Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin (eds), The Post-
Colonial Studies Reader, second edition (London: Routledge, 2006). For a good example of the 
philosophical applications of postcolonial studies, see Michael Syrotinski, Deconstruction and the 
Postcolonial: At the Limits of Theory (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007). 
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interests of a small but powerful elite. It has been well established that like the FLN 
the FIS exploited nationalism, but perhaps lacking in the available literature is the 
view that the FIS‘ expression of nationalism was an important step away from the 
FLN‘s self-serving, statist nationalism. Chapter I emphasises this distinction, 
identifying a ‗subtle but significant shift‘. Chapter II introduces what I also feel is an 
original viewpoint: the pertinence of the communitarian-liberal debate in political 
theory has not to my knowledge been raised in relation to the emergence of 
Islamism. Another notable absence from the literature is the view that the FIS‘ overt 
politicisation is commendable and not merely a sign of its ideological contradictions, 
as analysts like Addi and Roy argue. My depiction of the FIS as a balanced party is 
intended to emphasise that its politicisation represented another subtle but significant 
shift—away from apolitical fundamentalism towards political Islam, or Islamism—
and that this balance was the key to its legitimacy. 
 The final element of this work which I hope will be a welcome contribution to the 
study of recent events in Algeria is the level of detail introduced in its latter half, 
particularly in Chapter IV. By focusing on events like the massacre in Bentalha, the 
controversy over Habib Souaïdia‘s claims, and the interaction between the UN and 
the Algerian government, I hope to encourage a greater level of scrutiny on the very 
opaque history of Algeria‘s recent official conduct. This should be a particularly 
useful contribution for readers from the Anglophone world, as the vast majority of 
analysis of such events has so far come from France and Algeria.  
Thesis structure 
 I have opted for a thesis structure that offers a balance between theoretical and 
contextual analysis. The first two chapters provide the theoretical framework within 
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which my ideas have developed, while Chapters III and IV provide details of the 
political and military environments in which the FIS emerged and was ultimately 
defeated. It is my hope that this balance will provide the theoretical nuances 
necessary for a fresh interpretation of this party, as well as the supporting evidence 
necessary for academic rigour. 
Chapter I 
 Chapter I begins by framing the emergence of Algerian Islamism in the context of 
nation-building. This is not intended as a catch-all explanation for the rise of the FIS, 
but allows us to consider the Islamists‘ role in society as one that builds on rather 
than undoes the Algerian nation as established under the FLN. Using the theories of 
Anthony Smith on nationalism and national identity, I begin by showing how 
modern nation-building can require a balance between the imperatives of the nation-
state and the older unifying elements of a people. Smith tells us this is because 
nations are more than purely modern constructs, and their success depends not only 
on the political and diplomatic work done by the state but also on centuries of 
national consolidation. In the case of Algeria, I argue that the FIS may have 
represented this balance by seeking to bridge the country‘s ancient Islamic heritage 
and its modern voice as an independent nation. This would have complemented 
rather than supplanted the role of the FLN. As the party that gave Algeria her 
independence but also emphasised Islam as a common bond among the people, the 
FLN may be said to have respected this blend between modern national identity and 
historic essence. However, the critique made by the Islamic reformers, and later the 
FIS, is that the FLN failed in its mission as it increasingly co-opted the Algerian 
heritage to reinforce its own legitimacy. This meant that the blend of Islamic 
nationalism it promoted was in the service of the state and not the Algerian nation.  
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 That the FLN behaved in this way is not surprising, however. Section 1.2 looks at 
contributions from various analysts who have studied the difficulties of political life 
in the aftermath of independence. We see how the newly-independent state struggles 
to forge loyalty and unity, often taking on an overbearing role in an effort to ensure 
the success of its nationalist model. This explains the potential for conflict between 
state and nation: where identity is fragile or uncertain, as in an emerging political 
entity, the official or dominant expression of this identity, embodied by the state, 
may meet with opposition from competing interpretations and representations. The 
increasing hegemony of the FLN state met with such opposition in the form of 
political Islam. Although by no means the only explanation for the FIS‘ success—
one might also cite social or economic inequality, the success of the Iranian 
revolution, moral decline, administrative corruption, cultural ‗Westernisation‘, or a 
shifting world order with the decline of communism—this analysis allows us to see 
the Islamists not as an obscurantist force, but as a movement with its finger on the 
pulse of a society that no longer recognised itself in the nation forged by its political 
representatives. By tapping into nationalist sentiment, but in the context of Islamic 
heritage, the FIS offered an important yet subtle shift away from state-sanctioned 
(and state-serving) nationalism and towards a more popular expression of Algerian 
identity.  
 This view of Islamism as a constructive rather than destructive force is also at the 
heart of Section 2 of my first chapter. Here, I examine the often fraught relationship 
between religion and politics, arguing that the two are not as mutually exclusive as is 
often thought. With the rise of religious belief worldwide, it is no longer reasonable 
to assume that secular political systems will continue to emerge as the dominant 
force, and on that basis we probably need to review our relationship with politicised 
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religious values.
7
 For if we continue to see public and political manifestations of 
these values as a threat to stability, then the world may indeed become highly 
unstable (if it is not already). Such is my approach when assessing Algerian Islamism 
and the admixture of religion and politics more generally: a blanket refusal to admit 
this alloy into the modern political mould can only lead to further instability and 
injustice. I defend this view in greater detail from a theoretical point of view in 
Chapter II, and contextually in Chapter III, where I show that the FIS respected the 
legality of political opposition. In my first chapter, however, I wanted to begin with a 
definition of fundamentalism that would emphasise openness and the importance of 
eschewing prejudice. I do this by highlighting the origins of the term outside of the 
Muslim world and also by arguing for a more literal definition: fundamental belief in 
the tenets of a given system, whether philosophical, social, economic, political or 
theological. 
 That fundamentalism includes the political is an essential tenet of my thesis, 
which argues for the acceptance of actors like the FIS onto the political stage. For 
they are fundamentalist—although, as I explain, they represent a particular type of 
fundamentalism: Islamism. This is a political embodiment of (fundamental) religious 
adherence and as such represents another important shift—away from passive 
fundamentalism (as practiced by certain non-violent, apolitical believers) and 
towards its political application. This was significant in the Muslim world more 
widely, as it consolidated the increasing politicisation of society that had begun with 
the colonial confrontation between Europe and Islam, and in Algeria specifically, 
where I show that the predecessors of the FIS—men like Ben Badis and Cheikhs 
Sahnoun and Soltani—expressed their fundamental beliefs outside of the political 
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 One recent publication has focused on the growth of religious populations worldwide and the impact 
this might have on politics: Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and 
Politics in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile, 2010). 
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sphere. I provide historical information on the significance of these Islamic 
reformists in order to trace a link between that earlier movement and modern 
Islamism. By showing that the FIS built on two existing legacies (nationalism and 
reformism), I therefore suggest that its emergence was less of a rupture than was 
feared by so many. 
Chapter II 
 It is clear that parties like the FIS are perceived as a threat to or a rupture from 
stable political models. In order to rebut this perception, in Chapter II I set out to 
challenge restricted or prejudiced interpretations both of modern democracy and 
political Islam. This is a vast endeavour, so I have limited my analysis to a few select 
vantage points. After briefly discussing the problems associated with defining 
democracy, I go on to refer to the work of political theorists who have focused on the 
role of community in democracies. This work belongs to the liberal-communitarian 
debate, which, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, sought to clarify the apparent 
dichotomy between liberal emphasis on individual rights, individual lifestyles, 
individual gain, individual beliefs, etc. and the apparent desire in some societies for 
public policy to take account of unifying, community-based values. I chose this 
segment of political theory because, although it is not concerned with the Muslim 
world as such, it nonetheless reflects a debate that is central to political Islam, or 
Islamism.
8
 Islamists emerge in many different political contexts, and should be 
understood in relation to their individual objectives, but they all share a desire to 
attenuate the harmful effects of ‗Westernisation‘, with its individualist emphasis. 
This translates into a greater role for community, which is at the heart of Muslim 
society. By showing that this debate has taken place within Western democratic 
theory independently of any concerns about Islam, I therefore argue that at least one 
                                                     
8
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element of Islamism is not as unfamiliar as it may seem, and that it need not 
undermine democracy as we know it.  
 This approach is fundamentally about questioning the impenetrability of the 
Western democratic paradigm. It seems to me that by refusing to recognise the 
capacity of Islamist groups for democratic action, one weakens rather than 
strengthens the appeal of democracy. To take an obvious example, the refusal by key 
members of the international community such as the US and EU to deal with Hamas 
in Palestine is a clear message that democratic participation comes with conditions 
that extend beyond electoral success. Similarly, for the authorities to have denied the 
FIS its victory at the polls in December 1991 because of fears that Algerian 
democracy was under threat makes a mockery of the democratic model as favoured 
by that regime and its Western backers. This is the approach I adopt in my analysis 
of three French-language political scientists who have written extensively on 
political Islam: Lahouari Addi, Olivier Roy and François Burgat. I challenge Addi 
and Roy on the basis of their restricted interpretations of what is admissible in the 
modern political order, while in the work of Burgat, who is a champion of the 
Islamists‘ right to democratic participation, I emphasise his tendency to underplay 
the significance of Islam in this movement.  
 Of the three men, Addi, who is Algerian-born but now works in metropolitan 
France, has written the most about Algeria specifically. His analysis is very useful in 
understanding the state structures (economic, judicial, political and, above all, 
military) that have functioned with more or less success since independence, and his 
knowledge of the political apparatus appears to be excellent. However, I have chosen 
to focus on his ideological assessment of the Islamist movement, as it is here that he 
operates what I term a barrier to entry into the democratic model. By insisting on the 
irreversible rise of the individual as a condition of modernity, Addi effectively rejects 
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the political model offered by the FIS, which sought to renew social fraternity and 
combat the sense of isolation brought on by the increasing individualisation of 
society, particularly in urban areas. Such an objective, particularly when linked to the 
restoration of moral order, is incompatible with Addi‘s depiction of the modern 
world, which he says cannot aspire to a ‗utopian‘ blend of the sacred and the profane. 
The main problem with such a model, according to Addi, is that the role of religion 
in society should not extend into the quest for power, as this would undermine faith 
and put unfair pressure on voters to give political support to ‗divine‘ parties. Yet 
Addi himself recognises that Islam cannot be depoliticised: unlike in the Christian 
faith, where a clear hierarchy operates, Muslims are all free to act as spokespersons 
for their belief system, and this pervades both political and apolitical life. This 
ultimately implies that parties like the FIS have to abandon either their spiritual 
foundation or their political ambitions; Addi‘s analysis therefore obstructs rather than 
encourages the emergence of new democratic forces in the Muslim world. 
 Similarly, Olivier Roy interprets the nature of Islamism in a way that precludes its 
participation in democratic politics. His ‗Failure of political Islam‘ thesis depicts this 
movement in such a way that no matter what shape it takes, it is doomed to failure: if 
it adapts to the modern political model (institution-based governance and secular 
society), he says it will not have lived up to its revolutionary rhetoric, but its 
‗totalising‘ model of social change based on moral rectitude cannot work either, as 
there is evidence, he says, that Islam is enjoying renewal independently of the formal 
Islamist network. This, he suggests, shows that Islamism cannot claim to monopolise 
the expression of ‗re-islamicisation‘, although it is unclear that the movement ever 
displayed such an ambition. Ultimately, Roy‘s analysis is more concerned with rigid 
definitions than political fairness. His attempts to undermine the credibility of 
Islamism because of its weak ideology and its failure to re-shape the geopolitical 
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boundaries of the Muslim world disguise the impact it has had on political conditions 
on the ground. By focusing in part on the unrealistic nature of the rhetoric employed 
by Islamists, he reaches the conclusion that their fitness to govern must be 
questioned. But I would argue that a focus on the behaviour of individual parties 
aspiring to take part in elections is a more productive approach. 
 In the work of both Addi and Roy, we find varying degrees of hostility to the idea 
of Islamist governance. François Burgat, by contrast, has always supported the 
principle that overtly Islamic parties should be admitted into the political sphere. My 
analysis of his work therefore pays considerable attention to the ways in which he 
calls for a greater level of acceptance and openness to new political modes of 
expression. His fundamental perspective is that there is an inherent unfairness in the 
global distribution of political power, and specifically that non-Western voices (e.g. 
Islamists) should be allowed to compete with those who have held a monopoly on 
political expression. In the short-term, this would facilitate political change in the 
Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world, but it would also have a long-term 
impact on global perceptions of politics: the endogenous references (e.g. to Islamic 
concepts such as shura, or consultation) employed by Islamist actors to compete on 
their national terrain would gradually feed into political discourse generally, and the 
cultural porousness of the modern world would at last manifest itself on the global 
ideological terrain that has historically been dominated by the West. I find myself 
drawn to Burgat‘s work because of its consistent support for would-be political 
representatives who have been disadvantaged by an unfair distribution of power. His 
belief that politics would survive a certain amount of subversion by emerging forces 
is, I think, correct. However, I try to bring a nuance to his analysis: in his attempt to 
convince readers of the acceptability of Islamism, it seems that he underplays the 
very real Islamic basis upon which its proponents wish to build their political model, 
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arguing instead that their ambitions are in reality profane. The irony of this is that 
while emphasising the need to embrace non-Western modes of expression, he 
appears to reassure his (mostly Western) readers that the invocation of Islam is more 
a political tool than an ideological commitment. Such a tactic is problematic as it 
risks alienating those Islamists who would otherwise be drawn to work that offers 
principled support to their movement, and it undermines Burgat‘s own emphasis on 
openness and difference. 
 Chapter II ends with an analysis of two issues: the problem of popular sovereignty 
in political Islam, and the question of legitimacy. First, I address the apparent 
conflict between divine and popular sovereignty, arguing that these need not 
necessarily exclude one another. Looking again at the work of Lahouari Addi, we see 
how he traces the process of democratisation back to the debate on sovereignty and 
how his views ultimately reflect this process as experienced in a European context, 
that is to say in the context of popular challenges to the divine authority embodied by 
the Church. Although he is careful to emphasise circumstantial differences in the 
cases of Europe and the Maghreb, he concludes that any popular desire for 
democratisation could never be fulfilled by a party like the FIS, which failed to 
reconcile its rhetoric on divine sovereignty with the imperatives of governance. For 
Addi sees the two as incompatible: it is a question of which form of legitimacy a 
party enjoys—religious or electoral. He insists that the two cannot coincide, but I 
submit that this approach is misguided for two reasons. First, it is unrealistic to speak 
of bringing legitimacy to government where there has been no legitimacy to begin 
with. The political upheaval required to replace the FLN regime with a pluralist 
democracy implied considerable risk: the FIS may well have proven to be poor 
governors, but to delegitimise them on the basis of an apparent ideological 
inconsistency is not helpful, especially when legitimacy was so clearly lacking from 
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the FLN regime in the first place. Yet this is what Addi, Roy and others set out to do. 
Secondly, there is a wider problem in the debate on Islamists‘ fitness to govern: those 
who analyse parties like the FIS in purely political terms will never communicate 
successfully with the Islamists themselves, as the points of departure on each side of 
the debate are so different. Once again, it would be more helpful to push for 
inclusion, pluralism and free elections than to operate intellectual barriers to entry 
that ultimately preserve the status quo of hermetic political systems.  
Chapter III 
 Having argued in favour of inclusive democratic models from a theoretical 
standpoint, I move on in Chapter III to a more contextual analysis of the FIS. The 
intention here is to show that because of its broad cooperation with the state and 
because of its conscious shift towards overtly political action, this party earned its 
place in the electoral process. Without wishing to underplay its combative stance (the 
FIS was implicitly hostile to the existing balance of power), I try to depict a party 
that respected the legality of political opposition and acted with increasing maturity, 
flexibility and moderation in the period following President Chadli Bendjedid‘s 
decision to make the constitutional shift to pluralism, that is to say from October 
1988 onwards.  
 I begin this chapter by showing that the early emergence of political Islam in 
Algeria was necessarily problematic, as a diverse current of opposition to the state 
had to be consolidated under coherent leadership. In particular, the transition from 
apolitical opposition, as represented by men like Cheikhs Soltani and Sahnoun, to 
political representation implied certain challenges: Who would lead such a 
movement? How best to garner maximum electoral support? What policies to adopt? 
How best to relate to the existing state apparatuses? The reality is that these 
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questions were not answered with clarity at first. As this chapter shows, it was only 
as the FIS consolidated its leadership and discourse under the Djaz‘ara, the party‘s 
nationalist and moderate branch, that it displayed political maturity and unity. 
Whether this was in fact necessary for electoral success can only be the subject of 
speculation. In the June 1990 elections, considerable uncertainty still remained. The 
FIS had been reluctant to provide a clear political programme and its bicephalous 
leadership (Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj) at times appeared to represent different 
political views, yet its success at the polls was unequivocal. In any case, by the 
December 1991 elections, it was clear that the party was dominated by its more 
moderate members. 
 Chapter III provides details of this shift. It reveals a clear preference within the 
FIS for populist politics, as analysis of the party‘s strategy, constituency and 
leadership shows. Its strategy was based on popular appeal, with heavy exploitation 
of mosques around the country. Its constituency was largely made up of the urban 
poor, and efforts were made to retain mass appeal, even where this appeared contrary 
to the FIS‘ natural alliances (see the example of the Gulf War). Its leadership, finally, 
marked a clear preference for populism and political will. The supremacy of 
venerable Abassi and fiery Belhadj over and above the party‘s executive body 
(Majlis al-Shura) was effective in exciting voters, and the definitive shift towards 
domination by the Djaz‘ara in July 1991 was a clear indication that the party 
leadership should reflect political maturity.  
 Pragmatism and canny political alliances marked the FIS‘ approach, and I 
examine the ambivalent relationship it maintained with the existing state structures, 
notably how it sometimes mirrored and compared itself to the FLN, how it 
cooperated with Chadli‘s administration, and how it respected legality, while at the 
same time challenging the state in a way that no other party had done. The central 
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idea in this thesis is that the FIS offered a significant but not seismic shift in Algerian 
politics. It sought to alter the political landscape, dominated by the military-
bureaucratic FLN, without reversing the progress that had been made on the strength 
of the state‘s revolutionary legitimacy. This is reflected in the FIS‘ relationship with 
the FLN, a relationship that was marked by a greater level of understanding than is 
sometimes appreciated. To say there were similarities between the two parties is 
nothing new. It is no secret that, like the FLN, the FIS sought to capitalise on the 
legitimacy of the revolution, or that both parties employed a populist discourse. I 
discuss these similarities, but I am careful to emphasise the limits of such a 
comparison, arguing that despite drawing strength from the FLN‘s existing 
legitimacy, the FIS was nonetheless trying to redefine the boundaries of political 
action. By challenging the state‘s official or institutional Islam, and by using the 
mosque as the locus for political impetus, the Islamists sought to change the 
relationship between Algeria‘s governed and governors. 
 This could not be done by the FIS alone, however. Abassi and Belhadj needed to 
cooperate with the incumbent government and develop sympathies within the 
establishment if they were to effect this kind of change. And the details of how this 
was done offer great insights that show the FIS operating at the heart, rather than on 
the margins, of the political apparatus. They also show how the unity of this 
apparatus under Chadli was already extremely fragile, as the apparent manipulation 
and scheming reveal. Section 2 of Chapter III therefore examines some of the 
speculation surrounding the President‘s strategic decisions in an effort to learn more 
about his relationship with the FIS and thereby draw conclusions about how the party 
behaved politically.  
 In particular, this involves the controversy over the riots in October 1988, which 
led to a constitutional amendment authorising the formation of political parties. This 
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episode took place in a climate of deep suspicion, and there has been much 
speculation about who was behind it and why. Although I do not reach any definitive 
conclusion about this, I emphasise that Chadli was the ultimate beneficiary of the 
people‘s anger. The view that he played a role in encouraging the riots is supported 
by at least three facts: he had spoken of reforms long before October, but required 
fundamental structural change to bring these about; he made a speech just days 
before the outbreak of violence in which he appeared to provoke public dissent; and 
despite rumours that unrest was imminent, the security forces played a minimal role, 
at first, and then acted with brutality in suppressing the violence. Both their inaction 
and excessive use of force resulted in massive public anger. Because the internal 
opposition facing the President came from those who favoured a strong military, it is 
suggested that he benefited from the anger directed at the security forces in the 
aftermath of the repression. In line with other commentators, I therefore suggest it is 
most likely that Chadli was endeavouring to create the right conditions for the 
emergence of political opposition that would undermine his opponents within the 
FLN.  
 This analysis is consistent with what happened after Black October. I go on to 
show how the rise of the FIS was facilitated by Chadli‘s administration, with tacit 
cooperation on both sides. From the legalisation of the FIS—which the President 
could have refused on legal grounds—to the state‘s hands-off attitude towards the 
Islamists‘ successful operations (replacement of state services, political exploitation 
of mosques), it was clear that a strategic relationship quickly developed between the 
two parties. This tells us much about the extent to which the FIS was willing to 
engage in political manoeuvring, and is a crucial factor in my assessment of it as a 
balanced and moderate party. This is perhaps even clearer, however, from the 
behaviour of the party once the period of apparent cooperation ended. 
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 Section 3 examines the evolution of the FIS from March 1991 onwards. It was at 
this time that relations became more overtly hostile between the Islamists and 
Chadli‘s administration, as the parliament adopted new electoral laws that would 
penalise the FIS. The event that most clearly marked this hostility was the ‗general 
strike‘ called by Abassi on 23 May. The party‘s capacity for mobilisation was a 
crucial show of strength and allowed Abassi to reinforce his personal leadership. It 
also allowed him to generate new momentum in the run-up to the December 
elections. Most significantly in the context of this thesis, however, it proved the FIS‘ 
capacity for legal protest and respect for public order. Contrary to the assertions of 
some commentators, the demonstrations of June 1991 were not an attack on the state. 
My analysis highlights the FIS‘ cooperation with the authorities and relative 
passivity of its members, in stark contrast to the political bullying tactics of senior 
military officers and the aggression of the security forces. The reaction of the 
military to these demonstrations would appear to have portended its intervention in 
January 1992. Indeed, it continued to clamp down on the FIS even after the event; 
this culminated in the arrests of both Abassi and Belhadj. Similarly, the behaviour of 
the FIS at this time reflected its subsequent evolution towards legalism and 
moderation, as my analysis of post-1992 events clearly shows. 
 Despite the chaos that beset the Islamist movement in the aftermath of the coup, 
mainly due to the growth of radicalism in response to the perceived injustice, the FIS 
maintained a firm commitment to dialogue and compromise. It lost many of its 
members to the maquis, and several hundred of its political representatives were 
placed in detention camps in the south of the country. It would be incorrect to say 
that the party was able to operate coherently despite these losses; with its two historic 
leaders incarcerated, a clear direction was difficult to adopt. However, as the conflict 
continued, I show how it distanced itself from its most radical elements and engaged 
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in a process of attempted negotiations. With support from diverse segments of 
society (mainstream political parties, the ulama and the party‘s many voters), Abassi 
and Belhadj were able to meet with President Zeroual and other government 
representatives in a climate of potential reconciliation, but it would appear that the 
‗eradicators‘ within the regime yielded sufficient power to cut short these overtures. 
The same fate awaited the Sant‘Egidio platform, a document signed by all of 
Algeria‘s main political parties in 1995. The refusal by the regime of this proposal 
for a solution was, I suggest, the definitive rejection of the compromise and political 
respectability offered by the FIS. 
Chapter IV 
 It would appear that the regime‘s rejection of political Islam under the FIS formed 
part of a wider military campaign to eradicate this movement during the conflict. 
Chapter IV examines this campaign in an effort to show how it disfigured the 
original political opposition which so nearly came to power in December 1991. By 
looking at some of the claims made against the armed forces, we can appreciate the 
scale of the violence, and also understand why there is such widespread belief that 
the war was ‗dirty‘, i.e. not what it seemed. I hope to shed some light on the complex 
relationships between the different protagonists, and, given this complexity, I argue 
for a careful reading of the ‗facts‘. 
 The analysis of five cases dominates this chapter: two publications in which the 
regime is accused of orchestrating ‗Islamist‘ violence, one by a former officer, Habib 
Souaïdia, and one by a survivor of a 1997 massacre, Nesroulah Yous; the ‗Islamist‘ 
assassination in June 1992 of President Mohamed Boudiaf; a defamation trial, held in 
Paris, between Souaïdia and a senior Algerian General; and the interaction during the 
conflict between the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the state of 
33 
 
Algeria. The diverse evidence this analysis throws up is largely damning: it suggests 
total disregard for human life in a war where military leaders plotted to pass off their 
own crimes as those of the Islamist resistance in an effort to discredit this movement 
generally and remain in power. This implies complete disdain on the part of the state 
for its obligations under international law. 
 Souaïdia‘s account of the conflict is particularly useful as it provides inside 
knowledge of the military apparatus. He describes systemic hostility to the Islamist 
movement, encouraged and even demanded by senior officers. This, he says, even 
extended to Islam itself, as those in the armed forces who openly practiced their faith 
were treated with increasing suspicion. He also suggests that the war was very much 
planned—that recruitment and deployment were accelerated well ahead of the 
January 1992 intervention. This reinforces my analysis in Chapter III, where we see 
how the repression of June 1991 was a foreboding sign of things to come. Most 
crucially, however, Souaïdia provides one of the most credible testimonies about the 
military role in propagating and orchestrating the violence. He offers numerous 
examples of extra-judicial killings, torture, and staged ‗Islamist‘ attacks that he says 
were in fact the work of officers disguised as resistance fighters, or ‗terrorists‘. 
Although shocking, this allegation is consistent with the other evidence examined in 
this chapter. My endeavour is not simply to display this evidence, but to explain why 
it is credible in respect of my overall thesis, i.e., that a legitimate and democratic 
force capable of renewing Algeria‘s vitality was first denied access to the political 
stage, and then discredited in the long term by contrived association with mindless 
violence. 
 Taken alone, Souaïdia‘s claims might be difficult to accept unconditionally, but 
reports of state-sanctioned violence in the 1990s are so numerous as to be 
overwhelming. I have spoken of the discredit that the regime sought to inflict upon 
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its enemies; this makes it clear that legitimacy was the ultimate prize in this conflict. 
And there is no better example of this than the illegitimate establishment of a High 
State Committee (Haut comité d‟Etat – HCE) under Mohamed Boudiaf in January 
1992, and the President‘s assassination just a few months later. Widely seen as a 
putsch, the cancellation of the second round of elections badly damaged the regime‘s 
image, and it was therefore necessary to give the new government some degree of 
legitimacy. An attempt was made to do this by bringing in a man of unquestioned 
historic legitimacy due to his role in the revolution of 1954. Whether this was 
successful in the eyes of the people is hard to ascertain, but what is certain is that in 
office Boudiaf behaved in a way that did anything but reinforce the legitimacy of his 
sponsors. His attacks on corruption emphasised the hollow authority of those who 
had denied the electorate its choice, and it would appear that his assassination came 
from the very people who had encouraged him to return to political life. The killing 
was carried out by an officer from Boudiaf‘s security cortège who had allegedly 
acted on behalf of the Islamist resistance. The evidence, however, suggests that the 
decision was made internally. The complexity of the search for legitimacy is well 
illustrated in this case: legitimacy was the motivation of the regime in using a 
recognised revolutionary; legitimacy is what motivated the President in his attempts 
to root out corruption; and the legitimacy of the repression was the goal behind the 
staged ‗Islamist‘ killing. 
 The case of the massacre in the village of Bentalha, south of Algiers, is a grim 
reminder of the brutality of the conflict. And if Nesroulah Yous‘ testimony is to be 
accepted, then it is also an indication of the lengths to which the regime was prepared 
to go in its efforts to secure its militaristic monopoly on political power. This 
publication proved to be a particularly fruitful resource, as it led me to a wide range 
of related material, Bentalha being one of the most infamous massacres to have taken 
35 
 
place during the war. The publicity it generated was reflected in the subsequent 
journalistic investigations carried out by two French philosophers, Bernard-Henri 
Lévy and André Glucksmann,
9
 as well as the attention given to an award-winning 
press photograph often referred to as La pietà de Bentalha for its Madonna-like 
portrayal of one of the survivors.
10
  
 Yous establishes a solid foundation for his central allegation that the armed forces 
were at least complicit in, if not directly responsible for, the attack. This relies on his 
personal experience on the night in question (things overheard or observed, second-
hand testimony) but also on indisputable fact, such as the authorities‘ failure to 
intervene despite a heavy military presence in the immediate vicinity. I provide 
details of these, with additional information from other sources where possible, 
including an explanation by one senior General as to why the armed forces failed to 
protect their citizens. My aim is not simply to relay to readers the case being made 
against the regime, however; I wanted to ask what makes these claims credible. What 
can the testimonies of people like Souaïdia and Yous tell us about the complex 
relationship between the protagonists? How is it conceivable that the authorities, 
even if we accept the thesis that they wanted to discredit the Islamist movement, 
could have butchered their own civilians in cold blood? The answer may be that 
large sections of the population, as is so often the case in civil strife, were caught in 
between the two sides of the conflict: no longer supporters of the wayward Islamist 
movement, which had betrayed its political beginnings in favour of radicalism, and 
inherently mistrustful of the state that had let them down for so long, they could look 
to neither protagonist for protection and their lives were devalued as a result.  
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 The next segment of this chapter relates to the defamation trial between General 
Khaled Nezzar, former Minister for Defence, and Habib Souaïdia. In the interest of 
balanced analysis, I used this trial in order to consider what factors, if any, might 
attenuate the credibility of the claims made against the regime. The General‘s own 
account of events is one potential source. I examine the methods he employs to refute 
some of the wider claims made against the military, but the result is unconvincing. 
There is very little substantive evidence provided by Nezzar that would undermine 
these claims. However, I address one point of his in particular. He accuses a broad 
network of writers, journalists, commentators and other interested parties of blindly 
propagating the thesis that the army was behind all the violence. I look at one such 
example to see if there is any real cause for concern about how this thesis is 
constructed and presented. The case of François Gèze, director of the publishing 
house, La Découverte, is a good illustration of the potential pitfalls of analysis of 
recent events in Algeria. The uncertainty surrounding the conflict is largely due to 
the regime‘s resolute refusal to allow an international inquiry; as such, it raises 
suspicion in itself. However, perhaps this does not justify the kind of aggressive 
editorial approach adopted by Gèze, who has himself contributed to some of the La 
Découverte publications that attack the regime. Indeed, his role as a prominent figure 
in the network of French and Algerian intellectuals who denounce the military may 
be seen as incompatible with his position as editor. This is ultimately a minor point, 
however, and one that can hardly be used to refute the evidence of massive abuse on 
the part of the Algerian authorities. While it serves as a reminder of the need for 
careful analysis, it in no way detracts from the central point of this chapter: that the 
initial rejection of the FIS on the political stage degenerated into a brutal and 
concerted plot to rid Algerian politics of any serious challenge to the military 
hegemony over state governance in the long term. 
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 That the authorities‘ conduct can be questioned is made clear in the final section 
of this chapter, which focuses on the relationship between the Algerian state and the 
UN. Specifically, I examine the state‘s report to the UN Human Rights Committee 
and the Committee‘s subsequent responses. This analysis shows that at the very least, 
the state‘s obligations under international law appear not to have been met. It 
remains uncertain whether it was responsible for deliberately propagating or actually 
committing the atrocities, but the unusually harsh language of the Committee‘s 
concluding observations is an indication of its failure to rebut the claims made 
against it. 
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Chapter I: Nation-Building, Politics, 
Religion and the FIS 
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Chaîne prestigieuse où les 
générations ont soudé, bout à bout, 
leurs efforts et leurs contradictions et 
le résultat de tout cela : le progrès 
incessant ! – Malek Bennabi1 
 
Section 1 – Theories of nation-building and post-independence 
Algeria 
 This section takes the work of Anthony Smith and applies certain elements of his 
theories of nation-building to the case of Algeria. It then assesses the challenges of 
this nation-building process in the aftermath of colonial occupation. The state of 
Algeria today can better be understood in terms of nation-building than through the 
postcolonial framework alone, although the field of postcolonial studies does 
incorporate analysis of the nation.
2
 By ‗postcolonial framework‘, I mean an 
analytical perspective that assesses Algeria primarily as a former colony. My 
approach, by contrast, is to consider the colonial dimension as just one of the 
elements that have shaped modern Algeria. National identity is a concept that is not 
tied to one particular event in history: it may be fed more by certain key events 
(revolution or war, for example, and of course colonisation) than by others, but its 
reach extends as far back as possible into an identifiable past, for a shared identity is 
all the more credible when built up over a long period. However, a postcolonial 
analysis of contemporary politics, while it inevitably deals with the problem of 
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nation-building, necessarily attaches singular importance to the occupation of one 
land by an external power at a given time. The problem here is one of objectivity and 
credibility: for Western analysts to take European intervention (colonisation) as the 
pivotal moment in understanding the former colonies is clearly problematic, as it 
places the West at the centre of an endeavour to learn more about the non-West. This 
is not to say that postcolonial studies as a discipline is ethnocentric: many 
postcolonial critics have themselves highlighted the danger of over-emphasising the 
centrality of Western intervention in the postcolonial world. Nicholas Harrison, for 
example, asks ‗whether a ―postcolonial‖ perspective on colonialism and the ―colonial 
era‖ is liable [...] to be drawn into and reinforce the globalizing, self-mythologizing 
and ethnocentric tendencies of colonialism itself‘.3 And the discipline as a whole, 
with its ‗post-‘ prefix, might be identified as a critical stance that subverts or rejects 
colonialism and the ongoing manifestations of it in the form of neo-colonialism.
4
 
 Although it is impossible for a European scholar to completely avoid a 
Eurocentric perspective, my approach throughout this thesis is to remain open to 
non-European realities, i.e., those that led to the election of the FIS in the 1990s, in 
an effort to challenge some of the assumptions about the boundaries of politics. This, 
too, is why I wish to emphasise the importance of avoiding an exclusively modernist 
reading of nationalism, which explains my decision to focus on Smith, who as we 
will see insists on a wider perspective. 
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Section 1.1 – Smith and the nation 
 Smith‘s view of the nation is quite similar to that of several other theorists in that 
he identifies modern phenomena as being central to what a nation is.
5
 However, he 
identifies both modern phenomena and pre-modern influences in today‘s nationalist 
movements. First, let us consider his definition of the nation: ‗a named human 
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a 
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all 
members‘.6 One notices here that race, religion and language play no explicit role in 
Smith‘s nation. Indeed, there is nothing innate about nationhood in this definition; in 
other words, one must work towards establishing a nation. To have ‗an historic 
territory‘, Smith says, one must have occupied a given space where there has been 
mutual benefit for the land itself and for the people who used its resources and cared 
for it.
7
 The physical spaces shared by this population (mountains, lakes, rivers, etc.) 
then take on a symbolic importance that feeds into the ‗common myths and historical 
memories‘, which once again suggest that the nation is a construct of the people: 
Smith does not speak of a shared past to which one simply belongs, but of human 
expressions of such a past—a conscious or unconscious interpretation and 
propagation of certain episodes in the public mindset. Similarly, ‗a mass, public 
culture‘ is not something that can exist without direct intervention from a human 
population; unlike, say, racial or linguistic features, it must be provided or 
constructed. This, Smith says, is best achieved by the organs of media and education, 
which serve to include the masses in the process of nation-building:  
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[N]ations must have a measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of 
common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the population 
together in their homeland. The task of ensuring a common public, mass culture has 
been handed over to the agencies of popular socialization, notably the public system of 
education and the mass media. In the Western model of national identity nations were 
seen as culture communities, whose members were united, if not made homogenous, by 
common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions.
8
 
The final features of Smith‘s nation are a common economy and equality before the 
law, which, while examples may be found in pre-modern times, are phenomena that 
have taken on widespread significance since such defining moments in the modern 
era as the French Revolution. They are also, of course, constructs of human 
endeavour and not innate qualities. 
Minimally modernist: under-emphasising the role of the state 
 Smith describes his definition as ‗admittedly quite modernist‘.9 The reason he 
feels he has to concede such a point is that he carefully distinguishes himself from 
the ‗modernists‘ in the field. Smith identifies four schools, or branches, of nationalist 
theory: primordialism, perennialism, modernism and—his own branch—historical 
ethno-symbolism.
10
 The first two may be placed alongside one another as they both 
tend to be represented by actual nationalists, as opposed to theorists of nationalism. 
Primordialism sees the nation as a natural entity that has inherent qualities to justify 
its existence, even where it is dormant or forgotten. Perennialism, while similar in 
that it views nations as having existed for a very long time, does not necessarily see 
them as existing innately. Modernism, which Smith takes particular care to critique, 
considers the nation as a wholly modern construct and seeks to understand it 
uniquely in terms of modern events, such as the French Revolution, or modern 
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phenomena, such as global capitalism. For Smith, this approach is overly 
deterministic, as it sees nationalism as a function of political life, in other words as 
something that has been constructed by a small and powerful few, rather than as a 
phenomenon that can be traced back to pre-modern times. He argues that this 
approach avoids the challenging work of in-depth historical investigation and 
‗preclud[es] any understanding of the popular roots and widespread appeal of 
nationalism‘.11 We will see the relevance of this critique in later analysis of 
nationalism in Algeria, where the political elite can be seen to have appropriated 
long-standing popular nationalist sentiment; it was this in large part that fuelled the 
strength of the opposition Islamist movement. By contrast with a modernist reading 
of nationalism, Smith invokes ‗historical ethno-symbolism‘ in an effort to understand 
more about nationalism‘s roots in the past: ‗what gives nationalism its power are the 
myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a 
popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern 
nationalist intelligentsias‘.12  
 Smith thereby places ethnicity not at the heart of nationhood, but at the heart of 
nationalism or nation-building: he argues that while a nation need only have the 
characteristics outlined in his definition above, nationalism as a movement or 
ideology is about mobilising shared ethnicity to create a sense of unity. I suppose this 
to mean that a nation can exist without nationalism, but perhaps not in a modern 
understanding of the nation. The modern nation is less about shared characteristics 
per se than it is about officially recognising these characteristics as belonging to a 
distinct unit, naming that unit and defining its borders, i.e. defining what is not part 
of it. One might say that while the spirit of a nation comes from mobilising shared 
                                                     
11
 Ibid, p. 9. 
12
 Ibid. 
44 
 
ethnicity, its status comes from officialdom. Smith refers to the nation as a ‗sense of 
belonging‘, distinguishing between it and the state as follows: ‗the modern state 
refers to a set of autonomous and abstract institutions within a given territory; the 
modern nation refers to a sense of historic community associated with a unique 
―homeland‖‘.13 This distinction is important in the context of Algeria, where 
Islamism challenged the officialdom (and bankruptcy) of state nationalism and tried 
to replace it with something more perennial and popular, something that relied on 
more than the FLN‘s historic role alone. It is useful to understand this distinction in 
terms of state vs. nation. When defined by Smith, the nation is an entity that requires 
a great deal of work and does not exist independently of our intervention. It requires 
concerted effort by large numbers of people, as well as formal authority to generate a 
recognisable unit. This raises the question of what precedes the nation: in other 
words, what does one call a nation before it has established a symbolic relationship 
with its physical homeland, before it has developed common myths in the mindset of 
its population, and before it has a recognisable public culture and common economic 
and judicial experiences for all? The answer may be a state. In other words, the state, 
comprising of organs of government and a judiciary, represents the official and 
political entity—the country, to use a rather more vague term. This entity has a 
recognised status internationally,
14
 but it cannot immediately claim to represent 
national unity; this, as we shall see in Section 1.2, requires some hard work. Indeed, 
there is often express confrontation between state and nation, as one commentator 
has remarked: ‗some of the most important sources of regional and international 
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instability clearly are rooted in contending national and ethnic claims and the failure 
of the state to capture the loyalties of its citizens‘.15 
 Many analysts argue that the state precedes the nation,
16
 but Smith offers a crucial 
nuance to this view. He recognises the role of the state in allowing for the growth of 
national sentiments in the modern era, but asserts that ethnicity has been a powerful 
force for a long time and actually contributes to the emergence of the state:  
The state was certainly a necessary condition for the formation of the national loyalties 
we recognize today. However, its operations in turn owed much to earlier assumptions 
about kingdoms and peoples, and to the presence of core ethnic communities around 
which these states were built up. […] We are not here talking about actual descent, 
much less about ‗race‘, but about the sense of ancestry and identity that people possess. 
Hence the importance of myths and memories, symbols and values, embodied in 
customs and traditions and in artistic styles, legal codes and institutions. […] These 
ethnies in turn facilitated the development of homogenizing states […] to form the 
relatively novel concept of the nation.
17
 
In the context of Algeria, this view is essential if we are to understand the strength of 
the Islamist movement. The independent state under the FLN (and the fight for 
liberation under the ALN) provided the impetus for a kind of formalisation of the 
‗national loyalties‘ to which Smith and Barnett refer. However, the success of these 
loyalties depended on much more than state-sanctioned (modern) nationalism; it was 
the result of centuries of consolidation of that which the people felt defined them. 
And when this complex construct was limited to a tool that served to safeguard the 
legitimacy of the state, i.e., the ALN/FLN, then nationalist voices began to contest 
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this monopoly. Some of these were present from the outset, such as Hocine Aït-
Ahmed‘s Front des forces socialistes (FFS), and did not voice their opposition in 
explicitly religious terms, but it was of course from the Islamists that the greatest 
challenge emerged. By tapping into the ‗myths and memories, symbols and values‘ 
that had been activated in earlier movements such as Abdelhamid Ben Badis‘ Islamic 
reformism, the Islamists sought to motivate the country‘s core ethnie in an effort to 
challenge the FLN‘s monopoly on nationalist sentiment.18 
Vertical and lateral ethnies 
 The key to understanding Smith‘s depiction of ethnicity can be found in his 
distinction between historically lateral and vertical ethnic communities, where he 
expands on the role played by ethnicity in nation-building by identifying these two 
types of ethnie.
19
 The former refers to groups that were normally composed of 
aristocracy and higher clergy. While their members were confined to the upper strata 
of society and tended to conquer and hold power, they nonetheless mixed with the 
native inhabitants, even adopted their language and customs, and were 
geographically dispersed. The important point is that despite this cultural porousness, 
they retained their elitist sense of community and myths of descent, thereby 
remaining unified even within the culturally foreign societies they chose to conquer. 
Smith cites the Normans as an example of a lateral ethnie. Vertical ethnies, on the 
other hand, were more popular and compact. Their shared ethnicity spread out to all 
social strata and classes, and social divisions that did exist were not marked by 
cultural difference; in other words, the members of this group were united around a 
common heritage. Smith cites the Irish as an example of a vertical ethnie. These 
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‗demotic‘ groups share a religion-based ‗fund‘ of cultural myths, symbols, memories 
and values that is transmitted from generation to generation, across the territory 
occupied by the community, and, perhaps most importantly, ‗down the social 
scale‘.20 Organised religion is therefore the vector of traditions and social bonds 
within vertical ethnies. However, while vertical communities enjoy unity through 
religio-ethnicity, it can be hard for them to form nations, as many of their members 
assume they are already and always have been a nation on the basis of their shared 
divine heritage.
21
 Smith takes the examples of the Arabs and the Jews, both of whom 
are attached to an original homeland and have a sense of ethnic solidarity. However, 
both have also faced geographic dispersion, which runs counter to the compactness 
of the modern nation. In the case of the Arabs, colonialism has also served to 
reinforce historical differences within the Arab world, producing a great diversity of 
state institutions, economic patterns and cultural influences. This goes some way to 
explaining the failure of pan-Arabist politics from the 1950s onwards.
22
 Also, in the 
context of this thesis, it offers an explanation as to why the dominant form of 
Algerian Islamism that ultimately emerged under the FIS was primarily nationalist 
(Djaz‘ara) and not pan-Arabist (Salafist), as we will see in Chapter III. However, the 
key point for now (in the context of Algerian nation-building) is that impetus was 
required to make a more active shift towards nationhood. The theory of Smith‘s 
‗lateral‘ and ‗vertical‘ ethnies makes this clear, and I would like to develop it in 
application to Algeria, where there is evidence of both lateral and vertical ethnicity.  
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 For Smith, these two ethnic types represent the two different paths by which a 
nation is formed. The ‗lateral‘ path is state-driven; this means that the state 
(represented by the ‗original‘ members of the ethnie, i.e., the aristocrats) was the 
main agency behind the incorporation of the other social strata into the dominant 
heritage: ‗Through its military, administrative, fiscal and judicial apparatus [the 
state] was able to regulate and disseminate the fund of values, symbols, myths, 
traditions and memories that formed the cultural heritage of the dominant aristocratic 
ethnic core‘.23 Smith calls this ‗bureaucratic incorporation‘. The vertical ethnie, on 
the other hand, is one where a religio-ethnic core dominates any expression of 
national identity. While Smith‘s ‗lateral‘ path is forged by the elite holders of power 
who represent the state, the ‗vertical‘ path to nation-building is the domain of the 
intelligentsia. He explains that vertical ethnies were traditionally dominated by 
divine authority, which in turn meant that the human figures closest to this authority 
were members of the clergy. Such a power structure implied less political activism, 
whereby the people felt ‗chosen‘ as part of a higher plan and therefore did not feel 
the need to formalise their sense of identity.
24
 What he suggests in the context of 
modern nation-building is that this ‗quietist‘ existence must be transformed into a 
more active expression of national identity: ‗[T]he moment the question arises of 
transforming the community into a nation it is far more difficult to break out of the 
habitual conceptual ethnic framework and its lifestyle. Moreover, there is no internal 
coercive agency, no bureaucratic state, to shatter the mould‘.25 Therefore, while the 
‗lateral‘ communities have a ‗coercive agency‘ in the form of a bureaucratic state to 
pull them towards nationhood, the ‗vertical‘ communities require impetus from 
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another group: if the state organs do not provide this impetus, and nor do the 
members of the clergy, then it falls to the intelligentsia.  
FIS as agent in nationalism 
 Smith outlines the role of the intelligentsia as he sees it. It is a role that is not 
without tension and subtlety: because of the need for a shift from passive acceptance 
of a religio-ethnic identity to active assertion of one‘s identity in the modern world, 
the intelligentsia must to some extent come into conflict with the historical bearers of 
tradition—the clergy. For this reason, Smith refers to a ‗secularising intelligentsia‘, 
i.e., one that bridges the gap between the divine and the profane by encouraging the 
people to embrace and contribute to their national identity. However, this mission is 
not about a rejection of the past in favour of modern processes; rather it is about 
uniting the two in recognition of the force of historical ethnic bonds, and also of the 
inevitability of modernisation and rationalisation.  
These redefinitions should not be seen simply as inventions or constructs of 
intellectuals. Rather they are attempts to marry an understanding of Western processes 
of forming nations with a programme of rediscovering an ethnic past or pasts that will 
elevate the people and their vernacular culture to centre stage, often in place of (or 
reinterpreting) the old religious traditions. Instead of being merely a chosen vessel of 
religious salvation and passive recipient of divine ordinance, the ‗people‘ now become 
the source of salvation and the saints and sages of old become manifestations of the 
people‘s national genius.26 
 The key point here is that intelligentsia-driven nationalism is neither fully 
primordialist nor fully modernist: the agents of the movement are to a certain extent 
making nationalism a function of political life—they are using shared ethnicity as an 
instrument to push the people towards a modern conceptualisation of national 
identity—but they are also drawing on, and not replacing, a collective past that 
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makes it possible to conceive of a nation in the first place. In short, Smith‘s vision of 
‗vertical‘, or ethnic, nationalism in the modern era is one that accommodates both 
pre-modern ethnicity and modern politicking. He says of these intelligentsia: 
[They] did not ‗invent‘ a nation where none existed; they went back to the elements of 
an older ethnic culture and gave them a new social and political meaning, forging the 
lineaments of a political nation out of older demotic ethnies, by rediscovery and 
selective appropriation of popular myths, symbols, values, memories and traditions.
27
 
 Smith‘s distinction between lateral and vertical ethnies is useful, as it provides 
two clear nation-types to which we can relate and which we can recognise in various 
cases throughout the world. However, it might also be useful to consider examples 
where these two models are in conflict—or even complement one another. Algeria, 
along with many other postcolonial states, is a case in point. The ‗lateral‘ structure of 
bureaucratic incorporation described by Smith is easily recognisable in colonial 
Algeria, where a conquering elite maintained its cultural unity despite living among a 
very foreign people. It is also clear that the ethnicity of the French occupier did not 
filter ‗down the social scale‘, and that the colonial ‗nation‘ of Algeria was very much 
state-driven, i.e., driven by the colonial administration. This is not to say that this 
path to nation-building was as successful as in the more classic lateral ethnies; the 
state in metropolitan France, for example, managed to generate much greater unity 
than it ever could in Algeria. One explanation for this failure is of course the natural 
enmity that characterises foreign occupation, but it is perhaps also because Algeria is 
a perfect example of a vertical ethnie, where the organised religion of Islam could 
not easily be supplanted as the vector of national sentiment. Following Smith‘s 
analysis, then, it would fall to the intelligentsia (and not the state) in Algeria, in 
cooperation with a mobilised population, to build on a shared identity based 
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primarily on the country‘s Islamic heritage. This reflects the role played by the 
liberation fighters in the 1954–62 war, as well as that of the Islamist movement in the 
1980s and 1990s. In both cases, the active participation of the people was enlisted in 
an effort to define national identity in terms of Islam and in opposition to foreign 
influence and an increasingly illegitimate state. As I will show in Section 2 of this 
chapter, we can trace the origins of this impetus back to colonial Algeria, when 
nationalism became bound up in Islamic reformism under leaders like Ben Badis. It 
was Islamic thinkers and activists who first provided the impetus that would allow 
Algeria‘s ‗demotic‘ religion-based heritage to be expressed in the context of modern 
nationhood. This was then taken up by the nationalist leaders of the liberation war, 
but, crucially, was co-opted by the state once independence had been secured.
28
 The 
role of the latter-day Islamists, therefore, was to challenge this co-optation; it was, as 
Smith might put it, to ‗give a new social and political meaning‘ to something older, 
thereby ‗forging the lineaments of a political nation‘. More specifically, Smith‘s 
analysis reflects the role of the dominant Djaz‘ara in the FIS, who were mostly 
educated men from Arabophone backgrounds with natural hostility towards the 
mostly Francophone bureaucratic and military leaders who dominated the FLN 
state.
29
 They represented the new intelligentsia: they were the nation‘s ‗counter-
elites‘.30 As I will show in Chapter III, it was these men, more than their Salafist 
counterparts, who emphasised the Algerian (nationalist) specificity of their Islamic 
solution.  
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 We have seen that Smith rejects a reading of nationalism that identifies only 
modern causes, and I agree with this assessment inasmuch as the FIS‘ role was to 
transcend the postcolonial politicking of the FLN in favour of something more 
profound—perhaps the ‗vertical‘ ethnicity that truly defined Algerian nationhood. 
However, the fact remains that it was the FLN that defined this nationhood, at least 
from 1962 until 1989, when multi-party politics changed public expressions of 
nationalism. In respect of this, it is necessary to examine the climate in which the 
FLN first developed. In terms of nation-building, many challenges and tensions 
accompany the end of colonisation. These realities are, of course, not localised to 
Algeria or the colonies of the French empire; they are an evident legacy of the 
colonial era worldwide. A look at the work of theorists who have focused on the 
period following independence reveals some of the assessments one can make about 
the particular impact of colonisation on post-independence nation-building. 
Section 1.2 – Post-independence nation-building 
Inadequacy of economic analysis 
 Immanuel Wallerstein, an early theorist in postcolonial studies,
31
 explored some 
of the issues dealt with by Smith. He too sought to understand more about identity 
and expressions thereof, but adopted what Smith might critically have referred to as a 
modernist approach. For Wallerstein, identity is expressed in terms of race, nation or 
ethnicity, which, he says, usually implies an interpretation of identity on genetic, 
                                                     
31
 Aijaz Ahmad has remarked that, although not considered a postcolonial critic as such, Wallerstein 
was one of many theorists to focus on the dynamics of political rule in newly independent nations 
around the time when decolonisation and the end of official imperial rule had become inevitable. 
Ahmad suggests that the contribution to the field of postcolonial studies by theorists like Wallerstein 
has been neglected in later years as postcolonial theory has turned to questions of a more literary and 
philosophical nature. See: Aijaz Ahmad, ‗The Politics of Literary Post-coloniality‘, in Padmini 
Mongia (ed.), Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader (London: Arnold, 1996), pp. 276–93, p. 
280.  
53 
 
socio-political or cultural grounds.
32
 However, he suggests that these are instruments 
in the hands of modern politicians, who use them to ‗invent pastness‘ as a 
justification for maintaining or altering today‘s identity-based demarcations. Indeed, 
he even suggests that because the past is pliant when used as a political tool, ‗it 
makes little difference whether we define pastness in terms of genetically continuous 
groups (races), historical socio-political groups (nations), or cultural groups (ethnic 
groups). They are all peoplehood constructs, all inventions of pastness, all 
contemporary political phenomena‘.33 Wallerstein goes further to say that not only 
are these identity markers all traits of modernity, but that they can be explained by 
just one, albeit crucial, feature of the modern era—‗the historical structure of the 
capitalist world economy‘.34 He proceeds to provide an explanation as to why all of 
these elements have developed as the expressions of ‗peoplehood‘ today. On race, he 
argues that the axial division of labour into a core (locus of economic expansion) and 
a periphery (locus of primary production), a process that accompanied ‗the expansion 
of a Europe-centered capitalist world economy‘, made for a ‗spatial differentiation‘ 
that reinforced racial categories. In other words, the relative homogeneity of the 
genetic variants that existed at the time when this capitalist expansion began was 
maintained by the concentration in given spaces of the agents of either core or 
peripheral production: ‗Race, and therefore racism, is the expression, the promoter, 
and the consequence of the geographical concentrations associated with the axial 
division of labor‘.35 On socio-political belonging, Wallerstein again finds the answer 
in the capitalist world order, although this time in one of its more political 
manifestations—‗the interstate system‘. He says there are two reasons for the shift 
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towards nationhood among sovereign states: one is that a state requires cohesion in 
order to ward off threats of disintegration both from within and without; the other is 
that the interstate system is actually an arena for expressions of power and, although 
quite stable, offers the possibility for nations to climb up through the ranks:  
Inequalities that are significant and firm but not immutable are precisely the kind of 
processes that lead to ideologies able to justify high rank but also to challenge low rank. 
Such ideologies we call nationalisms. For a state not to be a nation is for that state to be 
outside the game of either resisting or promoting the alteration of its rank.
36
 
 Finally, on ethnicity, Wallerstein also traces the development of ethnic groups to 
the capitalist structures at work in the world. He argues that the broad division of 
labour into a hierarchy where some workers lose a larger proportion of the surplus-
value they generate than others has meant that people of similar labour backgrounds 
(or ‗household structures‘—proletarianized or semi-proletarianized)37 have tended to 
form communities (or ethnic groups) that behave differently to those around them. 
This process, Wallerstein argues, is inherently advantageous to the capitalist system 
as it makes the people themselves agents in the inequality associated with capitalism:  
Different kinds of relations of production, we may assume, require different kinds of 
normal behavior by the workforce. Since this behavior is not in fact genetically 
determined, it must be taught. Work forces need to be socialized into reasonably 
specific sets of attitudes. The ―culture‖ of an ethnic group is precisely the set of rules 
into which parents belonging to that ethnic group are pressurized to socialize their 
children. The state or the school system can do this of course. But they usually seek to 
avoid performing this particularistic function alone or too overtly, since it violates the 
concept of ―national‖ equality for them to do so. […] This therefore provides a 
legitimation to the hierarchical reality of capitalism that does not offend the formal 
equality before the law that is one of its avowed political premises. […] Ethnicization, 
or peoplehood, resolves one of the basic contradictions of historical capitalism—its 
simultaneous thrust for theoretical equality and practical inequality.
38
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 Wallerstein‘s view is crucially flawed. His Marxist analysis, which links national 
identity—whether expressed via racial, socio-cultural or ethnical belonging—solely 
to politico-economic factors, is limited to an exclusively modern reading of 
nationhood. In the context of this thesis, at any rate, it tells us nothing about the 
strength of an Islamist movement that deliberately tapped into something more 
transcendent than the—albeit very real—consequences of global capitalism. The 
thrust of Smith‘s ‗vertical‘ ethnie is that its defining characteristic trumps economic 
circumstance: spirituality that is shared ‗down the social scale‘. Indeed, this is clear 
from the socially heterogeneous members of the FIS, who represented various 
segments of society, from the urban poor to university students to educated 
professionals.
39
 However, if used only in application to the nation as a modern 
phenomenon, Wallerstein‘s work is very insightful. Working during the period which 
saw so many countries reach independence in the former colonial world, he 
identified the difficulties for newly independent states in making the transition from 
political and economic dependence. We must be aware of these difficulties if we are 
to appreciate the mitigated success of the FLN state, and the corollary success of the 
FIS in opposing it. 
Teething problems 
 Wallerstein made it clear that the political construct of a newly independent state 
was necessarily tied to its colonial past. He argued that a young government is above 
all concerned with ensuring stability and loyalty: ‗Unless the power is effectively 
exercised by a central agency, and unless the rules of the power game are generally 
accepted by all the competitors, disintegration and secession become not merely 
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possible but probable‘.40 Strong, centralised power, then, is needed to counter the 
inevitable rise in demands for the protection of private or regional interests. Under 
colonial occupation, and more particularly in times of nationalist resistance, such 
interests are effectively subordinated to the unity of the people through the common 
goal of independence, but when the loyalty of the people is later sought by a 
government and a state whose unity and legitimacy are not vouchsafed by centuries 
of tradition, it can be hard for wealthier or more influential sections of society to see 
the benefits of interdependence and cooperation with those who belong to different 
religious, ethnic or racial groups. This explains (although it does not necessarily 
justify) why many states adopt single-party systems or even military regimes in the 
early years after independence: opposition groups undermine authority and act as a 
destructive force in a fledgling entity. In the case of Algeria, where the FLN, with 
close support from the military, was the country‘s sole political party until social 
unrest in 1988 forced it to accept political pluralism, the development of opposition 
groups did indeed lead to instability, posing the most manifest of all threats to 
national unity—civil war. This of course is not to say that political opposition is to be 
silenced in the interest of the nation; indeed, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 
IV, the Algerian political elite and its indissociable military backers stand accused of 
hijacking the growth of legitimate opposition to the detriment of the nation. For now 
however, the point is that unlike in long-established democracies (where opposition 
is usually mounted against an incumbent government and not against the foundations 
of the state itself), newly-created states are particularly vulnerable to charges that the 
founding fathers, i.e., the country‘s first government, do not represent the people‘s 
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best interests. And consequently, in the FLN state, if such opposition had been 
successful, secession may have followed.  
 The tactics that a government can employ to combat this precariousness—and this 
is the second element of the above citation by Wallerstein, i.e., ensuring the ‗rules of 
the power game‘ are accepted by all—are diverse and may appear heavy-handed. 
The concentration of power in Algeria in the aftermath of independence is an 
illustration of this. The country‘s first Prime Minister, Ahmed Ben Bella, quickly 
acted to establish a presidential regime and occupied all three of the country‘s 
positions of power—President, Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces.
41
 Wallerstein explains that once central power has been firmly 
established, as for example under a single-party system or military regime, or a 
combination of the two, the electorate and its divergent interests must then be made 
loyal to the emerging state.
42
 He identifies several elements that must be reunited in 
order for this to take place. The state must be seen to function as an economic 
network, which requires incentives for internal trade and penalties for those whose 
economic activities tend towards the disintegration of the state. An emphasis on the 
state‘s shared traditions and history is another key element to the unity of an 
emerging nation and the public‘s perception of its legitimacy (this is state-sanctioned 
nationalism at work). Another way to create a bond between the state and its people 
is the use of public relations (some may prefer to speak of propaganda). All of these 
methods were employed to some extent by the state under Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–
65). In the absence of an established private bourgeoisie, the state felt it necessary to 
dominate all economic development, via mass nationalisation and the much-vaunted 
autogestion, a system whereby factories and farms that had been left without 
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managerial structures by the departure of the colons were self-managed by Algerian 
workers.
43
 In terms of creating a sense of historic legitimacy, it is clear that the FLN 
established itself on a mandate as liberator of the people, as examples from any state 
documents show. Finally, in terms of public relations, the Algerian state in its early 
years ensured tight control over all means of public communication, dominating the 
written press, radio, television, and publishing houses.
44
 In short, out of fear of 
disunity and in its quest for legitimacy, this state was omnipresent and all-
encompassing:  
[D]epuis 1962 [l‘Etat] devient à la fois « l‘Etat-gendarme » dépositaire du monopole de 
la force et de la contrainte et dont la finalité est d‘assurer la reproduction la moins 
conflictuelle possible des rapports sociaux, « l‘Etat-providence » (le Welfare State) qui 
prétend assurer la cohésion sociale par la réduction des inégalités et des tensions, 
« l‘Etat-patron », qui, outre son engagement maximal dans la sphère politique, sociale et 
culturelle, s‘approprie les principaux moyens de production et joue un rôle décisif dans 
le processus d‘accumulation du capital.45 
 What is important in this phase of newly-acquired independence is that the public 
be reminded that the new authorities are not an abstract and remote force, but that 
they have a real impact on the daily lives of each and every citizen. Perhaps one of 
the greatest measures of national unity is the extent to which there is a perceptible 
desire among citizens to see the laws of the land respected. This is not merely about 
individuals obeying regulations, for sufficiently draconian punishments can quite 
easily induce fear of state reprisal; it is about reinforcing the state‘s authority and 
legitimacy in order for the rules to be respected for their own sake, rather than for 
fear of the consequences of one‘s failure to respect them. This distinction requires 
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the public to identify with the state—a challenging reversal of the natural position of 
enmity that characterises colonial occupation.  
Self-determination: state or nation? 
 Having looked at some of the teething problems encountered by a state emerging 
from colonial occupation, let us now take one step further back to the moment of 
decolonisation itself and the task incumbent upon a soon-to-be independent state—
self-determination. This legal term refers to a political right that is provided 
universally by international law: ‗all peoples have the right [to] freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development‘.46 
It is therefore about determining policies, essentially bestowing upon states the right 
to run their own affairs. But it also implies another problem: that of determining the 
self. In other words, to which ‗people‘ does this right extend? It is evident that the 
task of running a state‘s affairs is difficult enough in itself, but one must first agree 
upon the cultural, geographical, religious and ethnic boundaries within which these 
affairs are to be run. Benyamin Neuberger has tackled this problem in the context of 
postcolonial Africa. One of his conclusions is that the colonial self is very much 
present in the mindset of Africans and has largely contributed to the boundaries of 
national self-determination that today demarcate the continent‘s different political 
entities:  
The national self in Africa is most frequently defined as the former colony in its 
colonial boundaries. An overwhelming majority of the African political establishment 
affirms the importance and even decisiveness of colonial history in the building of 
African nations.
47 
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 This is doubtless attributable to the practicality of continuance more than to any 
desire to respect the colonial legacy, as the borders left after independence 
represented a fait accompli and could not easily be redrawn. However, it is also true 
that most of the boundaries in post-independence Africa were determined by 
‗haphazard demarcation‘ by colonial powers and did not represent entities of ethno-
cultural or linguistic unity, therefore making it difficult to inspire loyalty among the 
newly independent citizens.
48
 By necessity, then, the political elite of the formative 
years after independence were obliged to adopt a position of what Neuberger calls 
‗statist nationalism‘.49 As discussed earlier in the context of Smith, this is whereby 
the concept of a nation flows from the state, rather than the state simply providing 
the tools of governance for a nation that already exists, and it is central to 
Neuberger‘s understanding of nation-building in the postcolonial world. It is of 
course not the only model: elsewhere, he identifies three possible paths to the 
creation of a nation-state. The first he refers to as a Kulturnation:
50
 this is the 
political entity generated by a pre-existing nation that breaks away from a larger 
state. Examples include Poland and Czechoslovakia, which, prior to independence 
from Soviet rule, by virtue of their distinct and shared heritage, were nations within a 
‗multinational state‘. In this case, the state flows from the nation. The second model 
is the Staatsnation: this is whereby a nation is the product of the state, as in France or 
Great Britain, where, Neuberger says:  
[N]ationalists called upon the state system to change and adapt in order to achieve the 
final coincidence of states and nations. […] In France and Britain monarchs who were 
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not nationalists had built nations. The nation-state was the result of their policies 
without this ever having been their objective.
51
 
 Although it is debatable whether the nation-state in France was the product of the 
monarchy, or something that emerged from the popular uprising of the Revolution 
and the subsequent consolidation of national structures under the Third Republic and 
beyond, this model nonetheless acted as the forerunner of the modern nation-state 
and must, according to Neuberger, be distinguished from the model of postcolonial 
states. The postcolonial model, he says, represents the third path to nation-building. 
Like the Staatsnation, it once again involved the state as the driving force behind the 
process, but with one important difference: because nationalism in modern times is a 
major force, which was not the case when the European Staatsnations were being 
created, most African leaders are nationalists, making the creation of the nation-state 
a conscious objective:  
All other major African leaders are […] already part of the nationalist era. They desire 
to accelerate a process which lasted for hundreds of years in Britain and France because 
it was not propelled but merely evolved. They clearly and consciously follow the 
Western European way and aim to achieve a nation-state ‗from state to nation‘.52 
 Neuberger‘s schema consolidates what I have already outlined in the case of 
Algeria. This is a country where nationalism was formally the product of the 
independent state, but where national sentiment long pre-existed the influence of the 
FLN. Neuberger‘s analysis applies to Algeria inasmuch as the state did indeed 
produce the modern Algerian nation, but his reminder that this process was rushed 
and self-conscious (rushed because Algeria‘s modern nationalists had to ‗catch up‘ 
and self-conscious because they knew what was expected of them) provides an 
explanation as to why alternative expressions of nationalism came to the fore to 
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challenge this ‗statist‘ nationalism. This is because this form of nationalism was 
considered to have been borrowed, or worse, imposed: ‗Ce nationalisme est une 
invention. L‘État-nation est une invention occidentale, c‘est une fixation occidentale 
qui nous a été imposée, que nous avons héritée du colonialisme‘.53 
State-sanctioned history 
 As suggested by Wallerstein, the invocation of history is one method by which the 
state may intervene in order to determine a recognisable self, and thereby construct a 
feeling of unity and continuity. As statist nationalists, formative governments 
throughout Africa in the early years of independence were responsible for reinforcing 
the legitimacy of the political entities under their care. This required a historical 
narrative that showed a pre-existing identity that could be associated with the 
boundaries of the new nation. Certain liberties therefore needed to be taken in this 
interpretive work:  
For nationalists, history has always meant, in fact, selective history. Nationalists, whose 
objective it is to foster a sense of identity and solidarity, to establish a chain of heroes, 
or to prove their case for a certain historical boundary, pick up those raisins from the 
cake of history which support and rationalize their cause.
54 
 In the case of Algeria, one effect of the early endeavours to promote national 
unity was the relative occlusion of a sizeable minority—the Berbers. Through 
excessive emphasis on unity, the Algerian state alienated and angered this sector of 
the population, which had inhabited the region long before the Arabs arrived 
(Berbers are the indigenous people of North Africa; they converted to Islam en masse 
in the seventh century during the Arab expansion).
55
 La Charte d‟Alger, the charter 
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adopted by the FLN during its first congress in 1964, reveals the intentions of the 
regime to promote national unity. As one would expect from a document drafted in 
the immediate aftermath of a victorious war of independence, the nation and its 
people are depicted without the slightest trace of ambiguity or obscurity. The 
Algerian people is described as an Arab-Muslim people, with national characteristics 
and a national territory, and which has benefited from the eradication of minority 
beliefs and non-Islamic practices (this is a reference to the success of the Islamic 
reformists in combating superstition in favour of scriptural Islam). As the following 
series of citations shows, the Algeria of 1964 was depicted as a well-established 
Islamic state with nationalist values and a homogenous identity, and which 
recognised the respective positive and negative contributions of Arab expansion and 
French occupation. On nationhood and shared values: 
Le peuple algérien est un peuple arabo-musulman. […] L‘essence arabo-musulmane de 
la nation algérienne a constitué un rempart solide contre sa destruction par le 
colonialisme. […] Malgré ses aspects contradictoires, l‘Algérie constituait déjà un Etat 
différencié. La culture islamique, une hiérarchisation sociale identique, une organisation 
juridique commune constituaient un lien entre tous les membres de la communauté 
algérienne.
56
 
On nationalism and the need for national unity in the face of minority beliefs:  
Le nationalisme, dans les pays colonisés, est la réponse que la population finit par 
donner à l‘oppression coloniale. Il s‘oppose au chauvinisme qui est plutôt le propre des 
pays impérialistes oppresseurs. […] L‘association des Oulémas57 a mené un combat 
acharné pour libérer le peuple des superstitions religieuses et du maraboutisme et a 
déployé des efforts méritoires pour aider à la renaissance culturelle et à la propagation 
de l‘enseignement de l‘arabe. […] Profondément croyantes, les masses algériennes ont 
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lutté vigoureusement pour débarrasser l‘Islam de toutes les excroissances et 
superstitions qui l‘ont étouffé ou altéré.58 
On the gift of Arab expansion: 
Au VIIe siècle, la rapidité et la profondeur du processus d‘islamisation et d‘arabisation 
qui commence ne peut s‘expliquer que par le rôle libérateur de cette religion et de cette 
civilisation nouvelle qu‘un peuple aussi combatif n‘aurait pas acceptées si elles ne lui 
apportaient libération, promotion sociale, enrichissement culturel, prospérité et 
tolérance. Le caractère arabo-musulman demeure ainsi, le fondement de la personnalité 
algérienne.
59
 
And the contrasting barbarity of the French occupation: 
L‘extermination des populations, le pillage de leurs ressources, la violence inhumaine 
qui se déchaîne contre la paysannerie algérienne, donnent un coup d‘arrêt au 
développement de l‘économie algérienne dans les villes et dans les campagnes, 
provoquant d‘énormes pertes en hommes. […] Le fonctionnement économique du 
système colonial et l‘implantation d‘une minorité européenne créent un véritable goulot 
d‘étranglement à l‘évolution du peuple algérien.60 
 Part of the price for unity in the aftermath of independence, then, was the under-
representation of the country‘s diversity (or ‗aspects contradictoires‘) in order to 
create the illusion of a seamless cultural, linguistic and religious bond. The 
perception among the new authorities was that Algeria needed to emphasise its 
existing unity if they were to remain in power. The later criticism of the regime as 
constructed by the FIS was that its nationalism had strayed from the essence of the 
November 1954 revolution; the FIS did not denounce the FLN as such, or even reject 
its legitimacy, but rather tried to breathe new life into this legitimacy by returning to 
                                                     
58
 La Charte d‟Alger (Part I, Chapters 1 & 3). 
59
 Ibid (Part I, Chapter 1). 
60
 Ibid. 
65 
 
something more profound than the regime‘s increasingly desperate attempts to retain 
unity.
61
 
Military politics 
 This legitimacy was above all the preserve of the military, whose reach into the 
political sphere is enshrined in the country‘s first two constitutions.62 It was only 
with the new constitution of 1989 that its political role was suppressed, officially at 
least. However, it took on an even more acutely political role as it became clear that 
the rise of the Islamists represented a threat to the status quo of the military 
bureaucracy.
63
 The strength of this structure in the aftermath of independence can be 
explained by the pre-existing military bureaucracy under colonial occupation. Hamza 
Alavi offers an analysis of postcolonial state structures that deliberately contrasts 
with classical Marxist explanations of the division of power.
64
 He points out that 
class structures are significantly different in a postcolonial state, as there is more than 
one dominant class (he cites the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie and the landed classes). While Marxist theory posits that the state is 
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created by the ascendant bourgeoisie as an instrument for its dominion over the 
working classes, Alavi reminds us that the colonial state is created by a foreign 
bourgeoisie and that when independence is attained, there are competing interests 
between the indigenous bourgeoisie and the neo-colonialists, who remain a 
recognisable and influential group in postcolonial society. This in turn changes the 
relationship between the state apparatus—what he calls the bureaucratic-military 
oligarchy—and these dominant classes. Marx argued in The Communist Manifesto 
that the state is manipulated by the ruling classes in pursuit of their common interests 
(‗The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie‘);65 however, Alavi suggests that colonial society is 
‗equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and with governmental 
mechanisms that enable it, through routine operations, to subordinate the native 
social classes‘.66 This apparatus is carried over into the postcolonial society and, with 
independence, ‗those at the top of the hierarchy of the bureaucratic-military 
apparatus of the state are able to maintain and even extend their dominant power in 
society, having been freed from direct metropolitan control‘.67 In other words, 
colonisation alters the distribution of power to such an extent that the emerging 
model after independence is recognisable neither in terms of pre-colonial rule nor 
metropolitan political rule. Alavi‘s approach explains the continuing strength of the 
‗bureaucratic-military‘ force in Algeria today. The country‘s sole political party until 
1988 was the FLN, which was the political wing of the armed forces (ALN – Armée 
de libération nationale) credited with winning the war of independence. Its power 
was built on the legitimacy it acquired during the liberation struggle, but was 
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compounded by its close links with the army and the state structure described by 
Alavi, i.e., one where the control exercised by the occupier in colonial times was 
inherited after independence and was then used to continue to dominate even the 
most elevated of social classes. Again, we see how the colonial legacy marks the 
structures of the newly independent nation. In this case, it is shown to have impacted 
on the distribution of power among the country‘s different social classes, where 
military power is synonymous with leadership and elitism (all the political leaders of 
Algeria since independence have had military experience; most were appointed or 
elected directly from within the armed forces, with the exception of the current 
President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who nonetheless served under Houari 
Boumediene‘s Army of the Exterior during the Algerian War of Independence).68 
 The links between the liberation struggle, with its necessary reliance on military 
power, and contemporary domestic politics in Algeria are also examined by Luis 
Martinez.
69
 His central thesis is that participation in conflict is perceived in Algeria 
to bring with it certain social advantages; it is a marker of prestige, honour, courage 
and opportunism. So pervasive is this perception, he says, that it can be used to 
explain the actions of various political entities at different times in the country‘s 
history. In the context of the civil war, for example, Martinez explains that the 
Islamist guerrilla fighters modelled themselves on the successful liberation fighters 
of the Algerian War: ‗Imprégnés du modèle de réussite des moujahidin de la guerre 
de libération, les guérilleros islamistes croient dans les vertus de la violence comme 
mode de promotion sociale‘.70 This is significant as it sets these fighters apart from 
their political counterparts in the dissolved FIS, which explicitly sought power 
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through the electoral process. The violence perpetrated in the name of Islamism 
during the civil war, therefore, did anything but further this party‘s political cause. It 
damaged its credibility as a democratic player and, indeed, damaged the very 
prospects of democracy in the country as a whole. Martinez is clear that the Islamist 
fighters in the civil war felt animosity towards the political figures of the FIS because 
they represented a break from the tradition of conflictual accession to power. This 
enmity is shared for the same reason by the military regime that cancelled the 
elections, although, obviously, it was also acting to ensure that a party hostile to the 
armed forces would not reach power. In a way, therefore, the violence between the 
guerrilla fighters and the military regime was tainted with an unusual common 
ground, that of mistrust and resentment of the political figures who so nearly came to 
power through the ballot box: ‗Militaires et maquisards islamistes ont perçu dans 
l‘émergence d‘un nouveau personnel politique issu, non plus du maquis mais de la 
légitimité électorale, une rupture dans le processus de formation des dirigeants‘.71 
This notion that the two camps in the civil war were not as adversarial as one might 
presume is a complex one and will need to be developed further (see Chapter IV). 
 Implicit in the first of the above two citations by Martinez is the idea that the 
legitimacy of the country‘s only political party for nearly three decades, the FLN, can 
also be attributed to the value of conflict. The FLN‘s military wing (ALN) succeeded 
in defeating the French and have benefited from their success ever since, completely 
monopolising the political scene until 1988 and effectively monopolising it since 
then. Martinez argues that the authorities in Algeria therefore felt more comfortable 
in armed conflict than in politicking, which explains the suggestion made by so many 
commentators (see Chapter IV) that the army fanned the flames of the civil strife in 
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order to garner support in the form of patriotic and nationalist sentiment and erode 
the solid base the FIS had built up prior to the coup: ‗L‘isolement intérieur du régime 
immédiatement après l‘interruption du processus électoral, était en effet complet ; 
seule la guerre lui a redonné un semblant de légitimité‘.72 This link between violence 
and legitimacy is supported by the Charte d‟Alger, extracts from which we saw 
above. This historic document reveals a great deal about the aspirations of the 
liberation movement and the central characteristics of Algerian governance in the 
early years of independence. In terms of the perceived link between violence and 
political legitimacy, much is said in the Charter to reinforce this. It is made clear that 
violent resistance was the only way in which the struggle for independence could 
ever have been successful: 
Dans son unanimité, le peuple algérien avait ressenti que la lutte était placée sur le bon 
terrain : celui de la critique du système colonial par les armes. Sa détermination de se 
débarrasser du colonialisme en appuyant fermement la lutte armée, a apporté un 
démenti cinglant aux dirigeants qui ne croyaient pas dans ses potentialités 
révolutionnaires, exagéraient la puissance de l‘ennemi et mettaient en relief les 
faiblesses sociales et culturelles de la Nation pour se refuser à affronter les difficultés de 
la lutte.
73
 
 This extract reveals two desires on the part of the FLN: to ensure that the armed 
struggle (and not a ‗legalistic‘74 approach) is seen as the key that unlocked Algeria‘s 
independence; and to include the ‗unanimous‘ people in this struggle so that they 
may share in—and therefore be more likely to recognise—this legitimacy. They were 
largely successful in this regard until Chadli‘s presidency in the 1980s, when the 
relative stability enjoyed under Boumediene gave way to rising prices and rising 
unemployment, ultimately resulting in the riots of October 1988. Then, as we shall 
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see in Chapter III, the military‘s use of force seriously undermined its portrayal as 
protector of the people, and inevitably tarnished the legitimacy of the state as a 
whole. 
 In this section we have looked at some of the central ideas behind nation-building 
and the difficulties it engenders. Smith provides us with a useful framework by 
which to see nationhood as a construct that is built up over time and suggests ways in 
which certain groups (such as the intelligentsia) may behave as agents of this 
process. In contrast to Wallerstein, he rejects an exclusively modern reading of 
nationalism, in which national sentiment is seen as a political tool, or, in 
Wallerstein‘s words, an ‗invention of pastness‘. I have applied Smith‘s analysis to 
Algeria to suggest that the Islamists were able to challenge the state-sanctioned 
nationalism of the FLN in an effort to replace it with something more befitting the 
vertical ethnicity—Islamic heritage—that, for them, truly defined what it is to be 
Algerian. The explanation for the FLN‘s attempts to hold on to power may come 
from the difficulties encountered by postcolonial governments, whose survival 
depends on their ability to foster loyalty among their people to a state that was forged 
out of conflict and instability. Wallerstein shows us that independence carries with it 
certain political imperatives that must be performed efficiently if a fledgling nation is 
to survive. Neuberger highlights the difficulties of identity in self-determination 
among the former colonies and the extent to which the colonial self survived the 
transition to independence. He also provides a complement to Smith‘s ethnies by 
suggesting different paths to nationhood and identifying the singularity of the 
postcolonial situation, where nationalism is seen as an imperative of the modern era, 
bringing with it the need for a selective historical narrative, as is visible in the 
extracts from La Charte d‟Alger. Alavi shows how the institutional framework of a 
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newly independent nation has specific characteristics that can be traced to its colonial 
legacy. In the case of Algeria, this legacy explains the strength of the military 
regime, as well as the adoption of a single-party system after independence. Finally, 
Martinez, whose work will be referred to again, notably in Chapter IV, reveals some 
of the complexities in the relationship between violence and politics in Algeria. This 
relationship requires further analysis in terms of the conflict, and in Chapter IV I will 
study the way in which violence may have been used to distort the political reality of 
the Islamist movement. For now, however, my priority is to examine a more 
theoretical question: the amalgam of religion and politics. In the remainder of this 
chapter I will consider definitions of fundamentalism and Islamism, showing how the 
latter represented a clear shift towards political activism. I argue that this shift also 
reflects the transition outlined in the first half of this chapter, i.e., from a passive 
sense of innate (‗vertical‘) national identity to an active nationalist voice. This voice 
was represented by the FLN in its nationalist struggle against colonial occupation, 
but was later challenged by the FIS, who felt the Islamic nationalism, as embodied 
by the Islamic reformist movement, that fed into this struggle was subordinated to 
the FLN‘s quest for continued legitimacy. Some historical information about Islamic 
reformism is therefore necessary, as its legacy is crucial to our understanding of the 
FIS.  
Section 2 – Politics and religion 
Section 2.1 – Fundamentalisms 
 Having developed in Section 1 the notion that the FIS made the shift towards a 
more active form of nationalism, as required in Smith‘s theory of vertical ethnies, 
this section introduces the idea of another shift: towards a more overtly political 
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representation of Islamic activism. In the latter half of this section, I will provide 
historical information about early Islamic reformism in Algeria and how it fed into 
the later Islamist movement. First, however, I would like to address the broader 
question of religion and politics. I will do this by questioning the role of secularism 
today and also by considering how we might define fundamentalism in a way that 
does not make it the preserve of violent Muslims alone.  
Secular fundamentalism? 
 One might be excused for thinking that in the modern world, religion is in decline. 
A widespread view, particularly in the West, holds that the modern post-
Enlightenment era, with its emphasis on rational thought, profane sources of 
knowledge and authority, and human-driven progress, is leading us inexorably 
towards the disappearance of religion—or at least its relegation to a less public role. 
Religion may be recognised as being a key feature in the governance of society in the 
past, and considered useful as a means to better understand this past, but, by many, is 
no longer taken seriously as a legitimate political tool. However, a closer look at 
governance and popular movements today—in Western and non-Western societies 
alike—reveals that the world is as ardently religious as it has ever been. Indeed, 
many commentators have begun to observe, and are contributing to, a reversal of the 
open rejection of religious influence that has often accompanied intellectual human 
endeavour since the Enlightenment. This is true of both academic and more 
mainstream circles. A recent article in the Guardian, a traditionally secular and 
politically liberal publication, is indicative of the reservations that are beginning to 
surface with regard to the sometimes absolutist—or fundamentalist—tenets of 
atheism. John Gray argues that the secular ‗tide‘ is turning and that the renewed 
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vigour with which some authors
75
 have begun to publish attacks on religion is an 
uneasy response to this shift: ‗The urgency with which [these authors] produce their 
anti-religious polemics suggests that a change has occurred […]: the tide of 
secularisation has turned‘.76 What is particularly regrettable about such attacks, 
according to Gray, is that they have deviated from a position of rational resistance 
(resistance to the notion of divine agency) to one of insistence that science should 
and will triumph over religious belief, a shift that Gray qualifies as ‗an article of faith 
rather than a theory based on evidence‘.77  
 Gray‘s observation merits further attention. Secularist thought holds that religion 
should be denied a role in the public arena, and yet its most fervent advocates act 
with the kind of zeal that is to be found among the faithful. Others have identified 
this irony, arguing that fundamentalist is a term that is just as applicable to the views 
of some atheists and secularists as it is to the intransigence of Muslim hardliners.
78
 If 
what we evoke by this label is unerring belief and absolutist values that are used to 
impose a certain view of the world, then surely it is as valuable in describing the 
supposed inevitability of religious decline and progress through rational intervention 
as it is in describing the refusal by certain clerics to engage with other systems of 
faith. A similar refusal has, after all, been seen on the part of secular authorities in 
various parts of the world. Turkey, for example, has a long history of closely 
protecting its secular tradition, with the army acting as the self-professed guardians 
of Atatürk‘s legacy. Three military coups—in 1960, 1971 and 1980—were justified 
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on the grounds that the unity of the state and its secular tradition were in danger, and 
when an Islamist Prime Minister (Necmettin Erbakan) came to power in 1996, the 
military began to exert political pressure until he stepped down, just one year later.
79
 
Algeria offers a more nuanced example of secularist intolerance, as it has never 
really known true secularism, even though, like in Turkey, the armed forces remain 
largely suspicious of anti-secular practices.
80
 In June 1990, the FIS won massive 
support (54%)
81
 in municipal elections across the country, and the military later 
began to curtail the powers of local government amidst fears that the Islamist party 
would damage the democratic institutions of the state.
82
 The following year, the FIS 
once again won a large percentage (48%)
83
 of the votes in the first round of 
parliamentary elections, and this time the military intervened definitively, cancelling 
the second round of elections, seizing power, banning the successful Islamists from 
political participation, and effectively triggering the conflict of the 1990s. A critique 
of this reactionary suppression can be made on at least two grounds. First, it is clear 
that the military did not act in the wider interests of the people, but rather to protect 
its own privileged position. Much of the criticism levelled against religious ‗fanatics‘ 
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is that the administration of the state cannot accommodate tactics that operate outside 
of its rational—and therefore objectively legitimate—structures, designed to protect 
the people from irrational—and therefore self-interested—behaviour. And yet, these 
structures are shown to be compromised when the interests of a small elite, with its 
politico-military concentration of power, are threatened by a broad-based movement 
that would dilute that power. The second point is that the military intervention in 
1992 was made in the name of democracy but actually served to undermine it. 
Chadli‘s administration took a step towards democracy by allowing multi-party 
elections, but the military then took two steps back by cancelling the democratic 
process when it proved not to work in its favour.  
 A word of caution is necessary here to distinguish between a critique of ‗secular 
fundamentalism‘ and one of secularism per se. Like most political models, be they 
based on religious authority, monarchic rule, tribal hierarchy, or universal suffrage, 
secularism naturally has the capacity to provide fairness and sound governance. To 
say otherwise would be absurd when one considers the advances made in Europe as 
the often oppressive influence of Catholicism was curtailed through the separation of 
church and state. Even Rachid al-Ghannouchi, a leading Islamist scholar from 
Tunisia, recognises this. Although a severe critic of secularism, he does concede that 
in the West it ‗led to the emancipation of the mind from the authority of religion, and 
emancipated both religion and society from the authority of the church‘.84 He even 
argues that in the absence of Islamic governance, secular rule, with its openness and 
respect for basic rights, may be the best alternative to the kind of authoritarian rule 
seen in the Maghreb region since independence:  
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No matter how critical one may be of secularism, it should not be denied its 
achievements as a progressive movement. One of the great accomplishments of 
secularism is the space it provides for pluralism and a reasonable degree of coexistence. 
Muslims should recognise that the presence of millions of them in the West today, for 
the first time in such big numbers, is the fruit of several factors including the secularist 
revolution which liberated the state from the hegemony of the church. […] Under such a 
system of governance, it is agreed to respect the fundamental rights of all people 
without discrimination and without commitment to a religious frame of reference. […] 
A democratic secular system of government is less evil than a despotic system of 
government that claims to be Islamic.
85
 
 Ghannouchi‘s reference to regimes that ‗claim to be Islamic‘ serves as a reminder 
that the Algerian system of government has never in fact been secular. To say that a 
government ‗claims to be Islamic‘ is to say that it is not really Islamic, but public 
affiliation with Islam is most definitely not secular either. Political discourse in 
Algeria has long contained explicit references to Islam, and no truly secular party 
could hope to succeed in the polls there. I will refer again to the relationship between 
the state and Islam in Section 2.2, but for now I would like to take a closer look at 
our understanding of fundamentalism. I wish to address three points in particular: its 
origins under American Protestantism in the early part of the twentieth century; the 
recent evolution of the term to refer to events unfolding in the Islamic world (and its 
parallel limited usage to describe violence in the name of Islam); and finally the 
term‘s literal interpretation as belief in the fundamental tenets of a particular doctrine 
or system.  
Fundamentalism and Islamism 
 While the term fundamentalist may be used to describe strict Christian 
interpretations of the Bible well before the eighteenth century,
86
 fundamentalism as a 
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movement per se developed in the early part of the twentieth century among 
Protestants in the United States anxious to distance themselves from the damaging 
openness of modernist thought and the development of scientific discovery that 
apparently contradicted the description of the physical world as presented in the 
Bible. Between 1910 and 1915 a series of popular texts entitled The Fundamentals 
was published in the United States as a counter strand to the developing modernism 
of the time.
87
 These texts defended and advocated a literal view of the Bible as the 
word of God, the immaculate conception of Christ, and the Second Coming.
88
 It has 
been argued, however, that the spirit of these publications was not as ardent as the 
fundamentalist movement that developed in earnest in the period following the First 
World War, when the ‗heirs of The Fundamentals, which had been rather moderate, 
turned militant‘.89 A World Christian Fundamentalist Association was founded in 
1919, quickly growing in numbers and increasingly seen to represent an official 
strand of Protestantism across North America.
90
 It would appear, however, that the 
influence of the Fundamentalists as a discrete body of Christians began to wane 
shortly thereafter; this is not to say that the conservative Protestantism they 
represented was in decline, but that it manifested itself under the auspices of other 
branches (Evangelicals, Pentecostalists).
91
  
 Fundamentalism, then, was well and truly established long before its application 
to Islam. Early use of the term in English to refer to a strand of the Islamic faith is 
recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary to have begun around the late 1950s, 
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when it described supporters of the Khilafat movement that sought protection for the 
Ottoman Caliphate after World War I.
92
 The term came into common use, however, 
in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979, when it was used to describe the 
doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini.
93
 As an extension of this usage, and in particular 
since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Pennsylvania, 
fundamentalism (even where not preceded by its modifier ‗Islamic‘) has come to 
evoke criminal activities carried out in the name of Islam. This is problematic, 
perhaps first of all because of the term‘s Christian connotations detailed above. To 
compare a literal application of the Bible to a literal application of the Koran is 
entirely misguided, as the two documents are themselves not comparable. As Hugh 
Roberts points out: ‗the Koran is not a collection of histories, but of prescriptions for 
the social order. To apply the term ‗fundamentalism‘ to radical Islamism is to 
stigmatise it by means of the connotations of anti-scientific eccentricity appropriate 
to fundamentalist Christianity‘.94 This use of the term is also problematic because of 
the complexity and diversity of fundamentalist behaviour. Consensus on the 
usefulness or appositeness of this term seems difficult to achieve. Youssef Choueiri 
considers it a vague term, but nonetheless one that can legitimately be applied to 
Islamic movements that claim ‗to derive political principles from a timeless, divine 
text‘.95 As such, Choueiri identifies three movements that can be described as 
fundamentalist: revivalism, a peripheral movement with its origins in 18
th
-century 
Arabia which saw the renewal of Islam ‗as an overriding task in the face of prevalent 
superstitions and religious innovations‘; reformism, an urban movement begun in the 
19
th
 century by intellectuals who sought to ‗[reassert] the quest of knowledge and the 
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function of consultation in the life of the community‘; and radicalism, a latter 20th-
century movement which was a response to the development of the secular nation-
state and ‗highlighted God‘s sovereignty and the role of jihad as the most important 
aspects of Islam‘.96 Choueiri‘s choice of such divergent movements reminds us of the 
complex and varying faces of fundamentalism. In contrast to reservations about the 
use of fundamentalism as a catch-all term, Choueiri explains that fundamentalism is 
eminently Islamic, with its origins in the early intellectual traditions of the Muslim 
world, and, as long as it is not used to ‗postulate continuity of cultural forms or 
revolutionary movements‘, does not object to its use in the Islamic context.97 One 
must be careful here, however, not to use fundamentalism interchangeably with its 
Arabic equivalent usuliyya (from usul, meaning root or basic principle). While the 
latter is indeed the term used in modern theologico-political discourse as the 
translation of fundamentalism, its original usage belonged to classical Islam, where it 
described adherents of the Twelver Shi‘a tradition who sought the application of 
rationalist jurisprudence to the work of mujtahids (Islamic scholars competent to 
interpret divine law).
98
  
 The manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism are diverse and numerous. There 
are perpetrators of criminal acts for whom political opposition is inadequate as a 
means of applying the fundamental tenets of Islam. The Algerian conflict saw the 
rise of such fundamentalists (for example, in the form of the Groupes islamiques 
armés or the Mouvement islamique algérien) once the political path to power had 
been closed off. And there are those who seek privately to fulfil what they see as the 
fundamental requirements of their faith, without engaging in public debate or 
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proselytism. But there are also proponents of a political reading of Islam who argue 
in favour of adherence to fundamental principles contained in the Koran and the 
Prophet‘s Sunna, and seek to encourage the application of these principles through 
political representation. These are Islamists, whom I understand to be 
fundamentalists.
99
 Islamism is a form of fundamentalism. The distinction between 
Islamists and other non-violent fundamentalists is that they are not content with 
advocacy of a certain moral outlook; they wish to seek its application through 
political channels. This reflects the shift I described in the context of Smith‘s vertical 
ethnies from a quietist sense of belonging to an active expression of nationalism, and 
was perfectly embodied by the FIS, who built on the Islamic nationalism of their 
predecessors (figures like Ben Badis and Cheikhs Sahnoun and Soltani, who were 
not overtly political) and sought to give it political authority. Similarly, their 
politicisation also reflected the shift away from a more passive expression of 
fundamentalism. It served, therefore, to 1) reinforce deep-rooted Algerian 
nationalism (as against the state-sanctioned nationalism cum politicking of the FLN) 
and 2) give an overtly political voice to Islamic fundamentalism. Burgat draws the 
following distinction: ‗la frontière entre le vieux discours fondamentaliste, passif et 
moralisateur, des clercs de l‘islam officiel [...] et le projet islamiste, actif, intégrant 
explicitement au nombre de ses moyens d‘action tous les instruments du champ 
politique moderne‘.100  
 If I have identified various expressions of fundamentalism, it is because I wish to 
emphasise that in itself it is neither illicit nor inherently threatening. While it may be 
abhorrent to those who believe in the value of liberal reappraisals of knowledge and 
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principles, it is not as dark and rare as is often suggested; indeed it is representative 
of a position held by many people in relation to many things. To claim a hold on the 
truth is, after all, nothing unusual. Indeed, many opponents of fundamentalism could 
themselves be said to claim to represent the truth. In A Fundamental Fear Salman 
Sayyid makes this point, arguing that it is not only fundamentalists who purport to 
represent the truth, but also Nazis, communists, socialists, conservatives and ‗even 
the parliamentarians of the North Atlantic plutocracies‘.101 This being so, Sayyid 
suggests that fundamentalism is not useful as a term: if we extend its application to 
the political (as well as the religious), then it is clearly difficult for many to escape 
the label, as ‗the difference between non-fundamentalists and fundamentalists 
collapses‘.102 However, perhaps it is this very openness that would be useful in 
breaking down some of the assumptions made about fundamentalism. If perceptions 
of the fundamentalist position could include those who operate outside of Islam 
(indeed, outside of religion) and outside of violence, then perhaps popular notions of 
a binary world (divided into those who support terrorism—and are therefore 
‗fundamentalists‘—and those who do not) would break down as the term 
fundamentalism took on a more literal meaning—the strict adherence to any set of 
basic ideas or principles. Sayyid himself points out that the ‗articulation of an 
―international community‖ in opposition to (Islamist) terrorism replays the colonial 
discourse of a world order that is organised in terms of the opposition between 
civilisation and barbarism‘, thereby tainting any challenge to state authority with a 
lack of legitimacy.
103
 And he bemoans with the demise of communism the 
concurrent loss of a politically educational ‗narrative‘ that depicted violence as 
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something that could be ‗structural and systemic rather than just the act of an ―evil‖ 
or ―mad‖ individual‘.104 Surely a more inclusive use of the term fundamentalism 
could serve public perceptions in the same way: what is needed is a clear 
understanding that fundamentalist values can be represented by the religious and the 
political, by conservatives and liberals, by insurgents and the authorities, by public 
activists and private believers. I will take a similar approach to my understanding of 
democracy in Chapter II, where I argue against excessively restrictive definitions, 
which act as barriers to entry for emerging political forces such as the FIS. 
Section 2.2 – Religion in politics 
Islam and the Muslim state 
 The acceptance of open definitions is at the heart of my analysis of the admixture 
of religion and politics, for it represents a vision of the two that does not mutually 
exclude but rather considers them as always and everywhere having been bound 
together. Let us consider, then, the extent to which Islam is part of politics. This 
requires a look at the ways in which the state, Muslim officials and the people have 
traditionally interacted in the Muslim world. It should be stressed at this stage that 
important differences exist between the political structures of the Shi‘a and Sunni 
branches of Islam, in terms of official outlets for representatives of Islam. Sunni 
Islam is more relevant to this thesis (99% of the Algerian population is Sunni),
105
 but 
it is useful to understand that Shi‘ism provides for the existence of independent 
clerical bodies as an extension of the usuli movement in 18
th
-century Iran, which 
advocated a greater role for mujtahids, the most influential of whom would go on to 
become ayatollahs. This structure accounts for the eminently political role of 
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religious representatives in Iran, but while the success of the Iranian revolution in 
1979 can be said to have impacted upon the Algerian Islamist movement, the 
structural differences between these two branches of Islam ensure that any perceived 
causal links must be treated with caution.
106
 
 Leon C. Brown provides a broad look back at the ways in which interaction 
between the state, religious representatives and the people in the Muslim world has 
evolved since pre-modern times. He suggests that traditionally there was little chance 
of an institutional clash between state and Islamic officials (in Sunni Islam), as no 
organisational structure existed by which imams or the ulama could mount an 
official challenge.
107
 He makes it clear this does not mean that no challenges came 
from clerics, but rather that such challenges were expressed on a more local level; in 
other words, the Muslim clerics did not have the means to operate as a unified whole 
(in contrast to the Catholic Church and its opposition to the state in medieval 
Europe). As for the state and its position in relation to clerics, Brown identifies a 
similar climate of circumspection, saying that the Muslim state might traditionally 
have avoided confrontation with them for two reasons: public perception of state 
hostility to preachers or the ulama might result in popular discontent; and because 
the clerics lacked the institutional structure to pose a challenge in the first place, the 
state had no reason to fear undue influence from them.
108
 Brown‘s structural analysis 
is doubtless accurate, but perhaps another explicative factor is the historic closeness 
of the religious and political positions in the Muslim world. Put simply, if the views 
of those behind the state apparatuses are only moderately divergent from those 
representing Islam, then the risk of massive conflict (as arose during the 
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secularisation of Europe) is low, particularly if these more or less convergent views 
are also held by large swathes of the population.  
 What, then, of popular perceptions of and participation in the political sphere? 
Brown argues that Muslims traditionally regarded politics as something best kept at 
arm‘s length, with a particular divide between rural dwellers and the business of 
government. In what he refers to as ‗premodern bureaucratic empire‘ (citing 
examples such as the Ottoman, Moghul or Safavid Empires), state and society were 
kept very much distinct and can be understood as a typical centre-periphery 
structure.
109
 This all changed in modern times, as European occupation forced a shift 
towards the politics of the nation-state and parallel ‗state penetration into society‘. 
While this shift cannot be seen as the pivotal moment in Muslim history (Brown is at 
pains to point out that significant change was evident before, during and after the 
colonial period), the colonial confrontation between Europe and Islam was 
nonetheless the most important political reality of the time. Brown sketches two 
approaches among the Muslim populations to this reality: ‗those prepared to adjust to 
the world as it is versus those insisting on making the world adjust to their image of 
what the world should be‘.110 The former—the ‗establishment‘ or ‗Westernising‘ 
approach—was initially the domain of the political elite, whose defeat at the hands of 
the colonial forces meant that the political imperative was ‗defensive modernisation‘. 
The efforts of these educated classes to come to terms with the new dynamic of 
society under Western occupation proved strained, and Muslim intellectuals soon 
began to study the processes behind European success, and there emerged a 
movement that has come to be referred to as Islamic reformism (or Islamic 
modernism). Perhaps the two figures most often cited as the fathers of Islamic 
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reformism are Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–
1905), both of whom preached a vision of Islam as a religion of civilisation that 
needed to adapt to the changing power structures of the time.
111
 In his early years 
Abduh was a student of al-Afghani‘s and as such adhered to his anti-imperialist 
discourse, a position that resulted in his exile from Egypt when he contributed to the 
Urabi Revolt of 1881.
112
 While in exile it is said that his position moderated and he 
was allowed to return in 1888. Brown therefore sees Abduh as an accommodationist 
or ‗establishment‘ thinker, while al-Afghani‘s views were more openly ‗anti-
establishment‘.113 Regardless of this distinction, both are remembered for their 
insistence that Islam was not incompatible with reason or science and was in need of 
regeneration in order to face the challenge of Western domination.
114
 The ideas of 
these two thinkers were first influential in more eastern parts of the Muslim world 
(Abduh was Egyptian while al-Afghani was born in Iran and spent his formative 
years in Afghanistan), before later being taken up by reformers in the Maghreb 
region.
115
 Abduh‘s visit to Algeria in September 1903 is said to have been pivotal in 
the rise of Islamic reformism there.
116
 It is essential to understand the import of this 
movement in terms of Algerian nationalism and the later development of Islamism 
under the FIS.  
Reformism, nationalism and Islamism in Algeria 
 In our understanding of the Algerian nation we cannot underestimate the status of 
reformist Cheikh Abdelhamid Ben Badis (1889–1940), the father of Islamic 
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reformism in Algeria: ‗[le réformisme musulman algérien] était fortement concentré 
autour d‘un homme, ‗Abd al-Hamīd b. Bādīs, qui en était la tête pensante et le centre 
moteur. De cet homme, et presque exclusivement de lui, il tenait son essence 
doctrinale et sa puissance de rayonnement‘.117 It was he who on 5 May 1931 founded 
the influential Association des ‟Ulama musulmans algériens (AUMA),118 a group 
which sought to establish ‗the supremacy of a modernist, scripturalist, puritanical, 
and tacitly nationalist Islam at the expense of the old-time religion of the saints‘.119 
That the reformers were nationalistic makes sense in the context of their formal 
beginnings, as the French administration had just celebrated one hundred years of 
colonial rule in Algeria (1830–1930), and several indigenous groups already existed 
who had expressed their disappointment at these celebrations.
120
 Indeed, there was 
ongoing opposition to the administration‘s handling of religious matters. Franck 
Frégosi tells us that broken promises to respect the autonomy of religious expression, 
made by the colonial forces as early as 1830, had angered religious dignitaries from 
the outset, and that this anger continued to be manifested until it was taken up by the 
association of Ben Badis in the 1920s.
121
 This is significant because although the 
AUMA was founded as a ‗strictly religious party‘122 its apoliticism was clearly 
undermined by the attacks it made on the colonial administration:  
La plupart des manifestations religieuses ou culturelles des réformistes avaient une 
résonance algérianisante, du fait qu‘elles étaient placées sous le signe de l‘Islam, de la 
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culture arabe, qu‘elles invoquaient l‘histoire pré-française de la patrie algérienne, et 
qu‘elles excluaient toute référence à l‘histoire, à la culture et à la présence françaises. 
L‘idéal religieux des réformistes ne se limitait pas à la réformation des pratiques 
religieuses, à la propagation de la foi, à la diffusion d‘une éthique islamique. Il 
impliquait la restauration de la dignité islamique, et la revendication d‘une personnalité 
algérienne arabo-musulmane, inassimilable à la personnalité française.
123
 
 Islamic reformism, therefore, was central to early Algerian nationalism, but it also 
had an influence on the later nationalist agenda of the revolution and the post-
independence identity of the Algerian nation. And the role the AUMA played in the 
later formation of an Islamist opposition can be understood by the closeness between 
it and the state in the post-independence era. Having first formed a close alliance 
with the PPA (Parti du peuple algérien), the party of Algeria‘s great nationalist, 
Messali Hadj, the association later aligned itself with the breakaway group that 
formed the FLN and as such ensured itself continued representation in the 
governance of Algeria.
124
 The cross-over between religious expression and 
nationalism was thereby sealed, a development which came as no surprise: ‗Cet 
emprunt, cette connexion entre valeurs religieuses et aspirations nationales ne 
pouvait surprendre dans un pays de tradition musulmane où face à la politique de 
nivellement de la communauté autochtone au plan culturel et religieux, l‘islam 
apparaissait comme une valeur refuge, un substitut de la nationalité‘.125 However, 
although the ulama had successfully established reformist Islam as the official 
religion of state, and had laid the spiritual foundations for the revolution of 1954, this 
did not ensure they enjoyed independence from the executive: ‗the fledgling nation-
state nationalized Islam much as it had nationalized the press and the oil industry, 
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and thereby subordinated the Islam of the reformers to the nationalist raison 
d‘état‘.126 Frégosi makes this same point, adding that the subordination of Islam to 
state control was an extension of colonial tactics. He tells us that while the French 
had never been able to secularise Algeria as such, they had maintained tight control 
over religious expression through ‗gallicanist‘ policies, and once the revolutionaries 
of 1954–1962 had successfully invoked Islam in their battle, they propagated this 
tradition into the post-independence era: ‗Après avoir durant toute la durée du conflit 
(1954–1962) sacralisé le combat pour la libération nationale – érigé au rang de djihad 
et le combattant transformé en combattant de la foi (moudjahid) – il ne restait plus, 
une fois l‘indépendance acquise, qu‘à nationaliser le sacré‘.127 While the close 
alliance between the reformers and the FLN continued, the fact that religion was 
used to serve political ends angered a minority of religious thinkers, including those 
who would go on to form the basis for Algerian Islamism, such as Abdellatif Soltani 
(1900–84) and Ahmed Sahnoun (1909–2003). It is worth explaining in brief the kind 
of influence these men had on the Algerian Islamist movement as a whole and how 
the emergence of the FIS must be understood in relation to their legacy. 
 Cheikh Soltani was a leading figure in Ben Badis‘ AUMA and later a key 
dissident who challenged the policies and dominance of the FLN state. He published 
a controversial text in 1974 entitled Le mazdaqisme est la source du socialisme.
128
 
Banned from print in Algeria, this diatribe criticised the Boumediene regime‘s 
Marxist tendencies and further rejected the importation of Western mores, drawing a 
parallel between the ‗impious‘ Algerian state and the libertine, communist values of 
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Mazdak, the leader of a Persian sect in the fifth century B.C. It was an attack that 
was representative of the anger felt by dissident ulama in Algeria:  
[Dans ce livre] Soltani résume le mieux les préoccupations, les inquiétudes et les 
déceptions des hommes de sa génération qui avaient cru, jusqu‘à l‘indépendance, à 
l‘avènement d‘une société débarrassée des mœurs néfastes – mixité, alcool, licence, etc. 
– introduites dans le pays par la colonisation‘.129 
 Soltani was arrested for his ‗opinions‘ in 1981, but on his release the next year 
continued to challenge the regime‘s lack of moral rigour.130 Significantly, he later 
collaborated with a young Abassi Madani (and Sahnoun) on a petition presented to 
the government in the aftermath of a clash between leftist and Islamist students, for 
which Abassi served two years in prison.
131
 The Cheikh‘s funeral in 1984 was 
attended by some twenty-five thousand mourners, despite no official announcement 
being made, and is popularly cited as an indication that the Islamist movement was 
gathering pace.
132
 
 While Soltani was a key figure of the reformist movement in Algeria, his death in 
1984 meant that he missed the dramatic events of 1988 and the subsequent electoral 
successes of the FIS. Of the two men, it was Ahmed Sahnoun who had the potential 
to shape the Algerian Islamism of post-1988; his decision not to join the FIS, 
however, was crucial in determining the party‘s future and is indicative of the step 
towards greater politicisation favoured by the party‘s founding members. In keeping 
with the tradition of Islamic reformism, Sahnoun, a preacher, was wary of an overly 
political application of Islam, although his actions over the years placed him very 
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much in a position of dissidence with regard to the regime. He had, for example, 
participated in the same petition that led to Abassi‘s arrest in 1982, and gave regular 
sermons at a private (and therefore independent of state control) mosque in 
Constantine between 1973 and 1980.
133
 His politicised attitude to the state has led 
Ahmed Rouadjia to place him between the traditional body of reformist ulama and 
the political Islamists who marked the 1990s.
134
 As such, Sahnoun would have been 
following on from the work of Ben Badis, who in turn had used the intellectual 
contributions of early reformist thinkers like al-Afghani and Abduh to have a greater 
impact on society and politics: ‗on constate [avec Ben Badis] une évolution réelle de 
la pensée réformiste avec, très clairement, ses premiers ancrages dans l‘action sociale 
et politique‘.135 However, Sahnoun ultimately opted for the primacy of religion over 
politics when he refused to join the FIS in 1989. In the wake of the October riots in 
1988, President Chadli felt it was necessary to meet with key Islamist figures, if only 
because there were no other spokespersons for the rioters, who were mostly young 
and not affiliated to any movement as such.
136
 And so it was that Abassi, Belhadj and 
Mahfoud Nahnah (1942–2003)137 met with the President, and were thereby 
‗consacrés leaders du mouvement islamiste‘.138 The impetus this gave the movement 
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led to the establishment of various organisations, including that of Cheikh Sahnoun, 
Rabitat al-Da‟wa al-Islamiyya (League of the Islamic Call), which brought many of 
the leading Algerian Islamists together and included Abassi, Belhadj and Nahnah. 
However, al-Ahnaf et al. suggest that this ‗apolitical‘ league never had the potential 
to harness the energy of the Islamist movement as it existed post-‘88:  
Il était clair alors que cette organisation, qui se présentait comme apolitique et 
essentiellement conçue pour la défense et l‘illustration d‘un islam à l‘algérienne et en 
vue d‘affirmer l‘unité de la mouvance islamiste, ne pouvait être le cadre idoine d‘une 
agitation politique et d‘une activité multiforme en vue d‘instaurer un Etat islamique en 
Algérie.
139 
 
 It was of course the FIS that harnessed this energy, thereby making that crucial 
step away from a form of fundamentalism which, while clearly political in its 
outlook, eschewed any involvement in the state structures per se. In Chapter III, I 
will provide further details of the FIS‘ development, showing how the party 
ultimately evolved towards a specifically Algerian political outlook, while respecting 
a legal and constitutional approach to electoral politics. What I hope to have shown 
in this chapter is that two significant shifts were made by the Algerian Islamists. 
First, they challenged the self-serving statist nationalism of the FLN regime in an 
effort to emphasise the deeper roots of Algerian identity, i.e., its Islamic heritage. 
This, I have argued, reflects the transition identified by Smith, who says that vertical 
ethnies require the kind of impetus I suggest was provided by the FIS in order to 
move towards more active expressions of nationalism in the modern era. Secondly, 
they built on the ambivalent legacy of Islamic reformism, which was political in 
nature but never overtly so, in an effort to apply Islamic principles directly to 
governance via electoral participation. That the FIS built on earlier legacies 
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(nationalism and reformism) is evidence that it did not represent the rupture that so 
many feared.  
Reconciling public practice and private belief 
 I would like to conclude this chapter with some general remarks about religion in 
the public and political spheres, in order to emphasise the popular reality of public 
faith in the modern world. This ties in with the approach I adopt in Chapter II, which 
argues in favour of an open assessment of democracy that would better accommodate 
the realities of many non-Western societies, where religion is often an unquestioned 
element of public life. John Esposito has remarked that Western development theory 
in recent centuries has equated secularism with progress and religion with 
backwardness.
140
 This has led to a common perception among the intellectual elite 
that fundamentalist belief in a system of faith is a minority phenomenon and one that 
is to be feared, when in actual fact it is and always has been the most common of 
spiritual models. For most people in the world, to be a believer is to subscribe to the 
fundamental tenets of one‘s faith; globally it is only in more select circles that belief 
has come to mean something more personal and relativistic. The world is as fiercely 
religious now as it ever has been. Indeed, it is the more conservative and dogmatic 
schools that are thriving, while those religious institutions that have adapted to or 
compromised with secularism—Catholicism in Western Europe and Protestantism in 
the US, for example—are in decline. 
 One feature of the modern era is the speed with which change is accepted, even 
expected. The absence of any spiritual references in public life, for example, has 
become the norm for people living in most Western democracies. Many are surprised 
looking back at a time when man could have been so naive as to have afforded such 
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an abstract notion as morality a place in positive law or governmental discourse. And 
yet the exclusion from public governance of direct reference to such faith-bound 
concepts is a relatively recent development. This is what is so surprising about the 
dominance of secularist thought: not that it has succeeded in gaining so much 
ground—for one can see its strengths as a viable political model—but that in such a 
short time span, and for so many people, it has become so unequivocally the only 
possible model one could perceive as progressive and modern. And this despite 
millennia of non-secular rule and openly religious influence on public life. 
 This dominant force in Western politics is responsible not only for the erosion of 
religious influence in public life, but also for our failure to come to terms with the 
force of political Islam and, more generally, the growth of popular religious 
movements worldwide. So unequivocal has the secular mindset become for most 
lawmakers, political analysts, journalists and other influential figures in public 
communication in the West that any other political view is often perceived as 
somehow backward. This goes a long way to explaining the disbelief with which 
many in the West view the rise of the Islamist movement globally. It can be hard to 
comprehend how an ideology that, to them, seems so inherently ‗unmodern‘ can gain 
any ground at all. And so it is that general misconceptions develop, such as the view 
that this movement is necessarily the domain of an ‗extremist‘ minority, or that its 
proponents must be ‗targeting‘ the disenfranchised and ill-educated in order to swell 
their numbers. It is inconceivable to many that large numbers of well-educated 
people elsewhere in the world could subscribe to an ideology that would allow 
unscientific and unobjective principles play a role in the governance of their society. 
Secularism has itself become akin to a dogma, whereby any political model with 
religious undertones is perceived as a threat to democracy and progress. It is against 
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such presumptions that so many Muslims have reacted with anger—all the more so 
in Algeria, where it was the people‘s own representatives who propagated these same 
presumptions by shutting the door on political Islam.  
 Esposito highlights the irony in the secularist view of religion as a private matter 
that should in no way reflect any more than personal experience.
141
 To see religion as 
a compartmentalised system of belief is to ignore the role played by human history in 
the evolution of faith, much like a conservative cleric who insists on the 
independence of religious truth from human intervention. Of course, in reality belief 
systems develop as part of the interplay between public and private life. No religious 
movement can be detached from the political, social, economic and cultural context 
in which it is born. The texts, principles and rules of a given system of faith are 
developed in accordance with what is understood to be just and instructive at a 
particular time and in a particular place. This is not to say that religious doctrine does 
not extend beyond the short-term needs and values of a given society—it does 
introduce ideas that are generally noble, meaningful and lasting—but the role played 
in its development by men and women such as scholars and preachers makes its 
application bound by context. This is true whether or not one chooses to believe in 
the unworldly authority of a deity, as all belief systems depend to a greater or lesser 
extent on the contributions made by worldly humans. To see faith as an exclusively 
private matter is to ignore the roles played by believers and non-believers alike in 
constantly shaping our perception of what it stands for. These roles are played out in 
a more or less ‗public‘ sphere: one‘s conception of faith may be influenced by, for 
example, a group conversation in a private setting, graffiti in a public place, or an 
article in a widely-read newspaper. This explicit interplay between the public and 
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private spheres, although not formalised in positive law or public policy documents, 
indelibly marks our political model in as much as it marks those who contribute to 
the design and implementation of that model. In other words, even in the West, the 
insistence that faith can only be private ignores the evidence that it cannot but be 
public at times. Secularism, when applied fundamentally, runs the risk of being 
dogmatic in its insistence that religiosity in society is anti-modern, and illusory in its 
belief that governance is possible without due influence from a long history of faith 
and society mutually shaping one another. 
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Chapter II: Islamism and Challenges 
to the Democratic Paradigm 
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While the West criticizes Islamic 
governments for not being 
democratic, it also supports 
governments who are not democratic 
and are keeping Islamic movements 
from developing their ideas – Rachid 
al-Ghannouchi
1
 
 
 This chapter is about challenging restricted interpretations of modernity and 
political Islam. The central ideas of this thesis are based on the conviction that Islam 
can inform the political structures of majority Muslim nations where there is a 
mandate for Islamic political parties to hold office. And that this need not threaten 
the values on which modernity is thought to be built. In our assessment of modernity, 
it is of course necessary to hold an ongoing debate about what constitutes fairness in 
society, democratic principles in governance, freedom in human interaction and so 
on. This means challenging any new political models that might be seen to 
undermine the acquis of modern times, such as the protection of individual liberties 
or the alternation of power in government, but it is equally important in this debate to 
avoid any intellectual posturing that would be reminiscent of the hegemony of 
Western—and especially imperial—political and intellectual contributions. In the 
context of Islamism this is especially sensitive, as the influence of religion in the 
political order is anathema to the modernist view that viable politics is essentially 
secular. I would wish to challenge any definition of modernity that depends on such a 
view: this thesis is underpinned by the view that the modern world is porous and 
complex, and as such no longer corresponds to dominant (mostly Western) notions of 
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 Cited in John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, ‗Democratization and Islam‘, Middle East Journal, 
45/3 (summer 1991), pp. 427–40, p. 438. 
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modernity. In terms of politics, the dominant paradigm of modernity is one that 
privileges the rights of the individual over those of the community and refuses the 
politicisation (and even public nature) of religious belief, two issues I will be 
addressing in more detail in this chapter. As such, it better accommodates the 
Western political order. Yet the pluralist nature of society today means that 
homogenous definitions of democracy and modernism are no longer adequate.
2
 One 
of my aims in this chapter is to challenge two differing approaches to the Islamist 
question, particularly as observed in the work of three French-language political 
scientists:
3
 the first—and most common—approach is to operate a kind of barrier to 
entry ultimately denying Islamism admission into the modern political paradigm 
(Lahouari Addi and Olivier Roy); the second is to under-emphasise the influence of 
Islam in Islamist thought in order better to convince (presumably Western) readers 
that parties like the FIS should be admitted into this paradigm (François Burgat).  
Section 1 – Democratic theorising 
 One of the key questions in the analysis of events in 1990s Algeria—particularly, 
it would seem, analysis done by Western observers—is the extent to which the FIS 
was in fact a democratic party. What some call the interruption of the electoral 
process, others refer to as an assault on democracy. But to what extent can we speak 
in terms of democracy when assessing the events of Algeria in January 1992? Can a 
party like the FIS be admitted into the democratic paradigm? Or is it necessarily 
excluded by virtue of certain perceived incompatibilities between its discourse and 
                                                     
2
 For an account of how modernity is being reshaped in the context of the world‘s major religions, see 
Robert W. Hefner, ‗Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age‘, 
Annual Review of Anthropology, 27 (1998), pp. 83–104. 
3
 I refer here to Lahouari Addi, Olivier Roy and François Burgat. Addi, it should be said, is in fact 
Algerian-born, but now works in France. 
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the universal tenets of democracy? Later, in Chapter III, I will look at the specific 
actions of the FIS in order to provide some perspective to help answer these 
questions. In Chapter II, however, I will examine the question of our theoretical 
approach to democracy as experienced outside of the Western political tradition. I 
will first draw on Western political theory in the hope of showing that at least some 
elements of political Islam are not as unfamiliar or unpalatable as is often thought, 
before going on to examine the work of Addi, Roy and Burgat, challenging the 
restrictive interpretations each offers in different ways. This chapter will serve as a 
theoretical complement to Chapters III and IV. Section 1 (challenging orthodox, 
Western definitions of democracy) supports my portrayal of the FIS in Chapter III as 
a dynamic, new political force, and Section 3 (on sovereignty, Islamism and 
legitimacy) further complements the view that the FIS respected procedure 
(including popular sovereignty) and was politically legitimate. Section 2 (in 
particular Addi and Roy‘s refusal to recognise Islamist democracy) reflects the tactic 
adopted by the Algerian regime during the civil conflict, when the essence of the 
Islamist opposition was distorted in order to portray it as demonic and irrational. 
 I would like to begin by looking at some theoretical approaches to democracy 
where Islam is not a direct concern. I will pay particular attention to those elements 
of democratic theory that find resonance in political Islam, but which do not address 
it explicitly. First, however, it is important to emphasise the changeable nature of 
democracy, a model that has been subject to differing interpretations for many 
centuries. I cannot offer a complete history of democracy, of course, but would like 
to highlight some of its different manifestations. 
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Section 1.1 – Democracy: some history and problems of definition 
 Broadly speaking, democracy has evolved from a system of direct rule by the 
people, in ancient Greece, to the more familiar and now common form of 
representative government adopted by most democratic states worldwide. When 
steps were first taken, more than two and a half thousand years ago, to hold regular 
meetings at which citizens could participate in a public decision-making process, we 
must assume there was no intention to ‗implement a coherently thought-out general 
conception of the political and social good‘; this development was, rather, ‗a severely 
local response to protracted local difficulties‘.4 Nor was it an open and equitable 
system that gave all citizens the right to participate; indeed, ‗the barriers to the 
acquisition of citizenship by outsiders were raised higher as the history of classical 
Athens went on‘.5 The same was true of ancient Rome, where not even a majority of 
the city‘s inhabitants were part of the ‗citizen class‘.6 This elitism was directly 
challenged in some of the Italian city-states during the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries, when 
councils that were nominated and effectively ruled by the nobility (podestà) saw the 
emergence of competing councils (societates).
7
 Although such developments can be 
seen as democratic in that they represented a challenge to the notion that governance 
was a God-given right enjoyed by certain members of society, Skinner reminds us 
that these city-republics were never considered to be democracies.
8
 At what point, 
then, did democracy emerge? The 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries saw the rise of 
constitutional government in places like Britain, France, North America, 
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 John Dunn (ed.), Democracy the Unfinished Journey: 508 BC to AD 1993 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. v. 
5
 Simon Hornblower, ‗Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in Ancient Greece‘, in 
Dunn (ed.), p. 3. 
6
 Bernard Crick, Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 
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7
 Quentin Skinner, ‗The Italian City-Republics‘ in Dunn (ed.), p. 58. 
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Scandinavia, Russia and the Iberian Peninsula.
9
 This was after widespread challenges 
to closed systems of privilege such as feudalism, monarchy and aristocracy, but it 
might be argued that this still did not constitute democracy, as universal suffrage had 
yet to appear.
10
 However, perhaps the necessary momentum had been built up. Jean 
Baechler, in his study of democracy, argues that following the French Revolution the 
peasantry had no difficulty in making collective decisions and playing a role in 
municipal life, and that the working classes of the early 20
th
 century needed little 
encouragement to forge a role for themselves in democratic governance, as political 
society already displayed both pluralist and democratic leanings:  
Il a suffi de moins d‘une génération, pour que les premiers signes de cette aptitude 
[ouvrière à constituer des centres autonomes de décision efficaces] apparussent [...] Ces 
succès et ces victoires auraient été impossibles et moins rapides, si [...] le régime 
politique et social n‘avait pas été déjà polycentrique en fait et démocratique par 
inclination.
11
 
 It should be clear that we cannot with any assurance consider democracy to have 
emerged at a given point in history; its evolution was not linear or steady, but 
circumstantial and irregular. And this continues to be the case today, with ongoing 
debate about how we should measure democratic systems.
12
 The history of 
democracy has seen innumerable interpretations that have shaped and reshaped our 
understanding of the democratic paradigm. And this paradigm continues to evolve, as 
the preponderance of discourse on Islam and democracy shows. Indeed, it should be 
remembered that democracy has only recently come to be accepted in most Western 
societies: ‗Widespread acceptance of democracy as a legitimate basis for political 
order is a phenomenon of the modern era. It tends to be forgotten that as late as the 
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 For a historical account, see Donald W. Treadgold, Freedom: A History (New York: New York 
University Press, 1990), Ch. 7. 
10
 Ibid, p. 227. 
11
 Jean Baechler, Démocraties (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1985), p. 533. 
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 See David Beetham (ed.), Defining and Measuring Democracy (London: Sage, 1994). 
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end of the eighteenth century, most Western political thinking was based on 
principles other than democracy‘.13 Its history, therefore, reveals not an atavistic 
model but one which has depended on circumstance. It follows that our assessment 
of democracy in the context of Algerian politics must account for Algerian 
circumstance and Algerian viewpoints. As two commentators put it: ‗our 
understanding of democratization will not be facilitated if we ignore the way 
democracy is interpreted in the culture in question‘.14 
 In terms of definitions, the task of defining democracy is clearly one of 
interpretation. Indeed, it is itself a highly political act. One approach to be avoided is 
to rely on specific existing models in order to deduce the essence of democracy, for 
if we assume it is something that is applied—and not innate—then it follows that no 
one system should act as a benchmark.
15
 Alternatively we can seek to identify 
minimum ‗requirements‘, but here too there is room for debate: for example, the 
basic notion that citizens have a role to play in the exercise of power already requires 
us to determine what we mean by ‗citizens‘ and ‗exercise of power‘. Anthony Birch 
has argued that we cannot employ the terms required to define democracy in a 
‗value-free way‘.16 When referring to ‗rule by the people‘, he says, our values (and 
perhaps our gender) will determine whether we mean women to be necessarily 
included in this category. And, though few would argue against such inclusion today, 
what of those democracies that only accorded women the right to vote in recent 
times? Was pre-1950s France undemocratic? And, Birch asks, would apartheid South 
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 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, ‗Islam‘s Democratic Essence‘, Middle East Quarterly, 3/1 
(September 1994), pp. 3–11, p. 3. David Held makes the same remark in his Models of Democracy, 
third edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 1. 
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 Nikolai Biryukov and Victor Sergeyev, ‗The Idea of Democracy in the West and in the East‘, in 
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 See Michael Saward, ‗Democratic Theory and Indices of Democratization‘, in Beetham (ed.), p. 6. 
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 Anthony H. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, second edition (New York: 
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Africa have been more democratic (or less undemocratic) if the ruling whites had 
been a sizeable majority rather than a minority? Similarly, the term ‗rule‘ is 
problematic. Just how much influence must the electorate have in order to participate 
in democratic rule? Is it sufficient to cast one‘s vote, or must there be greater 
involvement in the decision-making processes that are binding on the population?
17
 
One might argue that the gap between electoral participation and policy-making is 
growing, as increasing population levels mean that a smaller percentage of civil 
society can serve as public representatives. This might go some way towards 
explaining the apparent rise in voter apathy in what might be considered some of the 
world‘s most successful democracies.18 
Section 1.2 – Communitarian-liberal debate 
 If I highlight the difficulty of defining democracy, it is because I wish to argue 
that there is no objective or infallible criteria for excluding political Islam from the 
democratic paradigm. Indeed, some of the same values advocated by theorists of 
democracy are harnessed by political Islam. I would like to take an example from 
within democratic theory to show that, independent of any concerns related to Islam, 
a debate already exists—one which, like the Islamist discourse, challenges values 
such as libertinism, individualism, universalism and materialism without calling into 
question the democratic tradition as such. I thereby hope to show that to admit into 
the democratic paradigm those elements of political Islam that argue for less 
emphasis on, for example, material gain or the individual pursuit of happiness, and 
greater emphasis on family values or a sense of community, would not necessarily 
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 Birch, p. 74. 
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 To take just two recent examples: the regional elections in France held in March 2010 saw voter 
participation levels at a record low (Le Monde, 14 March 2010); and the scandal over MPs‘ expenses 
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disrupt the democratic model. This is partly because, as I have argued, there is no 
static model in the first place, but also because democratic theorists in the West have 
been debating similar issues for some time. I am referring here to the communitarian-
liberal debate, which one commentator has referred to as the ‗central debate in 
Anglo-American political theory during the 1980s‘.19 I would go further, and suggest 
that this debate continues to be crucial to ongoing efforts to create a just society 
worldwide. The reader may wish to examine developments in the field of human 
rights law, where the historical emphasis on individual rights is being complemented 
by consideration of cases where the legal protection of group rights might be 
required.
20
 As such, this is a recognition that the focus on individual rights is not 
sufficient to eliminate gross inequalities that affect identifiable groups within society. 
While this is not exactly the same argument as I present here in relation to political 
Islam, there is one key connection: it is the realisation that organising the world as 
though composed of individuals who can lead fulfilling and equitable lives as long as 
their individual rights are respected may not be the most effective model.  
 To understand the context of the communitarian-liberal debate in political theory, 
we must look back at a key moment in the development of modern liberalism. When 
John Rawls published A Theory of Justice in 1971,
21
 he made a number of significant 
contributions to political thought: he effectively supplanted the utilitarian view of 
liberalism that ‗the greatest good‘ should be sought for ‗the greatest number‘, on the 
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basis that this required morally reprehensible choices to be made and because ‗a 
rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximized the 
algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic 
rights and interests‘;22 he introduced a rights-based view of distributive justice that 
asserted the need to defend those with undeserved disadvantages;
23
 and he built on 
Kant‘s moral and political teachings by replacing, in the words of Michael Sandel, 
‗Germanic obscurities with a domesticated metaphysic more congenial to the Anglo-
American temper‘.24 Sandel is referring here to the work of Kant on justice and 
morality, suggesting that Rawls‘ writings would have been more easily digestible for 
Anglophone readers. Indeed, A Theory of Justice, although philosophical in nature, 
offers concepts that are easily applicable in substantive ways. Perhaps the central 
contribution of this work is Rawls‘ notion of the ‗original position‘, a hypothetical 
standpoint from which man would choose the principles by which to govern society, 
from behind a ‗veil of ignorance‘, i.e. prior to any knowledge of his personal 
interests or allegiances and with no specific views of what constitutes good in 
society. Rawls therefore imagines a human subject capable of judgement that is 
detached from its specific environment. He argues that such a subject, not knowing 
whether it is endowed with natural advantages or not, would tend to be risk-adverse 
in its conception of how society should be governed, because it might find itself 
among the less well-off. Rights and the protection of the disadvantaged are therefore 
paramount from the perspective of the original position, which has led liberal 
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political theory to advocate the primacy of rights, something that is at the core of the 
communitarian-liberal debate.  
 The liberal tradition insists on the rational-thinking subject who enjoys freedom of 
choice, and correspondingly argues against any authoritative assertion of what is 
good for society: as individual free-thinkers, the argument goes, we decide what is 
best for us and the state‘s role is to protect our basic rights, not guide us towards a 
particular way of life. This implies that the assertion of rights should not be based on 
a specific conception of the good in life, but rather should be universal and based on 
something like the abstract subject in Rawls‘ original position. This assertion of the 
primacy of rights has led to the suggestion that ‗the right is prior to the good‘,25 
reflecting the liberal position that universal justice should take pre-eminence over 
particularistic claims as to what is just. Jürgen Habermas has addressed this issue in 
the context of the communitarian-liberal debate, arguing for a sort of compromise 
between communitarianism and what he calls proceduralist politics, i.e., where 
inviolable procedures cannot be modified by specific interests. He suggests that no 
legal norms should be constructed without concern both for universal principles of 
justice and the competing interests in any given society that must be accommodated 
as part of the common good.
26
 Ultimately, however, he rejects the establishment of 
any ‗ethical convictions‘ on which justice would depend, saying that justice cannot 
be related ‗to a specific collective and its form of life‘.27 In other words, we can and 
must discard our own private contexts in order to reach objective conclusions about 
public justice.  
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 This, it would seem, cuts to the core of modern democracy: our private and public 
selves are kept separate. And Rawls must take this as a given when he advocates 
principles of justice that exclude private conceptions of the good. But is it not too 
great an assumption to expect people to disentangle the moral judgements they make 
in their private lives from the principles to which they subscribe in public 
governance? Can we reasonably expect people to live a dualistic life as citizens, on 
the one hand, and as moral persons on the other? This may be less problematic in 
established Western democracies, where people have come to accept, particularly in 
relation to their personal faith, that the public and private spheres are distinct. I tried 
to challenge this view in my closing remarks to Chapter I, arguing that there is 
always a certain amount of interplay between the two spheres, whether explicit or 
not. But even if we accept that the public and private have been successfully set apart 
in many modern democracies, it is clear that in a society such as Algeria a distinction 
between public citizen and private Muslim will be much harder to achieve. We are 
approaching, here, the crux of the problem in assessing the relationship between 
Islam and democracy: it is a question of barriers to entry into the democratic 
paradigm. By insisting on a pre-requisite to democracy, such as that the state cannot 
take into account the common moral position of its citizens in determining principles 
of justice, we do not encourage its growth but render it more exclusive, which in turn 
serves as a reminder of recent domination on the terrain of political ideology. 
 Later in this chapter, we will look at some of the analysis to come from French-
language political scientists in relation to Islamism and the democratic question. I 
hope to show how this restricted view of the democratic model, with its pre-
requisites taken from the Western experience of democracy, operates the kind of 
barrier to entry to which I refer. For now, however, let us continue to focus on the 
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main point of contention between communitarians and liberals, which hinges on this 
view of our capacity for detached assessment of who we are and what we want, with 
the former arguing that it is artificial to suggest there can be any such detachment 
from certain constitutive elements of our being. So where the liberal will argue that, 
for example, a Catholic is free to act in accordance or discordance with the qualities 
or viewpoints one might associate with the Catholic way of life, the communitarian 
will suggest this is not only impossible but ontologically undesirable, as to detach 
oneself from something as formative as one‘s religious background would be to live 
a shallow and empty—let alone artificial—existence.28 It should be noted that 
religion is not singled out as being any more or less constitutive an element than, say, 
family or ethnicity; the communitarian argument is simply that our social 
relationships inescapably shape our understanding of the world around us and of 
ourselves. This, then, would appear to be a philosophical debate, one that offers 
differing conceptions of the self. Communitarians object to the liberal notion of an 
abstract subject capable of free choice that is independent of the social influences we 
are exposed to in life: the liberal self is abstract and individualistic; the 
communitarian self is context-bound and inter-subjective. However, the locus of this 
debate is political theory and as such it is also a debate with normative application. It 
is this dimension of the debate that interests us most: communitarians challenge the 
liberal model of democracy, arguing that it can be changed in practical ways to 
reflect the realities of an inter-subjective society. The fact that their argument is not 
delivered in a religious context does not make their approach any more valid than 
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that of an Islamist who is also willing to challenge and engage with the democratic 
model.  
 What then are the normative objections raised by communitarians about the 
liberal, individualist perception of how society functions? Broadly speaking, and 
following on from their criticism of the overly individualistic emphasis of liberal 
thought, they regret the ‗atomistic‘ shape that modern society has adopted, with its 
emphasis on liberal politics designed to provide individuals with the means to pursue 
their own autonomous goals. The implication of such politics is that the state must 
not advocate certain values over others: it is the prerogative of individuals to choose 
those that correspond to their personal goals. Daniel Bell describes the liberal 
conception of neutrality as ‗a system of mutual advantage requiring only that (a) 
people be willing to coexist with ways of life different than their own and (b) the 
government doesn‘t justify its policies by appealing to the presumed superiority of 
any particular conception of the good life‘.29 Bell later critiques the requirement that 
such neutrality prioritise ‗neutrally justifiable principles of justice‘, arguing that 
without a certain amount of recognition by a government that its principles are 
committed to the specific community that it governs, one basic tenet of governance 
has been disregarded, i.e. ‗that the government ought to concern itself first and 
foremost with meeting the needs and interests of the community over which it 
governs‘.30 That this is indeed a basic tenet of governance is made clear when one 
considers the amount of time in election campaigns generally dedicated to the 
national economy or domestic crime, when compared to foreign policy. 
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 For Charles Taylor, atomistic society and state neutrality can lead to diminished 
political participation and a corresponding decline in the standards of political 
governance. In The Malaise of Modernity, he depicts modern society as one that has 
shed its respect for the ‗old orders‘ and is too reliant on instrumental reason. This 
means that people make decisions based on economy and personal advantage, and 
disregard the ‗moral horizons‘ that once structured society and provided indications 
of our role in relation to others: ‗Once society no longer has a sacred structure, once 
social arrangements and modes of action are no longer grounded in the order of 
things or the will of God, they are in a sense up for grabs‘.31 In political terms, 
Taylor‘s view is that as long as a government can continue to provide the people with 
‗the means to the satisfactions of private life‘, then they will worry less about 
participating in the public sphere, the state can establish tighter bureaucracy, and, in 
his words, ‗the vicious cycle of soft despotism is joined‘.32 Taylor borrows the term 
‗soft despotism‘ (despotisme doux) from Alexis De Tocqueville, who described how 
the tyranny and despotism of old would in time be replaced by a sort of tutelage, 
designed to keep citizens in a child-like state—concerned only with their personal 
pleasures and therefore politically docile:  
[S]i le despotisme venait à s‘établir chez les nations démocratiques de nos jours [...] il 
serait plus étendu et plus doux [...] Au dessus [des citoyens] s‘élève un pouvoir 
immense et tutélaire, qui se charge seul d‘assurer leur jouissance et de veiller sur leur 
sort. Il est absolu, détaillé, régulier, prévoyant et doux. [...] il ne cherche [...] qu‘à les 
fixer irrévocablement dans l‘enfance; il aime que les citoyens se réjouissent, pourvu 
qu‘ils ne songent qu‘à se réjouir. [...] C‘est ainsi que tous les jours il rend moins utile et 
plus rare l‘emploi du libre arbitre ; qu‘il renferme l‘action de la volonté dans un plus 
petit espace, et dérobe peu à peu chaque citoyen jusqu‘à l‘usage de lui-même.33 
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 Taylor defends the use of De Tocqueville‘s analysis even in the context of modern 
Western democracies. Despite the possibility for ‗protest, free initiative, and 
irreverent challenges to authority‘ that he says these democracies offer, Taylor 
suggests they are nonetheless guilty of producing citizens who are ‗increasingly less 
capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out‘, a decline he ascribes to 
the fragmentation, or atomisation, of modern society.
34
 
 Robert Bellah, in his defence of democratic communitarianism, does not go quite 
as far in his critique of the modern state, but he does find fault in the modern-day 
emphasis on impetus that is external to the citizen.
35
 His belief is that our 
‗ontological individualism‘ leads us to see opportunity as the solution to all our 
problems; in other words, if each citizen can find the means necessary for the pursuit 
of his own goals, then there is no need for substantive agreement or cohesive 
governance. The external impetus for these individual opportunities comes, he says, 
from one of two sources—the market or the state. Bellah uses this assessment to 
show how the political world is not as divided as one may think: if most of the 
world‘s democracies use either the free market or the welfare state as ‗the most 
effective provider of those opportunities that will allow individuals to have a fair 
chance at making something of themselves‘, then it follows that there is not much of 
a gap between conservatives or liberals, Republicans or Democrats, capitalists or 
socialists, who advocate one over the other.
36
 Both ‗sides‘ agree that the solution is 
individualistic.  
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 Daniel Bell also emphasises how both the political left and right can be criticised 
in normative terms for their excessively individualist application of policy.
37
 Left-
wing governments, for example, may be guilty of ‗shifting power away from local 
communities and democratic institutions and towards centralized bureaucratic 
structures better equipped to administer the fair and equal distribution of benefits, 
thus leading to a growing sense of powerlessness and alienation from the political 
process‘.38 Furthermore, he points out that a society built on universal rights and 
entitlements, such as under the welfare state, can isolate people and render 
superfluous their interaction with the communities to which they belong. It is also 
clear, he says, that the political right, with its preference for free-market capitalism, 
can undermine the family (where inadequate parental leave is granted in the private 
sector, for example) and disrupt local communities (as happened following the mass 
dismissals during the Thatcher government). 
 Different theorists offer variations on the central theme of communitarianism—
the artificiality and danger of governing society as though composed of discrete 
individuals willing to cooperate only to the extent that their own purposes are served. 
Alisdair MacIntyre, for example, insists that modern ‗systematic‘ politics places too 
much weight on institutional arrangements and not enough on moral consensus, thus 
making the traditional expression of virtues in society impossible.
39
 Michael Walzer 
emphasises the need for political thought to reflect the traditions of the particular 
society in which it is formed, thereby allowing us to share the ‗world of meanings‘ 
that develop over time as part of those traditions.
40
 Some theorists emphasise the 
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importance of certain communities over others, drawing distinctions between those 
that involve voluntary association and those to which one is inextricably linked.
41
 
The common thread in communitarian discourse, however, is concern about the 
development of a modern society in which the essence of community belonging is 
diminished, and in which governance relates more to individual liberty than moral 
solidarity. The result, it is argued, is that individuals are losing a sense of who they 
are and governments are eschewing the search for consensus. 
Section 2 – Assessing Islamism: some perspectives from 
metropolitan France 
 My aim is not necessarily to take sides in the communitarian-liberal debate, but 
rather to highlight the similarities between the points raised by communitarians and 
the concerns voiced by Islamists. There are of course many different Islamist 
viewpoints, and I do not wish to speak of a homogenous whole. However it is safe to 
say that the Islamist movement, with its emphasis on Islamic morality, advocates in 
all cases a greater place in society for consensus and unity under God. And it decries 
the impact that modernisation, and Westernisation in particular, has had upon Islamic 
morality. For it is the evolution of the modern political order that has had a particular 
impact on the capacity for such morality to be ever-present in public life. With 
greater emphasis now placed on the individual, the fraternity that marks Islamic 
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society gives way to a different common bond: citizenship.
42
 One analyst of Algerian 
politics has sketched the difficulty for many Algerians of making the transition to a 
fully modern conception of public space and human interaction within communities. 
Lahouari Addi is an Algerian-born political scientist whose academic career has 
taken him from sociological and economic analysis (his early publications focused 
on banking and agricultural structures in colonial Algeria)
43
 to a more direct 
assessment of contemporary Algerian politics and the Islamist question in particular. 
We will return a little later in this chapter to his ideological assertions with regard to 
democracy, sovereignty and Islam, when I will show how his apparent openness to 
non-Western specificity is ultimately subordinated to his insistence on certain 
universal principles of democracy as experienced in Europe, and even more 
specifically in France. Now, however, I would like to focus on his comments with 
regard to community and Islam and the challenges that have accompanied modernity 
in Algeria. 
Section 2.1 – Lahouari Addi 
 The traditional Algerian society depicted by Addi is one in which informal control 
in many segments of the population is maintained by unofficial community 
structures. He argues that the single-party regime under the FLN failed to provide 
public links between citizens outside of the family or community units, meaning that 
a public sphere in which individuals could interact independently of these units was 
never created. The historic strength of these units means that the individual who is 
free of attachments, as described in the liberal political tradition examined above, is 
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regarded with mistrust and is left in a precarious position. This became a major 
problem in Algerian society, Addi suggests, as more and more people began to 
migrate to urban areas in the wake of independence. The effect of such migration 
was to create neighbourhoods in which anonymity now reigned, a phenomenon that 
left many ill at ease as it eroded the efficiency of the ‗contrôle social informel‘ that 
was possible in tight communities:  
[L]‘anonymat dans la ville, favorable à l‘agressivité et à la délinquance, faisait regretter 
l‘efficacité de la pression du village sur l‘individu […] En effet, les habitants du 
quartier, ne connaissant pas sa parentèle, se sentent désarmés face à un individu 
susceptible de mal se comporter sans « faire rougir de honte » les siens.
44
 
 The suggestion here is that individualism was feared by some on the basis of 
morality; there was a worry that without accountability and free from the pressures 
exerted by the family and/or community, individuals would no longer benefit from 
the moral checks and balances that would otherwise keep them from subverting 
community norms. This, Addi suggests, is what explains the strength of the growing 
Islamist movement in urban areas: its proponents sought to combat ‗le désordre 
urbain et la licence‘, thereby compensating for the loss of informal control brought 
about by the massive population changes of the post-independence period.
45
 
Identifying the state‘s failure to provide formal social structures outside of the 
family, the FIS sought to consolidate social harmony via religion. This implied group 
participation in the safeguard of religious ethics, and therefore less pressure on the 
state to provide the kind of public sphere associated with secular Europe, presumably 
a political tactic on the part of the FIS to distance the FLN regime from the provision 
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of public order in the mindset of the population.
46
 Indeed, this was a tactic that the 
FIS employed in other ways: its offer of various forms of ‗public‘ assistance prior to 
the municipal and parliamentary elections of 1990/91 served to cement the 
perception that it was already a key player in the community, providing the kind of 
services one would ordinarily associate with the state (family planning, financial 
advice, aid in the aftermath of the 1989 earthquake).
47
 Martin Stone has suggested 
that the key strength of the FIS was as a ‗corrective‘ movement, compensating for 
the lacunae in public services with the help of financing from wealthy donors in 
Saudi Arabia, as well as domestic investment from ‗merchants‘.48 This spirit of 
entr‟aide was a key component of the FIS‘ success: by highlighting what could be 
achieved independently of the state, the party emphasised the value of community 
support—in a context of Islamic morality—in the face of individual adversity.  
 The thrust of Addi‘s Les mutations de la société algérienne is his attempt to 
identify the contradictions in contemporary Algerian society. He argues that there is 
a desire in Algeria for a departure from the pre-eminence of the family structure in 
favour of a freer and more individualist form of association, but that individuals 
continue to propagate the ‗habitus communautaire‘ as a result of the state‘s failure to 
build a modern society.
49
 What is interesting is the rigidity of his definition of such a 
society. Writing in Le Monde diplomatique, he challenges the capacity of Algerian 
society for development, asking whether it is ready ‗à se concevoir comme une 
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collection artificielle d‘individus libres, et non plus comme un ensemble organique 
doté d‘une âme collective, à l‘intérieur duquel l‘existence de l‘individu n‘a de sens 
que par rapport au destin du groupe‘.50 Elsewhere, he argues that modernity is ‗built 
on the depoliticization of religion‘.51 Significantly, he says such depoliticisation is 
not really possible in the context of Islam, which does not have recognised 
spokespersons in the way that, say, the Catholic Church does, and can therefore be 
represented (politically or apolitically) by any Muslim believer. However, he rejects 
the Islamist ‗utopia‘ of combined spirituality and profanity, saying that what is 
needed is a careful re-working of political modernism to fit the ‗mold of Arab-
Islamic culture‘.52 This is possible, he says, but must not come from the streets, as in 
the case of the FIS. While it is positive that Addi acknowledges the capacity of 
political modernism to be revised or ‗re-worked‘, it is clear that he refuses to accept 
the arrival of political forces like the FIS, which he identifies not as a political party, 
but as a ‗sentiment‘, a ‗pre-political culture‘.53 I will show in Chapter III that the FIS 
in fact behaved in an eminently political fashion. What disconcerts Addi is perhaps 
that the FIS‘ popularity belies his assertion that most Algerians seek a more 
individualist society, free from the ‗habitus communautaire‘. Ultimately, the party‘s 
electoral successes undermine his rigid understanding of modernity, which he 
repeatedly asserts is fundamentally about creating a public sphere in which legal 
norms (Etat de droit) can be constructed; he describes this space as ‗le lieu de 
naissance de la société globale composée d‘individus libres des attaches 
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communautaires et des solidarités familiales et consanguines‘.54 He clearly has a 
vision of modernity, therefore, that subscribes to the liberal tradition described 
earlier, in which we are free to shed the ‗attachments‘ and ‗solidarities‘ of our 
environment. He even seems to laud the development of the kind of material and 
legalistic foundation bemoaned by the communitarians, arguing that while modernity 
inevitably entails the loss of some authentic and indigenous features of society, it 
compensates for such a loss by providing individuals with ‗rapports marchands 
balisés par des règles politico-juridiques‘.55 And this model of modernity, he argues, 
is fundamentally incompatible with the group-oriented societal structures envisioned 
by the Islamists, who would endeavour to preserve community values in cities 
populated by millions. 
 It is interesting to view Addi‘s analysis in the light of Smith‘s description of 
lateral and vertical ethnies, explored in Chapter I. We saw how Smith warned against 
exclusively modernist assessments of the nation, challenging any definition that did 
not take account of the historical ethnic traditions that form a nation‘s identity. One 
problem we might identify with Addi‘s analysis is not so much that he fails to 
recognise these traditions in the case of Algeria, but rather that he sees them as a 
hindrance to the country‘s ‗modern‘ development. I argued in Chapter I that it is 
useful to see Algeria as representing elements of both of Smith‘s ethnies: while the 
‗lateral‘ structures of occupied Algeria are evident in the layered society that colonial 
domination implies, and these structures could even be said to have persisted 
somewhat after independence with the dominance of a secular, Francophone elite, 
there are clearer signs that Algeria is above all a nation typical of Smith‘s vertical 
ethnie (one in which organised religion is the vehicle for traditions and social bonds). 
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Smith explains that in such cases the transition to modernity tends to blend the ethnic 
traditions of the past with the imperatives of the modern nation. Addi, on the other 
hand, by arguing that it is misguided to seek to preserve communitywide morality, 
effectively rejects the mobilisation of a shared heritage as incompatible with the 
necessarily rigid definition of modern society. This is an example of the kind of 
barrier to entry to the democratic paradigm that I have suggested is being operated 
against emerging democratic forces like the FIS: Addi seems to view society as a 
modern phenomenon that is to be defined in opposition to traditional structures; this 
in turn means that any political thought that values such structures (and any voters 
willing to support such thinkers) is automatically excluded from the ‗modern‘ 
political process, i.e., the construction of a modern society made up of individuals no 
longer ‗restrained‘ by their family/community ties and who find support from the 
state in the form of an ‗Etat de droit‘, ‗rapports marchands‘ and ‗règles politico-
juridiques‘.  
Section 2.2 – Olivier Roy 
 Addi is not the only analyst to identify an uneasy relationship between Islamism 
and the inescapable features of modernity. Olivier Roy, perhaps best known for his 
thesis that political Islam has failed,
56
 identifies certain factors that have shown the 
essence of Islamism to be misguided. One such factor is the spread, or ‗banalisation‘, 
of openly Islamic modes of expression. In a process he calls ‗réislamisation‘, Roy 
explains how the original impetus of the Islamist movement—its insistence on the 
fusion between the religious and the political—has been lost as a form of secular 
space has developed with the increasing re-islamicisation of Muslim societies 
worldwide. What he means by this seemingly paradoxical assertion is that 
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widespread expressions of the Islamic faith in public spaces allow religion to operate 
outside of the political sphere (albeit in the public sphere), and therefore outside of 
the aegis of the Islamists; in other words there is a separation between the religious 
and the political, something he says that Islamists expressly combated as they sought 
a monopoly on both. This, Roy says, reinforces the assertion that the religious and 
the political can never be one, and that all Islamist claims to offer a complete mode 
of social being were destined to be proven false: ‗[la réislamisation] se fait en dehors 
de l‘ordre politique, réduit alors à sa logique propre, ce qui souligne l‘impossibilité 
de « totalisation » sociale propre à l‘islamisme‘.57  
 This certainly seems to be an original argument: Roy has effectively reinterpreted 
the notion of secularism, broadening its scope from the rigid and typically French 
laïcité, which sometimes even appears hostile to religion, and applying it to the 
growth of Islamic practices that are distinct from any politico-religious objectives. 
The problem with this viewpoint, however, is Roy‘s assumption that the Islamist 
movement claims some kind of monopoly over religious expression: if the non-
political manifestation of one‘s Islamic faith can be seen as a challenge to the success 
of Islamism, as Roy argues, then it follows that Islamists desire such faith to be 
expressed within the framework of their political authority.
58
 It is more likely, in my 
view, that the rise of Islamist politics reflects what its partisans believe to be an 
inherent characteristic of the people—an Islamic culture that transcends politics. 
Here we can identify some tension in Roy‘s analysis: he himself emphasises that in 
their desire to create an Islamic state, many ‗neofundamentalist‘ movements, 
including the FIS, encourage its development to come from the people (‗par le bas‘), 
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and not be imposed from on high.
59
 This implies that the objective of such groups is 
to harness and encourage the spiritual sincerity of the masses and give it state 
recognition; it is to formalise something that is already effectively in place. Indeed, 
Roy goes so far as to say that in Islamist thought the role of institutions has always 
been diminished, as emphasis is placed on the virtue of the people who make up an 
Islamic society rather than the organs responsible for its governance. In such a 
society, he says, there would be great value placed on communal virtue rather than 
state-sanctioned civic modes of being: ‗les relations sociales seraient l‘expression des 
vertus individuelles et n‘auraient pas besoin d‘être médiatisées par des institutions‘.60 
But this is the basis for Roy‘s assertion that Islamist ideology is destined to run up 
against an impasse: ‗Le modèle politique islamiste ne pouvant en fait être réalisé que 
dans l‘homme et non dans les institutions, cela suffit à rendre impossible une polis, 
une « cité » islamiste‘.61  
 At least two objections can be made to this line of argument. First, it is unclear 
just why a diminished role for political institutions implies the redundancy of 
Islamist thought. It is only because Roy‘s understanding of a modern ‗polis‘ requires 
strong institutions rather than community-centred governance that he can draw a 
conclusion about the impossibility of the Islamist ideology. Essentially, he would 
only admit parties like the FIS into the political sphere if their objectives and 
methods were more closely aligned with his restricted interpretation of successful 
political power. He consistently argues that Islamism has failed because it never 
managed to redraw the geopolitical boundaries of the Muslim world,
62
 but this seems 
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like an excessive pre-requisite for a political movement not to be written off. Salwa 
Ismail has suggested that the success of the Islamist movement reaches beyond state 
and government alone, highlighting the wider impact it has had by redefining some 
of the political stakes in the modern Muslim world:  
Some Islamists have rendered the defense of morality a continual test of the state‘s 
legitimacy. Others have rivaled the state in providing social services, mobilizing local 
communities‘ resources and responding to vital needs. In all this, Islamists are both 
conscious strategists and beneficiaries of deeper social change. Islamist politics, 
understood in this way, has proven its adaptability and resiliency.
63
 
 Secondly, Roy‘s conclusion implies that if an Islamist government were to 
embrace the modern nation-state structure, this would signify a failure on their part 
to implement their political vision. Once again, this all-or-nothing approach only 
serves to make the political sphere exclusive and rigid. Of course we will see failure 
if we adopt a literal interpretation of Islamist rhetoric that appears to reject modern 
political processes, but we should focus more on actions than words. When judging 
the success or failure, practicability or artificiality, of political Islam, what exactly is 
it that we would expect in real terms were an Islamist party to reach power? And 
prior to the electoral process, surely we should consider it more important for parties 
to respect legal procedure than to produce literature and speeches that are easily 
digestible in terms of the status quo. There can be no doubt that parties like the FIS 
intend to destabilise the body politic, so it is no surprise that their discourse 
emphasises massive change. But can we really judge their success on the basis of the 
margin between what they claim and what they do? Burgat, who as we will see is a 
consistent advocate of the need to accommodate the emerging political challenge 
from the Islamist camp, argues that too many observers have taken a literal approach 
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when assessing the feasibility of implementing the vision of political Islam. He 
argues that the early ‗acritical‘ references to religious virtue as the guiding force of 
Islamic society need to be read in the context of a fledgling political movement, 
trying to come to terms with exactly what it sought to achieve. Critiquing Roy‘s 
premature conclusion that political Islam has failed, he prefers to see the departure 
from a radical and zealous discourse as an example of how the Islamist movement 
has evolved, rather than as proof that its fate was sealed because of ideological dead 
ends. Perhaps the central difference between Burgat‘s approach and that of analysts 
like Addi or Roy, is his insistence that Islamism is about reconstructing identity 
rather than applying dogmatism to politics; he describes a movement which has 
moderated and revised its insistence on perennial virtues: ‗la lecture ahistorique et 
acritique de la référence religieuse a évolué pour s‘inscrire ou pour se diluer dans une 
dynamique beaucoup plus large de reconstruction identitaire‘.64 
 The restrictive reading offered to us by Roy is also clear in his use of the term 
‗neofundamentalist‘, as he draws a careful distinction between Islamism and 
neofundamentalism. He suggests that in many cases what began as Islamist politics 
(‗une synthèse fragile entre islam et modernité politique‘)65 ‗slipped‘ (‗glissé‘) 
towards a more puritanical and populist attempt to generate a purification of the 
people, reinstate shari‘a law, and thereby create an Islamic state; this is what he 
terms neofundamentalism, and he identifies the FIS as the ‗prototype‘ of these 
movements.
66
 He says their objective was less about effecting change at the level of 
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state policies than about fundamentally changing society (mores and popular 
expressions of Islam), but that they still sought to gain political representation in 
state institutions.
67
 Part of Roy‘s assertion that political Islam has failed, therefore, is 
based on the fact that it shifted towards a less modern movement that was more 
closely aligned with its fundamentalist origins. Gilbert Achcar has suggested that no 
such shift ever took place, and that Roy is simply justifying his own shift towards 
increasing intolerance of Islamism:  
« L‘islamisme », ayant échoué, se serait transformé en ce que Roy appelle 
« néofondamentalisme », c‘est-à-dire une interprétation socialement « conservatrice » 
de l‘islam par opposition à l‘interprétation « modernisatrice » – comme si ce caractère 
socialement conservateur (réactionnaire en réalité) ne se trouvait pas au cœur même 
dudit « islamisme » depuis les origines.
68
 
 But even if we accept that Islamism did shift towards greater puritanism or 
populism, Roy‘s analysis operates a rigidity in defining political Islam that is not 
useful if we are to engage with the shifts taking place in the political landscape 
across the Muslim world. Even if we subscribe to Roy‘s view that political Islam as 
‗islamisme‘ has failed because it has evolved (or degenerated) towards something 
slightly different, it is unclear how we can dismiss the phenomenon as a whole, 
especially when he recognises that even the ‗neofundamentalists‘ are still interested 
in joining the political ranks. The fact remains that diverse and evolving 
manifestations of political Islam (or Islamic politics) have been changing political 
relations within the Muslim world—and between it and the West—for some forty or 
fifty years; for Roy to insist on the failure of political Islam is to deny the fluidity and 
flexibility of a phenomenon that may very well be here to stay. Burgat has 
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emphasised this fluidity and embraced it as a sign of the dynamic nature of Islam‘s 
role in politics. He consistently argues against the persistent focus by certain 
observers on the more radical strains within Islamism, highlighting the danger that 
we will unfairly tarnish all those who invoke their faith in their political acts and 
overlook the extensive and diverse impact they are having: 
Il n‘existe pas en effet de définition académique consensuelle de la notion 
d‘« islamisme ». [...] Cette incertitude terminologique traduit la diversité et le caractère 
évolutif des perceptions de dynamiques à l‘œuvre à la fois dans le champ politique 
arabe (ou plus largement « musulman »), dans l‘arène des relations internationales nord-
sud ainsi que dans l‘espace européen, au cœur de l‘alchimie identitaire occidentale.69 
 I wish to raise a final point about Roy‘s introduction of secularism to the debate, 
i.e., when he suggests that independent expressions of the Islamic faith have created 
a kind of autonomous (secular) space in which religion can enjoy separation from 
politics. I submit that this reflects a broad tendency among analysts of contemporary 
Islamism, albeit one that is difficult to avoid: by bringing our perspective back to 
terms we can readily understand, there is a danger of tainting our neutrality and 
imposing a ‗Western‘ reading on a non-Western context. Although Roy‘s argument 
is adroitly constructed, it amounts to saying that Islamism has been defeated by the 
development of an autonomous secular space, as if this is the inevitable outcome of a 
move towards a potential increase in the influence of religion on politics. He writes 
of how religion has sought greater autonomy from the political process, in a neat 
reversal of European secularisation (‗à l‘inverse de l‘avènement de la sécularisation 
en France et en Turquie, qui visait à sauver le politique du religieux‘).70 This 
reinforces the view that for a stable polity to emerge, it must first work through the 
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same kind of antagonism between religion and politics experienced in the West, 
thereby strengthening old ethnocentric lines of argument. And this is the one thing 
that should be avoided if we are to attenuate the angry reactionism we have 
witnessed from some actors in the Muslim world, as Burgat has pointed out:  
La tonalité triomphaliste et parfois revancharde des écrits qui nous annoncent 
l‘« échec » ou le « dépassement » [des islamistes] montre par ailleurs que l‘émergence 
d‘une modernité qui ne soit plus perçue comme l‘imposition unilatérale d‘un modèle 
civilisationnel unique n‘est pas encore à l‘ordre du jour de la relation avec notre vieil 
alter-ego musulman. Or c‘est là l‘une des premières conditions de l‘atténuation de la 
réaction islamiste et du penchant ethnocentriste occidental dont, pour l‘essentiel, cette 
réaction se nourrit depuis plus d‘un siècle.71 
Section 2.3 – François Burgat 
 It is important that Burgat should be the one to condemn this unilateral and 
ethnocentric reading of contemporary politics in the Muslim world. He stands out as 
one of the most sympathetic Western analysts of the Islamist movement, consistently 
arguing for porousness in our cultural evolution and challenging readers to imagine a 
world in which references from the ‗other‘—from ‗les nouveaux partenaires obligés 
de notre relation au monde‘72—would inform life in the West as well as life outside 
of it. And yet, I would like to develop the view that he too is guilty of colouring our 
interpretation of Islamism with a Eurocentric description of what this movement 
stands for, providing readers with a familiar and easily digestible vision of the causes 
and stakes behind politics in the Muslim world. He does this through his careful 
insistence on the ultimately politico-cultural nature of Islamism, which, he says, 
invokes religious values and references more as a means of reconstructing Muslim 
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identity than as a true expression of Islamic faith. Before I develop this view, 
however, it is necessary to take a closer look at the cornerstones of Burgat‘s analysis.  
 We saw earlier how Addi has suggested that modernity is opposed on some 
fundamental level to the project of the FIS or other Islamist parties. This is 
something that has been dealt with extensively by analysts both within and outside 
the movement of political Islam, including Burgat, who emphasises the importance 
of giving voice to the men and women behind the Islamist movement, a strategy 
intended to show that the ‗other‘ in this case—the ‗homo islamicus‘—is to be 
engaged with and not mistrusted.
73
 One prominent homo islamicus from the 
Maghreb, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, explains that the dispute between Islamists and the 
ruling regimes in that region is not one that opposes modernity and fundamentalism. 
He says that political Islam is about seeking a particular type of modernity: ‗one that 
emanates from within, one that is in response to local needs and that is in conformity 
with the local culture and value system‘.74 This mirrors the emphasis among 
communitarians on local heritage and the need to respect our constitutive past, and it 
even more closely mirrors a recurrent idea expressed by Burgat, who argues that the 
values of modernity are not being rejected by Islamists but integrated into an 
endogenous form of expression. He speaks of reconciliation between these values 
and the symbolism of the Muslim world (‗les catégories et la terminologie du 
système symbolique musulman‘): ‗la poussée islamiste participe […] d‘un complexe 
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processus de réconciliation qui contribue davantage à étendre le champ de [la] 
modernisation qu‘à en interrompre ou à en perturber la progression‘.75 
 Perhaps the key word in Burgat‘s assessment of Islamist movements is 
endogenous (endogène): this reflects his central thesis that Islamism is more about 
internal growth than outward attack, more about reappropriation than opposition, and 
more about reconciliation than rejection. The discourse employed by many Islamists 
may appear to Western observers to be a refusal of modernity, but Burgat argues that 
it is in fact an expression of their desire to participate in it by adding an all-important 
local perspective. He speaks of reclaiming the ideological, cultural and 
terminological terrain on which Muslims can express their vision of the modern 
world, using references and philosophical/intellectual/spiritual resources that 
resonate with the people and reflect the ‗itinéraire historique différencié‘ of their 
culture. Burgat does not deny that aggression and hostility have marked the discourse 
of political Islam, but explains this in relation to the historically subjugated position 
of the Muslim world. According to this perspective, the need to ‗re-write‘ modernity 
using local references results from the context of aggression in which colonialism 
took place: ‗la modernisation dans le contexte de l‘agression coloniale a été écrite 
depuis l‘extérieur du système symbolique musulman‘; and it is this task of re-writing 
which the Islamist movement is now undertaking, as Burgat says, ‗sous le couvert de 
son discours de refus‘.76 
 Elsewhere, Burgat explains the cultural significance of this discourse of refusal as 
part of the long process of decolonisation, which, like colonisation, he sees as having 
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three primary phases or dimensions, each progressively longer than the next.
77
 When 
colonial forces first arrive, it is their military might that is felt above all. The physical 
presence of military personnel and infrastructure is therefore the initial phase of 
colonisation, just as its absence, i.e., the departure of military personnel, is the first 
phase of decolonisation, marking political independence (sovereign army, national 
flag, etc.). The second phase of both processes, Burgat posits, is economic: the 
colonial occupier integrates the native economic structures into its own; similarly the 
second phase of decolonisation is the gradual shift towards economic independence. 
The final and most important phase is cultural: just as the invasive force slowly 
erodes indigenous cultural mores and references, so too does the independent people 
slowly begin to win back the terrain of its own cultural production. It is this final 
dimension of decolonisation that Islamists are expressing with their apparent 
rejection of Western culture:  
[C]‘est bien la remise en cause d‘une relation culturelle nouée lors de la phase coloniale 
que manifeste la percée islamiste. [...] c‘est bien « le troisième étage de la fusée de la 
décolonisation » qui s‘est allumé, la troisième étape de la prise de distance à l‘égard de 
l‘Occident qui, sur le terrain où l‘irruption étrangère a produit les effets à plus long 
terme, s‘exprime aujourd‘hui à travers l‘islamisme.78 
 Of course, this ‗cultural‘ antipathy crucially extends to ideology and is not 
therefore limited to markers of identity. This is an example of how Burgat‘s analysis 
is at times restricted. So insistent is he that identity is the key factor behind the 
Islamist phenomenon, that even when it comes to something as ideologically charged 
as democratic governance he continues to cite the ‗matrice identitaire‘ as the main 
driving force behind those who reject it. For Burgat, the attitude of Islamists who 
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reject democracy is to say: ‗je suis contre « leur » démocratie, donc je commence à 
exister‘.79 It is ironic that Burgat should choose this Cartesian formula to represent 
the mindset of the average Islamist, as he is the one French analyst who insists on the 
need to embrace the difference of the Islamist heritage, with its endogenous 
references and emphasis on independence from the West. Although Burgat does not 
go as far as Roy, who as we have seen introduces (or imports) notions of secularism 
to his socio-political analysis of Islamism, he is nonetheless making a conscious 
effort to appeal to (or appease) the Western reader who may have reservations about 
political activists making overt references to faith. This, I suggest, is the key flaw in 
Burgat‘s otherwise excellent work. His extensive thesis about the role of identity in 
the development of the Islamist movement is consistent and is backed up by lengthy 
and numerous citations from ‗primary‘ sources, i.e., thinkers, activists and ordinary 
citizens from the Muslim world. But when he says, for example, that ‗their‘—
Western—democracy is being rejected for strategic reasons as part of an identity-
based struggle, he effectively undermines the Islam in the Islamist discourse, 
depicting it as a mere tool that is used ostensibly to express the tenets of Islam but in 
reality to achieve something profane. There can be no doubt as to the profane nature 
of Islamism in some respects (we saw in Chapter I how it can be viewed as a political 
extension of earlier Islamic reformism and in Chapter III we will see the real political 
engagement of the FIS), but there is no reason why Burgat‘s ‗matrice identitaire‘ 
cannot be integrated into an assessment of Islamism as faith and Islamism as profane 
identity-based movement. Let us now take a closer look at some of the ways in 
which Burgat eschews this faith-based analysis. 
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 Burgat‘s most recent monographic publication, L‟Islamisme à l‟heure d‟Al-Qaida, 
provides a good insight into how he assesses the main explicative factors behind the 
Islamist phenomenon. He first reiterates, in Chapter 1, his central thesis that this 
phenomenon is ‗essentiellement identitaire‘, before going on to consider the 
‗temporalities‘—or distinct and successive historical contexts—that have shaped the 
growth of this movement over the years.
80
 Burgat identifies three such phases, the 
first of which is the dawn of Islamism in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, which built on the intellectual (and less explicitly political) work of reformist 
figures like al-Afghani and Abduh to lead a political struggle against colonisation. 
The second is the period that stretches from the independence of many Muslim states 
(such as Pakistan in 1947 or Algeria in 1962) to the 1990s. The elite regimes in 
power during this period met with growing opposition from Islamist activists who 
decried the broken promises of the independence struggle and the authoritarian 
methods used to repress dissent. Finally, with the demise of the USSR, came a period 
in which there was a ‗return‘ to the internationalisation and binary nature of the 
Islamist struggle: the enemy was once again the old imperial powers, as national 
leaders were increasingly seen as puppets of neocolonialism, as regional strife (the 
Israeli-Arab conflict) could be traced to the balance of world power, and as the world 
order was tipped in favour of powers like the US, which were no longer tied down by 
the ‗régulation essentielle‘ previously provided by the Soviet Union.81  
 Burgat goes on to explore the interplay between these global factors and the 
specificities of various national instances of Islamism, constantly reminding the 
reader that our understanding of this movement depends on two ‗levels‘ of analysis:  
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Il est essentiel, pour pénétrer [dans le phénomène islamiste contemporain], de distinguer 
deux processus et donc deux niveaux d‘analyse : d‘une part, les raisons, essentiellement 
identitaires, pour lesquelles une génération d‘acteurs politiques choisit de « parler 
musulman », c‘est-à-dire de recourir de façon privilégiée et parfois ostentatoire à un 
lexique ou un vocabulaire emprunté à la culture musulmane ; d‘autre part les usages 
diversifiés que ces acteurs font de ce lexique, chez eux ou dans l‘arène Nord/Sud, en 
fonction de variables à la fois multiples, banales et profanes, qui déterminent leurs 
différentes revendications et mobilisations politiques.
82
 
He therefore relies on analysis that only identifies sociological and political factors, 
with no room for the role of faith as the determining factor behind Islamist action: it 
is ‗essentially‘ about affirming one‘s identity, whether in a global or nationally 
specific context, and in ways that are ‗banal‘ and ‗profane‘. The weakness of this 
restrictive approach is, ironically, identified by Burgat himself when he criticises 
certain sources of information about Islamism. He correctly argues that some 
academics have been guilty of a reductive analysis of Islamism, focusing on its 
radical strains and explicitly religious references in order to explain why it is 
incompatible with politics as we know it. He suggests this develops from a weakness 
in their understanding of (or willingness to engage with) sociological and political 
context; in other words, by default they focus on what is most visible—foreign and 
menacing terms like fitna, jihad, takfir, salafist—and lend it a disproportionate level 
of importance in their analysis. This, he says, is a refusal to separate the religious 
from the political: analysts should realise that what appears to be religious zeal is in 
fact eminently political, and those who fail to do so are opting for the ‗confort d‘une 
explication culturaliste globalisante‘.83 Yet Burgat opts for the same level of 
‗comfort‘ when he endeavours to pitch Islamism exclusively as a rational and 
comprehensible movement that grew out of factors to which we can all relate. 
Indeed, he is so willing to separate the religious from the political that there is 
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virtually no religious content at all in his vision of Islamism, except as a ‗cloak‘ 
beneath which lies an infinity of profane ambitions: ‗la rhétorique islamiste, sous le 
manteau du discours religieux, peut véhiculer une infinité de revendications tout à 
fait profanes, non seulement économiques ou sociales mais également, de plus en 
plus souvent, démocratiques‘.84 This vision can be compared in some respects to that 
of John Esposito, who has collaborated with Burgat and shares his view that 
Islamism reflects a wider ‗quest for identity‘. However, Esposito also recognises that 
for those who seek a revival of Islam, its application is not simply one ideological 
option among many, but a political and theological imperative; Islamism is a socio-
religious phenomenon.
85
 By contrast, Burgat‘s depiction of an Islamism that 
developed for familiar reasons, as opposed to more mystical and foreign beliefs, has 
two negative effects: it denies the profundity of an Islamist‘s attachment to God (or 
at least the role of that profundity in Islamist action) and thereby risks alienating 
Islamist readers who might see a potential ally in Burgat; and it seeks to reassure 
Western readers of the acceptability of Islamism by deliberately understating at least 
one of the motivating factors behind the movement.  
 Burgat has elsewhere explained why we must be careful not to over-determine the 
theological factor in our analysis of Islamism. He suggests, correctly in my view, that 
the label ‗Islamic‘ can be misused to make the religious variable the guiding force in 
politics in the Muslim world.
86
 Such misuse has the effect of ‗over-theologising‘ 
phenomena that can be (also) explained in terms of ‗profane‘ objectives on the part 
of the political actors concerned, but also leads to the implication that only the 
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Muslim world is affected to such an extent by the religious variable. Why, Burgat 
asks, do we seek the expertise of Islamic scholars to explain the tension in the 
Middle East, but not engage scholars of Judaism or Christianity when assessing the 
policies of Israel or the US?
87
 Of course he is being provocative; we know that the 
overt invocation of Islamic principles by violent protagonists in Palestine, for 
example, is an invitation for analysts to determine whether there is any inherent 
quality in Islam that makes it conducive to violence, and that neither Israel nor the 
US justify their foreign policy explicitly in terms of religious doctrine (even though 
public references to religion are not rare in political discourse). But Burgat is right to 
remind us that the easy way out is to explain everything on the basis of religious 
fanaticism; we must allow a greater level of complexity to permeate our analysis. 
The problem is that he resists ‗sur-théologisation‘ to such an extent that he barely 
admits the reality of the Islamic factor into his analysis. Consider this lengthy 
citation from a leading Moroccan Islamist, Abdessalam Yassine, in discussion with 
Burgat: 
Vous, observateurs de l‘extérieur, en lisant la production des islamistes..., en analysant 
leurs discours, vous percevez seulement la partie de l‘iceberg qui est émergée, la chose 
commune que l‘on peut voir directement..., c‘est-à-dire la dénonciation de la 
domination culturelle occidentale..., la dénonciation de la mauvaise gestion des affaires, 
l‘existence de cette injustice sociale... Ça, vous le percevez... Le reste, le non-dit, ou 
plutôt le non-perçu qui est cette spiritualité, ce retour à Dieu, pour nous, dont l‘organe 
spirituel n‘est pas complètement oblitéré..., ça existe. Et c‘est ce qui nous réunit. [...] 
Moi, je vous dirais que ce qui me lie à ces gens qui sont là devant vous..., ce n‘est pas 
tant la mobilisation idéologique au nom de l‘islam pour combattre ceux qui nient notre 
personnalité, notre authenticité..., notre adversaire historique..., ce n‘est pas tant cela 
que notre attachement à Dieu. Dans vos articles, je lis l‘analyse d‘un Occidental pur qui 
sympathise avec l‘islamisme, ça..., oui..., l‘islam vous est sympathique. Mais, pour 
vous, cette région spirituelle reste volontairement opaque. Vous ne voulez pas y voir, 
vous ne voulez pas y regarder. Je retrouve en fait le travers de ces intellectuels qui font 
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la partie belle à leur point de vue sans tenir compte de celui des autres. C‘est ce qui leur 
fait adopter cette interprétation, à mon gré un peu facile et superficielle, qui consiste à 
expliquer le phénomène islamique par des déterminismes économiques et politiques.
88
 
 I have chosen to cite Yassine at length as he clearly expresses the kind of 
frustration which I suspect is felt by many Islamists reading Western analysis of their 
ideological stance. Indeed, this frustration must be even more acute in the case of 
Burgat‘s work: at least in the examples of Roy or Addi, there is clear opposition on 
the part of the author to the fundamentals of the Islamist movement, but Burgat is a 
clear supporter of its right to exist and an advocate of engagement with it. One feels, 
however, that the essence of Islamist thought and action (at least as perceived by the 
Islamists themselves) is somewhat diluted when explained almost exclusively in 
terms of economics or the historic imbalance between East and West. This is what 
Yassine combats when he evokes a dimension that is unfamiliar and even anathema 
to Burgat‘s intellectual modus operandi—the cosmic, the divine.89 He reproaches 
Burgat, who has the potential to be a friend of Islamism, for giving excessive value 
to the Western scholarly perspective. The irony of this is that Burgat himself 
emphasises the ‗plasticity‘ of Islamism and argues that we must embrace its 
‗unsettling diversity‘ if we are to understand it fully,90 yet he is not ready to leave 
behind the security and comfort of an analysis grounded in the rigour of sociology or 
political science. And in doing so he adopts the kind of obscuring tactics employed, 
he says, by political leaders intent on discrediting the Islamist opposition. 
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 For it is not only academic or journalistic observers that Burgat accuses of ‗over-
theologising‘ the basis of Islamist action; he reserves his harshest criticism for those 
in power who oppose the Islamists by refusing them admission into the political 
arena on the basis of their religious fanaticism. And this applies just as much to 
Western powers as it does to those directly ‗combating‘ the Islamists on the ground. 
From Paris to Algiers, and from Tel Aviv to Moscow, the threat of the 
‗fundamentalist‘ or the ‗fanatic‘ is brandished, Burgat says, in an effort to criminalise 
legitimate political opponents and garner electoral dividends:  
La criminalisation idéologique de ceux qui [...] se retrouvent souvent sur la première 
ligne de la contestation, fonctionne plus que jamais comme une efficace machine à 
dissoudre dans l‘émotionnel et l‘irrationnel oppositions et résistances, aussi légitimes 
qu‘elles puissent être, aux maîtres des ordres politiques nationaux, régionaux et 
internationaux. En Algérie, les leaders d‘une junte militaire passée maîtresse dans la 
manipulation de la terreur, pour avoir pris soin de se poser en « rempart contre 
l‘intégrisme », ont pu acquérir ipso facto la confiance sans limite des institutions 
financières internationales et bourrer impunément leurs prisons et leurs urnes. [...] Les 
leaders occidentaux eux-mêmes savent bien que la recette de la « menace intégriste » 
contient de mystérieuses enzymes capables de convertir les angoisses en tous genres de 
leurs concitoyens en autant de dividendes électoraux.
91
 
 This is what Burgat later describes as a tactic designed to ‗seal‘ the Islamist 
movement in the religious in order to better exclude it from the political.
92
 This is a 
phenomenon we will be looking at in more detail in Chapter IV, in relation to the 
accusations brought against the Algerian regime for its behaviour during the conflict, 
but for now let us consider Burgat‘s theoretical arguments supporting the claim that 
officials distort the nature of the Islamist movement in their own favour. He seems to 
argue that a kind of short-cut policy was adopted by the West (the US mainly, but 
also by its supporters in Europe and within the Arab world) in its response to the 
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increasing terrorist threat from Muslim extremists. This meant that militarily it would 
make irresponsible use of its weaponry in order to achieve results quickly (by, for 
example, bombing Afghanistan almost indiscriminately in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks) and would flout international rules in its engagement with the enemy in its 
eagerness to deliver justice (Burgat speaks of the ‗guantanamisation de l‘adversaire‘ 
as a Western version of takfir); and that intellectually it would eschew any rational 
examination of the causes behind the attacks, preferring instead to ‗ignorer les 
revendications profanes‘ made by the Islamists and ‗criminaliser l‘exotisme du 
vocabulaire employé pour les exprimer‘.93  
 In my discussion of fundamentalism and applications of the term in Chapter I, I 
referred to Salman Sayyid, who argued that violence should be seen as something 
systemic and not only the preserve of illicit networks working outside or in 
subversion of the state. This reminds us of the danger of a binary vision of world 
power—those representing official power and those trying to corrupt it; those who 
support terrorism and those who fight it; those who are ‗with us‘ and those who are 
‗against us‘.94 Burgat is challenging a similar process of simplification on the part of 
the US and its allies, when they reinforce rather than seek to understand the divide 
that has apparently opened up between the Muslim world and the West. This ‗short-
cut‘ is designed to depict a binary world in which the actions of the other are always 
irrational and unacceptable, and in which any attempt to understand the other is 
brandished as perverse fascination or even complicity: ‗comme si l‘enjeu n‘était pas 
de mieux comprendre les ressorts profonds des agressions anti-occidentales pour 
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tenter d‘y mettre fin, mais au contraire de les alimenter pour mieux justifier une 
posture de domination‘.95  
 One wonders, however, whether Burgat is not also guilty of taking short-cuts. 
Where he accuses Western powers (and pro-US Arab leaders) of criminalising the 
religiosity of their adversary, is he not guilty of over-rationalising it and 
underestimating its impact? And where he accuses them of preferring simplistic 
analysis that avoids the challenging work of understanding the other, is he not guilty 
of a similar tactic, i.e., presenting the other in terms that make sense to the ‗rational‘ 
reader? If a pattern is to be identified in the tactics of both ‗sides‘—those who tend to 
oppose Islamism and those who tend to have sympathy for it—it might be that 
religion is either over- or under-emphasised. ―Listen to this vitriolic and zealous 
discourse‖, one ‗camp‘ might say, ―we cannot engage with these people‖. ―Don‘t be 
fooled by these religious invocations‖, the other might say, ―they are merely a 
counter-cultural cover for perfectly rational and profane objectives‖. Burgat, as we 
have seen, rejects the excessive use that is made of the ‗Islamic‘ label. But he 
sometimes appears unwilling to accept it even when applied to something as 
historically observable as Islamic culture. When denouncing the early colonial 
attempts by the French to supplant Islam with their strict laïcité, for example, Burgat 
feels the need to use inverted commas around the word ‗Islamic‘, reminding us that 
the culture was above all ‗locale et endogène‘.96 In other words, ‗Islamic‘ for him is 
just a label used to describe the way in which a given people expresses itself 
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culturally, no different from the secular or mythological references used in other 
cultures. 
Section 3 – Sovereignty, Islamism, legitimacy: potential 
incompatibilities? 
 So far, this chapter has focused on restrictive interpretations of political Islam. 
This is relevant to my overall analysis of the FIS, but especially in relation to 
Chapter IV, where I discuss the tactics of the military in establishing an ad hoc Haut 
comité d‟Etat (HCE) to run the Algerian state after January 1992, and more 
especially, its tactics in the war on the Islamic ‗terrorists‘. Chapter IV should make it 
clear that the intention was to distort the true nature of the political opposition 
represented by the FIS, even where this required brutal repression and falsification of 
the violence (although I am careful to emphasise that this analysis remains at the 
level of speculation, despite considerable evidence). To complete Chapter II, 
however, I would like to address a few questions that will be particularly relevant to 
Chapter III: sovereignty, Islamic governance and legitimacy. This is intended to 
complement the next chapter, where I examine the detail of what the FIS did as a 
legalised party, arguing that their respect for procedure (including popular 
sovereignty and the ballot box) made them politically legitimate. 
Section 3.1 – Popular sovereignty and Islamic governance 
 At the beginning of this chapter I highlighted the difficulty of defining 
democracy. However, perhaps one of its least controversial defining characteristics is 
that it is determined by popular elections and that it alternates at regular intervals in 
accordance with the results of these elections. This is a procedural element, which 
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does not carry the same potential for debate as the ideological elements of 
democracy, such as the role played by religion or the influence of community values. 
It nonetheless presents difficulties in the context of Islamist governance. The main 
problem is that a system of popular elections implies popular sovereignty: the people 
are the ultimate arbiters of governance. Islamists may argue that popular sovereignty 
is inadmissible as only God can be sovereign, implying that accession to power 
through elections is un-Islamic. Consider the following remarks by Abū‘l A‘lā 
Mawdūdī (1903–1979), a leading South Asian Islamist who founded the Pakistani 
group, Jamāt-i-Islāmī: ‗Islam, speaking from the view-point of political philosophy, 
is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy [...] [Islam] altogether repudiates 
the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the 
sovereignty of God and the vicegerency (Khilāfah) of man‘.97 This is not as damning 
an assessment of democracy as it seems, however. The key point here is that man 
acts as God‘s vicegerent, so rather than a theocracy governed by a religious elite, 
Mawdūdī‘s vision is of a ‗theo-democracy‘, whereby ‗Muslims have been given a 
limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The executive under this 
system of government is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who have 
also the right to depose it‘.98  
 On this question of sovereignty, I would like to return to Lahouari Addi, who has 
addressed it in great detail. His analysis will be useful in relation to Chapter III, 
where I consider the attitudes of the FIS in relation to procedural elements of 
Algeria‘s transition to democracy (constitutionality, relations with the incumbent 
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administration, legal protest, diplomacy, etc.). Once again, Addi‘s position typifies 
the kind of restrictions I have highlighted so far in this chapter. Broadly speaking, 
this position is open to the specificities of the Arab political context, careful not to 
demonise the FIS or Islamist groups in general, but ultimately rigid when it comes to 
assessing the fundamental (or ‗universal‘) tenets of democracy and the place of 
religion therein. More specifically, in relation to sovereignty, Addi argues that in 
itself sovereignty is not what is at issue, as man has always been sovereign (by 
making rules and determining methods for governance); it is our awareness (‗prise de 
conscience‘) of our own sovereignty that is the critical moment in the path towards 
secularisation and, as he sees it, democratisation.
99
 Several elements require 
explanation here: What is meant by this ‗prise de conscience‘? Why does it mark the 
start of the secularisation process? Why is this crucial to democratisation? And, most 
importantly, how do these questions tie in with Addi‘s understanding of procedural 
democracy in the Algerian context?  
 Awareness of man‘s role in the exercise of sovereignty begins when the debate 
about the temporal or divine nature of power is made public, Addi says.
100
 This in 
turn means that the secularisation process has begun: there may be violent resistance 
to the view that divine authority can be supplanted, but even a minority asserting 
such a view represents the kernel of secularism. It is the public element of this debate 
that is crucial here. Addi repeatedly emphasises that modern (democratic) politics 
must be rational and public, and that notions of divine authority have no place in 
political debate.
101
 To introduce a religious element to the electoral process is to rob 
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voters of their rational choice, he says, as believers cannot be expected to vote 
against that which is depicted as the divine project. Democratisation, therefore, 
grows out of the secularisation process: a public debate about the nature of power 
should ultimately eliminate the ‗partisan‘ element of religion from the choices facing 
voters. 
 This view is intrinsically linked to an understanding of secularisation and 
democratisation as experienced in Europe when the Church‘s authority was 
challenged by secularising forces and its influence was effectively depoliticised. The 
context of Muslim North Africa is by no means the same, a point Addi is careful to 
emphasise: ‗la prise de conscience de la souveraineté de l‘homme [...] prend des 
formes différentes selon les pays‘.102 The depoliticisation of Islam is a particular 
challenge because it is structured in such a way that ordinary believers can invoke 
religious authority when speaking of temporal (and therefore political) issues, unlike 
in the Catholic Church, where only those belonging to the formal ecclesiastical 
hierarchy can speak on behalf of the Church. Furthermore, as Addi points out, Islam 
has played a highly political role in recent history as a mobilising force in the 
struggle against colonialism and as an essential element of nationalist sentiment.
103
 
This challenge is by no means insurmountable, however. Addi recommends a careful 
distinction between the depoliticisation and marginalisation of religion from public 
life. While arguing in favour of the former, he says that Islam need not be 
marginalised and should continue to exercise a moral authority by reminding society 
of the need to protect certain values:  
Il serait même souhaitable que la mosquée ait dans la société une autorité morale pour 
appeler à la sauvegarde des valeurs humaines que véhicule le message divin [...] 
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Cependant, pour que la mosquée puisse incarner cette autorité morale, il lui faudra se 
tenir à l‘écart de la compétition pour le pouvoir.104 
 So, to a certain extent, Addi here appears to defend the place of Islam in an 
established democratic society. Elsewhere he reinforces the notion of Islam as a 
potentially democratising force; this is the idea that Islam has a role to play 
‗upstream‘ of democratisation. By comparing and contrasting the contexts of 
modern-day Algeria and 16
th
-century Europe, when the Church‘s authority was being 
challenged, Addi identifies a paradoxical parallel: the move towards secularisation in 
Europe (a retreat from religion) was an attempt to wrest power from the hands of a 
small minority, while the move towards an Islamised Algeria (increased religiosity) 
is an attack on the FLN/ANP and their authoritarian and elitist hold on power. In 
both cases, the objective is to assert popular claims to governance: 
Dans un pays comme l‘Algérie, la revendication de la souveraineté divine est populaire 
en réaction à la privatisation du pouvoir par les militaires qui monopolisent le pouvoir 
[…] Dans ce contexte, affirmer que la souveraineté n‘appartient qu‘à Dieu, c‘est 
signifier qu‘elle appartient à tout le monde (Vox populi, Vox dei) et non à une poignée 
d‘individus […] Une telle revendication de souveraineté divine exprime en réalité une 
profonde aspiration à la participation au champ de l'Etat […] Aussi, la popularité [du 
slogan « la souveraineté n‘appartient qu‘à Dieu »] dans les pays musulmans a 
paradoxalement un contenu démocratique.
105
 
 He also suggests that the invocation of Islam by the FIS in its political campaign 
is the ‗expression du souhait de rééquilibrer les relations entre les gouvernants et les 
gouvernés‘, again suggesting there is something inherently just and democratic in 
what the party set about to achieve.
106
 So he appears in favour of a moral and public 
role for mosques and seems to depict Islamism as a democratising force. A detailed 
reading of Addi‘s analysis, however, reveals that he does not view the FIS—or any 
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other Islamist party—as democratic per se. First of all, the above citation does not 
actually endorse the FIS project as a democratic one, but simply says that a shift 
towards ‗popular‘ power in Algeria would have been a move towards greater 
democracy and away from authoritarianism. The implication here is that while there 
was a desire for democracy among the people, that desire was merely harnessed—
and not necessarily embodied—by the FIS. This suggestion leads us to a key 
question in our analysis: if we consider that the cancellation of the January 1992 
elections was a setback for Algerian democracy, then is it because the people were 
robbed of the chance to dilute the power of the bureaucratic-military elite or because 
a democratic party was robbed of its inevitable victory? Is it because undemocratic 
forces were not defeated or because a democratic force was? To what extent do we 
admit the FIS into our assessment of the political context of the early 1990s? Did this 
party ride on the back of something stronger (the people‘s ‗profonde aspiration à la 
participation au champ de l‘Etat‘) or was it the party itself that gave rise to such 
aspirations?  
 Addi makes it clear that in his view the FIS was not the answer to Algeria‘s 
democratic shortcomings. He did however see the potential for the FIS, if elected, to 
play an indirect role in the growth of democracy in Algeria. Criticising the military 
intervention of January 1992, he argues that electoral success for the FIS would have 
been a ‗régression féconde‘107 in the long term: having participated in the democratic 
process, the Algerian people would later have refused to allow the FIS to turn back 
the clock on the country‘s progress, as Addi suspects it would have done. The 
potential ‗fecundity‘ of FIS involvement was that by planting the seed of democracy, 
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it would later be resisted by emerging groups if it attempted to erode the civil 
liberties the people had come to expect: ‗la défense du processus électoral peut ainsi 
donner une base populaire aux forces démocratiques‘.108 This is why Addi and others 
argue that the FIS, if elected, would have been forced to govern democratically or 
fail in office—to ‗sink or swim‘ politically.109 Identifying what he sees as the central 
dichotomy in Islamist politics, Addi argues that the FIS failed (indeed, was never 
given the chance) to reconcile its rhetoric on divine sovereignty with the imperatives 
of governance. Regardless of how it might have justified the turnaround, he says, 
once in office the FIS would have been forced to separate the temporal from the 
spiritual by exercising the sovereignty granted to it by the people: ‗une fois au 
pouvoir, la souveraineté doit être exercée d‘une manière ou d‘une autre, quel que soit 
l‘habillage verbal qui la justifiera‘.110 
Section 3.2 – Legitimacy: are we asking the right questions? 
 This explains one of Addi‘s central claims—that to assert the primacy of divine 
sovereignty is a position that can only be adopted while in opposition. This suggests 
that the spiritual is something that can be invoked as a political tool only—a means 
to an end. In other words, it would have to give way to temporal imperatives once 
those who invoke it have made it to power and have to face the job of governance. A 
useful way of looking at this issue is through the lens of legitimacy, a key issue in 
Algerian politics. In Chapter I, we looked at the search for legitimacy in the process 
of nation-building and how it can lead to the exercise of power in a way that 
emphasises unity, sameness and historic justification for the modern form a nation 
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takes. In Chapter IV, we will see how the military stand accused of using abhorrent 
tactics to delegitimise the Islamist movement, and also how the question of 
legitimacy was central to the efforts of the Haut comité d‟Etat to find the right 
candidate to serve as the public face of the regime. Here, with regard to the 
invocation of Islam in politics, the question is one of religious legitimacy and 
electoral legitimacy and whether or not the two can ever coincide. Addi argues they 
cannot, at least not for long: 
Au départ […] il est probable que légitimité religieuse et légitimité électorale 
coïncideront. Pour les islamistes cette légitimité est structurelle et durera dans le temps. 
Or rien n‘est moins sûr, car dans la pratique, avec l‘expérience d‘une vie politique 
pluraliste, la légitimité électorale et la légitimité religieuse se distingueront de plus en 
plus nettement chez l‘électeur moyen qui se rendra compte que ni dans l‘opposition, ni 
dans le pouvoir, les islamistes n‘apporteront de vraies solutions à ses problèmes 
quotidiens.
111
 
 It is this refusal to imagine an effective Islamist government that seals Addi‘s 
analysis. Despite his openness to change (we have seen how he favours the growth of 
democratic forces to redress the balance between Algeria‘s governors and governed) 
and his emphasis on the relativity of specific context (democratic aspirations in 
modern Algeria, he says, are expressed in ways that are very different from the 
founding period of European democracy), he is adamant that Islam can be no more 
than a useful tool in combating the authoritarianism of the state. 
 But perhaps it is misguided to ask whether the FIS could have brought religious 
legitimacy to the electoral legitimacy of the polls, or whether it could have 
participated in the democratic institutions of the state. The reason, of course, is that 
there was no pre-existing electoral legitimacy and no pre-existing democratic 
institutions. Algeria in the 1990s was in transition. The single-party regime of the 
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FLN could hardly be said to have had electoral legitimacy: by 1992 only municipal 
elections had taken place since the admission of other parties into the political 
sphere, and these had been won comprehensively by the FIS, making it the only 
party with electoral legitimacy. And the democratic nature of the FLN regime is 
hardly even debatable: quite apart from the fact that the FLN had not been elected as 
such, it is widely agreed that the people felt alienated and let down by the state, a fact 
illustrated by the upheaval of Black October in 1988. This point has been made by 
Vickie Langohr in relation to the Islamist question broadly, and by Abderrahim 
Lamchichi in relation to Algeria specifically. Langohr argues that by asking whether 
Islamists are prepared to play an active role in democracy, we assume a political 
context which does not exist in most of the Muslim world.
112
 Lamchichi, for his part, 
identifies the Algerian state as having what he calls instrumental legitimacy: by 
imposing its control over all aspects of life (social, political, religious, cultural) and 
by maintaining a fragile equilibrium between the varying demands of the elite, the 
state generated a kind of unilateral legitimacy that remained intact until the pressures 
of 1988, when, Lamchichi says, ‗la pénurie des ressources devint trop grande et que 
les demandes adressées à l‘Etat dépassèrent ses capacités à y répondre‘.113 He argues 
that the crisis of the 1990s was not the result of events immediately preceding the 
conflict, but that the steady emergence of authoritarian practices had left Algeria—
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and other Arab states
114—with democratic lacunae or shortcomings that made it 
‗illusory‘ to speak of any kind of transition to democracy. He describes attitudes 
within the post-independence Algerian state as follows: 
Depuis l‘indépendance, en effet, les élites dirigeantes ont développé des pratiques 
autoritaires reposant notamment sur une représentation selon laquelle la société civile 
devait se construire par le haut, par l‘Etat, sous l‘étroite surveillance des cercles 
dirigeants. Aucune véritable autonomie n‘était reconnue à la société ; toute expression 
démocratique était étouffée.
115
 
 One final point should be made about the way we frame our questions. There is 
another, more deep-rooted problem in addressing the potential for a party like the 
FIS to be democratic. An inherent incompatibility exists between, on the one hand, 
rational analysis that sees Islamism as a tool, an ideological utopia, an expression of 
Algeria‘s mythical relationship with violence, etc., and on the other, the spiritual 
arguments of Islamists who will never see such analysis as anything but temporal 
talk, subordinate to divine truth. There is a sense of inevitability to this ideological 
debate: it will always end with each side dismissing the other because they can never 
come to terms with the fundamental difference between their chosen points of 
departure. The ideological debate is worth having, but its direct application to 
politics on the ground is limited. If what we are interested in is seeing representative, 
constitutional politics and the capacity for authoritarianism to be challenged legally, 
then we should be more concerned by what happened in Algeria in January 1992 
than by the boundaries of modern politics. Do we want to push democracy forward 
by its preference for inclusion, pluralism and free elections? Or do we want to 
determine who can and cannot join? John Esposito reminds us of a crucial irony in 
the hostility towards emerging forces in Muslim politics. The more an Islamic party 
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is willing to participate in mainstream society, he says, the greater the perceived 
threat: ‗The impact of [Islamic] revivalism can now be seen by the extent to which it 
has become part of mainstream Muslim life and society and not simply the province 
of marginalized and alienated groups. Ironically, this has led many to see it as an 
even greater threat‘.116 In cases where these groups are seeking acceptance from the 
political establishment, he says, each side faces a test:  
On the one hand, governments in the Muslim world and in the West that espouse 
political liberalization and democracy are challenged to remain true to these very 
principles. On the other hand, Islamic movements, should they come to power, will be 
challenged to extend to their opposition and to minorities the very principles of political 
pluralism and participation which they now demand for themselves.
117
 
 Esposito‘s remarks are a reminder that the emergence of atypical political forces 
is often unwelcome and always requires compromise. It is accompanied by intense 
ideological debate, where attempts are made by the new arrivals to redraw the 
boundaries of the existing order, and where corresponding attempts are made by the 
masters of that order to limit this endeavour. And this is how it should be: that which 
is built up over time deserves respect and temperance on the part of those who wish 
to alter it, but long-standing hegemony also needs to be challenged or even subverted 
at regular intervals in history. The desire to subvert the dominant (Western) political 
order is evident in the often inflammatory rhetoric employed by Islamists across the 
Muslim world, yet my research has taught me that—in the case of the FIS at least—
there is a corresponding desire to participate in that order, albeit modified to 
accommodate new representatives with fresh mandates.  
 That communitarianism should have featured in Western political theory is a 
reminder that at least some of the values espoused by Islamists would not unduly 
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upset the framework of modern politics. Further proof of this, as I suggested earlier, 
can be found in international law, where the sacrosanct status of the individual in 
human rights is now being nuanced following the realisation that the theoretical 
equality of all individuals is sometimes insufficient, and that people may also need 
protection on the basis of their group identity.
118
 While this may not in itself 
legitimise Islamist aspirations for the public recognition of community-wide 
morality, it nonetheless reminds us that our understanding of modernity can and 
should continue to be revised. Such an approach would better serve analysts like 
Lahouari Addi and Olivier Roy, whose excellent contributions to and knowledge of 
political Islam are nonetheless restrained by rigid barriers that would ultimately 
refuse parties like the FIS entry into the modern political paradigm. Even the greatest 
willingness to see developments in that direction, however, can also be marked by 
Eurocentrism, as my analysis of Burgat shows. His objective of convincing Western 
readers that Islamists need not be feared relies too heavily on the view that their 
religious discourse is in fact a cover for their rational and profane political ambitions. 
One might suggest that those who wish to sell Islamism underplay its sacred 
foundations, while those who wish to condemn it over-emphasise this same element 
as proof of its zealotry and fundamental incompatibility with sound governance. This 
second approach is the central theme of Chapter IV, but first let us consider how the 
FIS evolved politically in the short period between its legalisation (September 1989) 
and its effective demise.
119
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Le pays a besoin d‟une cure 
de vérité, d‟une cure 
d‟honnêteté – Mohamed 
Boudiaf
1
 
 
 Having adopted a theoretical approach to the nature of Algerian Islamism in the 
first two chapters, I would like now to focus on specific elements of the political 
climate in Algeria leading up to the conflict that broke out in January 1992. The aim 
of this chapter is to examine the political nature of the FIS; in Chapter IV this will be 
seen to be in direct contrast to the representation of the Islamist movement as made 
by the regime during the conflict.  
 I will show how the party developed more or less steadily towards a moderate 
discourse and proved flexible in the face of political imperatives, ultimately 
identifying itself more with the popular cries of the ‗marche pour sauver la 
démocratie‘ of 2 January 1992 (―Ni Etat policier, ni République islamique‖)2 than 
with the authoritarian and regressive politics so feared by the regime and its Western 
backers around the time of the 1991 elections. In Chapter I, I showed how in terms of 
nation-building the case of Algeria may be seen to represent a middle ground 
between Smith‘s vertical and lateral ethnies, and more particularly how the role of 
the FIS reflects that of Smith‘s intelligentsia in bridging the gap between a passive 
understanding of demotic heritage and an active shift towards modern nation-state 
identity. Chapter II was intended to follow on from this assessment of a balanced FIS 
by arguing against analysis that refuses the middle ground of Islamism. Via the 
debate on communitarianism, I argued that an Islamist form of governance need not 
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be a radical challenge to democracy as we know it, and that modernity could very 
well accommodate some moderation of its individualist emphasis and greater 
blurring of the public-private divide. And we saw how, in different ways, Addi, Roy 
and Burgat refused the reality of a spiritual, democratic Islamist voice. This chapter 
will depict a moderate and balanced FIS, a party that embraces the modern 
democratic process but which has its roots in Islam. This balance becomes all the 
more apparent as one traces the party‘s evolution from its formation in 1989 through 
to the latter stages of the conflict.  
Section 1 – Emergence of the Islamist movement: early uncertainties 
Section 1.1 – A distinct politics? 
 Prior to the formation of a political Islamist opposition, the role of religion at the 
level of state in Algeria was ambivalent. From independence onwards there was an 
official attitude to Islam that was marked by public deference but which in fact was 
one of careful control. Although the revolution of 1
st
 November 1954 had been 
fought on a religious basis and was popularly referred to as a jihad, the inheritors of 
independent Algeria were not religious leaders but military men.
3
 Indeed this, as I 
will explain later in this chapter, was one of the key elements of the FIS‘ identity: it 
claimed to embody the essence of the revolution, which it argued had been eroded 
under FLN rule. In any case, the newly-independent state quickly made it clear that 
Islam was to be subordinate to political will and not the other way round. As the 
official state religion, Islam was effectively controlled by institutions such as the 
Ministry for Religious Affairs, which was responsible for setting and paying imams‘ 
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salaries as well as, crucially, overseeing the Friday sermons. We saw in Chapter I 
how this angered men like Cheikhs Soltani and Sahnoun, whose attitude to the state 
was combative. However, their opposition did not extend into the political sphere, 
and the FIS would never benefit from their leadership. Soltani died in 1984, and 
therefore missed the spectacular rise of the Islamist movement, and Sahnoun turned 
down the opportunity to join the FIS in 1989.
4
 
 Hugh Roberts has explained in detail the impact Sahnoun‘s decision not to join 
the FIS must have had on the party‘s methodology and ideology, arguing that two 
features of the party would have been significantly different under Sahnoun‘s 
leadership.
5
 The first is its popular appeal. Because Ben Badis and his disciples (of 
whom Sahnoun was one) targeted traditional offshoots of Islam, such as 
maraboutism, reformism effectively excluded the majority of the population, who 
were largely illiterate and did not therefore have access to the scriptural teachings of 
the reformist tradition. This, Roberts argues, would have meant that a FIS under the 
leadership of Sahnoun—or any ulim of his generation for that matter—would have 
been unable to mobilise popular support in the way the FIS did so spectacularly. The 
second point is that the reformist ulama had an ambivalent relationship with the 
FLN: they rallied behind it during and after the revolution, but resented the lack of 
autonomy they were allowed under the FLN‘s rule, feeling that they were in fact the 
true instigators of Algerian independence. Roberts suggests therefore that the FIS‘ 
tactic of claiming to be the heirs to the FLN‘s historic legacy would not have been 
adopted under more traditional reformist leadership. This is undoubtedly true, but I 
would argue that the ulama were not so distinct from the later Islamists in rejecting 
the FLN‘s claims of legitimacy. The FIS claimed to be the bearers of the Islamic 
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essence of the revolution, as established at the time of Ben Badis and his disciples. 
As such, they were not trying to share in the legitimacy of the FLN but rather point 
out how the single party had squandered its right to that legitimacy. They did not 
dispute the legitimacy of the revolution or of the original FLN—after all, Abassi had 
been one of the few revolutionaries to have participated in hostilities on the night of 
1 November 1954 and had been a member of the FLN until 1975
6—but rather 
decried the wayward path adopted since independence. Rouadjia tells us that even as 
early as the 1970s, the Islamist movement was insisting that the revolution had been 
a victory for Islam and not politics:  
Ils réfutent l‘argument d‘une victoire due à un combat politique. Selon eux, cet 
argument est destiné à escamoter « la force de l‘islam, qui seul a permis de jeter la 
France dehors ». De sorte que les Oulémas, qui ont longtemps préparé la révolution 
dans les esprits avant de passer aux actes, ont été tout bonnement trahis, tandis que les 
fruits de leur jihâd étaient récoltés finalement par les mécréants.
7
 
 As I argued in Chapter I, the potential for change offered by the FIS was subtle 
but significant. This party represented an attempt, albeit uncertain and at times 
disorganised, to break new ground by harnessing the religious legacy left by the 
reformers, while at the same time engaging politically with the stagnating structures 
of governance under single-party rule. As such, it was a party of some balance: it was 
neither a zealous, radical group that rejected modern political processes, nor a 
profane and manipulative party that was willing to use Islam as a mere tool to reach 
power. This balance is reflected in the reformist legacy to which it owes so much. 
For Islamic reformism itself struck what might seem like an improbable balance 
between a return to scripture and modernist thought. Tariq Ramadan, in his review of 
the leading Islamic reformers, tells us of their:  
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[V]olonté de retour aux sources (à l‘exemple des salafī fondamentalistes et 
traditionalistes) liée à une exigence rationnelle (qui les apparente à des mu‘tazlite 
modernistes) ; se nourrissant de la fibre patriotique (à l‘image des nationalistes) tout en 
appelant à l‘unité de l‘islam (dans l‘expression d‘un panislamisme antinationaliste).
8
 
 This ambivalence is perhaps what makes the Islamist movement difficult to 
accept. My analysis of Roy and Addi in Chapter II outlines the kind of arguments 
one might employ to reject such a movement, but the reality is that its political 
success was legitimate, regardless of the uncertainties from which it suffered. 
Roberts highlights the continued ambivalence of post-independence Algeria: the state 
was modernist in its economic and political ambitions—not allowing independent 
religious thought, for example, to detract from its hegemony—but the nation was not 
modern in that public consciousness had not yet accepted key characteristics of 
modernity such as the separation of religion and politics or the distinction between 
the public and private domains.
9
 One of the potential roles the FIS could have played 
in power would have been to bridge this gap between the electorate‘s appetite for a 
public Islam and the state‘s need for modern political maturity. Of course, what it 
would or would not have done in power can only be the subject of speculation. 
Despite its success in the municipal elections of June 1990, it was never given real 
access to the key power structures of the state. Nonetheless, contrary to the common 
view that the FIS was retrograde and politically fickle, there is much evidence to 
suggest that even as early as the party‘s foundation it was in fact a canny political 
organisation and sought to safeguard the public role of Islam in a way that responded 
to popular demands while also addressing the political lacunae that had marked 
successive post-independence governments. Consider, for example, the fifteen-point 
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platform it presented to Chadli‘s presidency in April 1990.10 This document outlines 
mostly political ambitions, such as the dissolution of the National Assembly to make 
way for new elections, which would be run under the auspices of a new independent 
body. It also calls for reforms in security policies and the independence of the 
judiciary, as well as state-sanctioned violence and an end to the single-party 
monopoly over the media. It is only towards the end of this document that explicitly 
Islamic reforms are suggested, and these are worded in moderate language that might 
just as easily have been employed by any other political party with ambitions to 
govern in a country where there was strong support for public recognition of Islamic 
principles.  
 So did this early manifestation of the FIS‘ political positions reflect balance or 
uncertainty? One might be tempted to argue that from the very foundation of the 
party the FIS displayed a certain amount of balance, as its leadership was very much 
dual: the fiery and puritanical Belhadj on the one hand, and the older, more 
statesman-like Abassi on the other. This would be misguided, however. The early 
years of the FIS were necessarily marked by uncertainty: a structure was required to 
harness the increasing support for Islamism nationally, and this would have to speak 
to a diverse audience with as yet undeveloped views on policy and the exact 
application of political Islam. The bicephalous leadership of Belhadj and Abassi 
reflected this need to draw in as wide a level of support as possible. As Hugh Roberts 
commented: ‗it appears that [the FIS‘] leaders have been deliberately playing on 
several registers in order to accommodate several audiences, and are consciously 
sustaining an intelligent double-act‘.11 The uncertain future of Algerian Islamism 
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around the time of the party‘s conception is also clear from the apparent 
disagreement among leading Islamists as to whom such a party would include and 
what it would set out to achieve.
12
 And this uncertainty was to continue through the 
formative years of the FIS; as we will see, it was only in 1991, with the consolidation 
of the Djaz‘ara branch at the head of the party, that the FIS began to adopt a 
balanced, unified and coherent stance, condemning violence, explicitly supporting 
democratic values, and advocating multi-party negotiations. 
Section 1.2 – Islamist diversity 
 Before we look at this development, a word is necessary about the diverse views 
represented by the Islamist movement as a whole around the time that Algeria was 
taking its first steps towards political pluralism. First, it is important to remember 
that to conceive of an Algeria divided into Islamists and non-Islamists is misleading, 
as the majority of political and apolitical organisations of substance in Algeria have a 
broadly Islamic outlook. This is significant in terms of an open political perspective, 
such as developed in Chapter II. The FIS were an expression of existing political 
realities in Algeria, i.e., Islam had always been placed at the forefront of political 
expression (however insincerely), and did not therefore threaten the political model. 
In fact, what it threatened was the distribution of power and not the stability of 
politics or ‗democracy‘. It is also significant because there were parties formed under 
the 1989 constitution that were not Islamist as such but competed with the Islamic 
credentials of the FIS (e.g. Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie (MDA) and El 
Oumma).
13
 Then, within the Islamist movement, there were various divisions and 
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sub-divisions that reflected the challenge of altering the national political landscape. 
Many activists did not support the notion of political participation, considering it 
contrary to Islamic laws, and adopted a revolutionary stance towards the state. These 
were represented, for example, by the violent Takfir wa Hijra, and more generally by 
those militants who had returned from Afghanistan (‗les Afghans‘).14 There were 
also those who felt Algeria did not need a political party to represent the Islamist 
movement and preferred to affiliate themselves with non-political groups such as 
Cheikh Sahnoun‘s Rabitat al-Da‟wa al-Islamiyya. Significantly, however, as I have 
already highlighted, these groups could no longer compete with the dominance of the 
FIS once it became clear that the political path offered the most gains in terms of the 
Islamist agenda.  
 Within the FIS there were also divisions. Many of the party‘s original members 
disagreed in principle with political participation, but felt it could be used as a means 
to an end: in other words, elections could be fought by a party with a view to 
establishing an Islamic republic, but that party would have to be dissolved once this 
objective was reached.
15
 This was the stance of the Salafist branch of the FIS, which 
originally held a majority in the party‘s founding council (Majlis al-Shura) but later 
came to be dominated by the Djaz‘ara (Algerianists)—crucially just ahead of the 
1991 parliamentary elections. The prevailing interest of the Salafists was the 
international Sunni Islamist movement, defined by its relationship with the 
worldwide umma and largely supported by the Saudis. By contrast, the Djaz‘ara 
‗took their bearings from the Algerian national context and were inclined to give 
priority to the search for allies in other Algerian political formations‘.16 A 
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spokesperson for the FIS-in-exile, speaking in 1996, described the two branches as 
follows:  
[L]es Salafistes souhaitent un retour aux traditions, c‘est-à-dire la restauration du grand 
califat à travers tout le monde arabe ; ils prônent une révolution islamique internationale 
tandis que les Djaz‘aristes veulent faire la révolution en Algérie avec les Algériens, ils 
sont nationalistes.
17
 
 As Amine Touati reminds us, any long-term assessment of the FIS must take into 
account the earlier affiliations of the party‘s members: the Salafists were in large part 
made up of former members of the disbanded Mouvement islamique armé (MIA), the 
violent resistance group established by Mustapha Bouyali in 1982.
18
 And we must 
also be aware that the later (post-1991) evolution of the party can be explained in 
part by the departure of many of these same founding members, who saw no 
alternative but to return to the maquis after the coup in January 1992, re-forming the 
MIA under Abdelkhader Chebouti, a former lieutenant who had fought with 
Bouyali.
19
  
 The Djaz‘ara, on the other hand, were less prone to militant resistance and far 
more political in their outlook. Their background alone set them apart from their 
Salafist counterparts: Tahi refers to them as ‗counter-elites‘ with a high level of 
education but frustrated by poor job prospects.
20
 It is because the FIS came to be 
dominated by the Djaz‘ara that the comparison between them and Smith‘s 
intelligentsia (Chapter I) is so pertinent. It was the impetus provided by the Djaz‘ara 
that bridged the gap between ‗vertical‘ nationhood and modern, political nationalism. 
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Their modern path more closely reflected the historic legacy they sought to valorise: 
these were the members of society who had followed the Arabisation path opened up 
by Boumediene, who had been intent on securing greater legitimacy via the forced 
dominance of the Arabic language and culture (at the expense of both Francophone 
and Berber identities).
21
 In reality, however, the market proved more powerful than 
policy, and the existing advantages of a French-based education continued to benefit 
those who had avoided the Arabisation programme (in many cases, the sons and 
daughters of military officers and senior FLN members), leaving thousands of 
Arabophone graduates unemployed. This reflected not only the bias of key sectors 
such as heavy industry and commerce towards European business links (and in 
particular the dominance of French and English), but also the strength of the foothold 
that the Francophone elite had in the public administration. This ‗archaic‘ power 
structure was the focus of the Djaz‘ara branch of Islamist opposition: ‗C‘est sur les 
décombres de ce pouvoir [archaïque] qu‘ils ont bâti leur contestation ; sur leur 
marginalisation sociale que cette jeunesse instruite et globalement arabisée a élaboré 
sa cohésion et renouvelé son idéologie‘.22 And this ideological ‗cohesion‘ began to 
draw support from within the regime, as represented by Islamist sympathisers in the 
FLN known as ‗barbéfélènes‘ (bearded FLN members).23 A further reflection of this 
natural sympathy between the Djaz‘ara and certain elements within the FLN was the 
key strategy adopted by Abassi: to identify the FIS with the historic role of the FLN 
in the national revolution. But before we look in detail at the ambivalent links 
between the FIS (offering opposition yet continuity) and the FLN, I would like to 
explain the ways in which the Djaz‘ara came to represent the main voice of the 
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party—and thereby made possible what I argue is the balanced political 
representation it might have offered to the Algerian electorate.  
Section 1.3 – Rise of the Djaz’ara 
 As I have said, it was the Salafists who provided the impetus to create the FIS in 
1989. It was they who guided the initial actions of the party, playing a ‗social and 
cultural‘ role to tap into the heart of the Algerian electorate.24 This was achieved in 
part via a network of FIS-run charitable associations, allowing the party to show up 
the shortcomings of the state (as in the aftermath of the 1989 earthquake) and 
mobilise massive popular support ahead of eventual elections. But the primary 
intentions of the party at that time are the subject of some debate: was the FIS 
primarily designed to convey the orthodox ideals of Islamism, thereby reforming 
society, or was its raison d‟être to fight Algerian elections on the basis of Algerian 
political issues? An analysis of the party‘s behaviour reveals a steady progression 
towards increased politicisation and doctrinal flexibility, which ultimately allowed 
the Djaz‘ara element to come to the fore. Hugh Roberts argues that by accepting to 
form a party under the 1989 constitution, the Islamist movement willingly 
subordinated the religious to the political, as the formation of a party was not an 
obligation but a free choice; in other words the movement could have continued to 
lead its opposition to the FLN regime via apolitical bodies such as Cheikh Sahnoun‘s 
Rabitat al-Da‟wa al-Islamiyya.25 This decision to move towards political power, he 
says, was a direct reversal of the movement‘s earlier stance that Islamic reform of 
society must precede any formal political involvement, and was a fundamental 
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choice that was reinforced by various other factors: the FIS‘ strategy, its leadership, 
its constituency and its discourse.
26
  
 In terms of strategy, the FIS‘ political success owed much to the intense 
politicisation it brought to mosques around the country. By using these places of 
prayer to spread its political message, the party was able to reach a wide audience 
with great regularity (five times a day in some 10,000 mosques nationwide, including 
a longer session for Friday prayers).
27
 Roberts raises an interesting point in relation 
to this strategy, arguing that the abuse by the FIS of the pulpit to spread a political 
message reflected the official tactics of the state, which, as I have pointed out, had 
attempted to create official channels for the expression of Islam: ‗the old Islamist 
reproach of the state-appointed imams, that their sermons tended to substitute 
political apologetics for their proper content of guidance in matters of faith and 
morals, became increasingly applicable to the imams in the FIS-controlled 
mosques‘.28 One might wish to add a nuance to this view, however, which is that the 
Islamist imams were not seen in the same light as those working for the regime. 
Their superiority in terms of religious instruction, and the spiritual role they played 
with regard to public worshippers, were beyond question: ‗Devant les imams 
intégristes, [les imams rétribués par les Affaires religieuses] font piètre figure ; ils 
ont honte de parler en leur présence, les évitent souvent et ne les abordent que 
contraints et forcés‘.29 It is nonetheless beyond doubt that their willingness to blend 
politics and preaching is a sign of the party‘s shift towards increased politicisation.  
 Similarly, in terms of leadership, the executive body that governed the party 
(Majlis al-Shura)—and was based on an Islamic concept of consultation (shura)—
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was made subordinate to the party‘s two populist leaders, as revealed for example by 
Abassi‘s decision in May 1991 to call for a general strike despite opposition from the 
council.
30
 Such charisma-based leadership is another clear sign that populist politics 
was the new preoccupation of the Islamist movement‘s leading force. Furthermore, 
of the two leaders it was Abassi, an educated professional with no formal religious 
training, who took precedence over the religious scholar and preacher, Belhadj.
31
 
This preference for political maturity over and above passionate spirituality is 
perhaps the clearest indicator of the direction the FIS wished to take. And this was 
not without difficulty: as the party grew in strength, with the electoral success of 
1990, so it grew in numbers and struggled to maintain its original political line. The 
arrival of new members meant the arrival of divergent views: 
Lorsque le FIS s‘est constitué, il s‘est donné comme ligne fondamentale d‘être un front 
regroupant des tendances modérées. Mais les événements se sont succédés très 
rapidement [...] ses rangs ont grossi trop vite, et les hommes qui chaque jour venaient le 
rejoindre apportaient avec eux leur force, mais aussi leurs divergences. Et la direction 
n‘a eu ni le temps ni la possibilité de réviser ses programmes, de se restructurer autour 
de ses principes et de ses hommes, de préserver sa ligne politique initiale.
32
 
 However, this difficulty was dealt with more or less decisively in July of 1991, 
when a conference was held to reshape the party leadership. This confirmed Abassi‘s 
authority by removing key figures of dissent such as Benazouz Zebda, Hachemi 
Sahnouni and Mohammed Kerrar.
33
 It was clear at this crucial stage—months before 
the parliamentary elections—that the FIS was endeavouring to root out those 
elements that would serve as a hindrance to their definitive admittance into the 
political apparatus. 
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 With regard to the party‘s constituency, it is widely recognised that it was the 
urban poor who provided the bulk of the FIS vote in both the 1990 and 1991 
elections.
34
 Roberts identifies this as an indication that the party had prioritised the 
popular vote over and above the Islamist movement‘s traditional base, ‗the arabisant 
wing of the Algerian intelligentsia‘ and ‗small- to medium-sized traders and 
entrepreneurs in the private sector of the economy‘.35 Seeking to garner support from 
a wider group of the electorate does not in itself represent a shift away from Islamic 
governance, but, as pointed out by Roberts and others, the party‘s decision to follow 
mainstream opinion during the first Gulf War removed any doubt about the party‘s 
populist intentions. When Iraq first invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the Arab states 
collectively condemned the act—officially at least. On the streets of Algeria and 
across most of the Arab world, however, there were massive demonstrations in 
support of the Iraqi people and in defiance of the allied intervention.
36
 Seeing this, 
the FIS made a crucial decision: to go against its natural enmity towards a secular 
Ba‘athist regime and to risk angering its financial backers in Saudi Arabia (whose 
hostility towards Saddam Hussein‘s anti-monarchist discourse was clear) by 
supporting the popular view of the allied invasion, i.e., that an Arab solution, rather 
than imperial interference, was needed. Indeed, it even sent several thousand young 
party activists to Iraq to offer their services to the Iraqi military;
37
 they never had the 
opportunity to fight, but the FIS‘ intentions were to safeguard its wide constituency 
and stand out from the rest of the country‘s political parties, all of whom had adopted 
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more or less hostile positions to the allied invasion.
38
 Roberts interprets this strategy 
as a pivotal shift in favour of the Djaz‘ara and seems to identify a clear dichotomy 
between populist politics and authentic Islamism:  
[W]hat is clear is the extent to which the FIS was willing to put its Algerian 
constituency before its international links, and its popular character before its Islamist 
doctrines. In short, the crisis appeared to mark a major stage in the ‗Algerianisation‘ of 
the FIS, and to confirm its doctrinal shallowness but also its populist militancy and 
political flexibility, and the extent to which, in all of these respects, it is heir to some of 
the traditions of the old wartime FLN.
39
 
 That the party‘s strategy marked a preference for domestic over international 
concerns cannot be refuted, but the implication that one cannot be at once ‗popular‘ 
and Islamist seems unfair. Islamist doctrine does not require loyalty to one‘s 
financial backers, and the position of the FIS was not to support a secular dictator, 
but rather to show solidarity with his people—fellow Arabs and, as the demonstrators 
in the streets of Algeria saw it, victims of imperial aggression. However, the partial 
comparison between the FLN and the FIS is accurate, and is a crucial factor in my 
view that the FIS did not represent radical change, but rather, as I argued in Chapter 
I, a significant yet subtle shift away from state hegemony. It needed to build on the 
legacy of the FLN in order to secure its popular base, but also needed to address the 
electorate‘s appetite for a truly public Islam. It needed to harness the energy of 
nationalism but in a way that invoked something more permanent than the success of 
the FLN. The FIS sought to exploit the tried-and-tested legitimacy of the revolution, 
a legitimacy that was already active in the imagination of the Algerian people, yet at 
the same time bring about a clear shift towards a new and more lasting political 
representation. This of course explains the links—both in word and in deed—
between the FIS and the FLN. We have seen how, as the successors of the earlier 
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Badissian movement, the modern Islamists (and in particular the Djaz‘ara)40 never 
operated outside of a schema placing Islam and national unity at the same level. And 
this is precisely what the ALN had done in its fight for liberation. The problem for 
the post-independence FLN regime was that its exciting anti-French and Islamic 
glory was slowly replaced with corruption and failed governance; in order to trump 
this, any potential opposition needed to tap into that earlier glory, while at the same 
time presenting itself as something fresh:  
La force de l‘islamisme consiste à proposer une nouvelle rupture avec l‘Etat actuel, en 
retrouvant les mots, le vocabulaire de l‘ancienne fracture avec l‘Etat colonial. Ils 
réactivent une mémoire politique selon un processus déjà mis en œuvre dans ce temps 
colonial : rupture avec un Etat considéré comme impie ou antireligieux ; rupture avec un 
islam officiel, institutionnel.
41
 
Section 1.4 – FIS du FLN ? 
 There are several examples of how the FIS both reflected the FLN and even 
cooperated with it, but we must realise that the comparison has its limits. Roberts has 
argued that the FIS‘ choice of acronym was a clear indication that it saw itself as the 
next generation of the FLN, that it was selling itself as the progeny (fils) of the ruling 
party.
42
 There was indeed a clear intent on the part of the FIS to build on the FLN‘s 
legacy, but I would argue that the desire for rupture was nonetheless strong. The 
Islamist party‘s secrecy, it has been said, mirrored the behaviour of the FLN during 
the revolution. Le Monde commented that the decision not to commit its programme 
to writing reflected the tactics of the wartime FLN, and that ‗Il est aussi difficile de 
percer les secrets de la vie intérieure du FIS qu‘il pouvait l‘être de deviner ceux du 
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FLN à l‘époque de la guerre de libération nationale‘.43 However, this secrecy was a 
product of the FIS‘ political opacity—necessary for the populist strategy it adopted—
rather than its revolutionary status. In fact, the secrecy between 1982 and 1987 of 
Mustapha Bouyali‘s MIA, an altogether different organisation to the legalised FIS of 
1989–1992, would make for a better comparison.  
 Another similarity often identified between the FLN and the FIS is both parties‘ 
use of a populist discourse. Lahouari Addi, for example, has argued that the FIS took 
over the populist discourse of the FLN with virtually no changes.
44
 He points out that 
populism was a necessary feature of the struggle for independence and that in order 
to retain power the ruling party later continued its populist approach, addressing 
those sections of society with the least privileges. This mirrored the approach of the 
FIS, which not only adopted a discourse that would ensure wide appeal, but did so 
with the intention of appropriating a defunct FLN base. In this respect, the FIS did 
not wish to annihilate the FLN as such, but rather to breathe new life into it under a 
new name: ‗Le FIS refuse l‘échec du FLN, qu‘il voudrait faire revivre sous une autre 
forme et dans de nouvelles conditions‘.45 This view is reinforced by comments made 
by Belhadj in the aftermath of the June 1990 elections, when he declared that the FIS 
victory did not constitute ‗une claque au FLN mais à ceux qui ont trahi le FLN‘.46 
This should be the focus of our analysis: not whether the individual policy stances of 
the FIS distinguished it radically from the FLN, but the ways in which it was 
attempting to redraw the boundaries of Algerian politics. Addi is clear that in terms 
of, for example, economic liberalisation, labour policies and the future role of 
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science and technology, no great distinction can be found between the positions of 
the FLN and those adopted by the Islamist party. He also points out that the populist 
discourses of both parties contained the same vague promises and ‗verbal 
generosity‘. Yet he draws our attention to one key distinction: the FIS‘ form of 
populism was moral rather than political.
47
 Because of the nature of state-driven 
nation-building in Algeria, Addi tells us that there was no role for the governed, no 
dialogue between those in authority and those subject to that authority. This, together 
with an absence of press freedom, meant that any opposition had to be voiced in the 
only other public space available—the mosque.  
 For me, this shift from a political to a moral form of populism is highly 
significant, as it reminds us of the very real ability of a religion-based entity such as 
the FIS to challenge the authority of the state on new territory, to create an 
alternative politics. And there can be no denying that this new territory proved 
politically viable, in light of the successive electoral victories enjoyed by the FIS. 
Addi seems to dismiss its significance, however. I argued in Chapter II that his 
appreciation of the modern state is limited to one that is interested only in individuals 
and has no regard for community interests. Similarly in relation to populism, he 
argues that by nature it is anti-democratic, as it presents a false vision of consensus 
and therefore blocks any attempt at acknowledging and reconciling social 
differences. While it is true that the FIS discourse emphasised unity and eschewed 
specific detail that might alienate potential followers, it is also true that this party 
successfully challenged the ruling FLN in free and fair elections.
48
 It would seem 
unfair to deny them legitimacy on the basis that (1) their policies were similar and (2) 
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they misrepresented the electorate‘s unity, while at the same time they had managed 
to challenge the very core of modern Algeria, i.e., a once-legitimate state that had 
forgotten its pledges and abused its powers. By deploying a populist discourse akin 
to that of the FLN, the FIS may not have offered a radical alternative in terms of 
policy, but it marked a significant scission from a state which had placed limits on 
public Islamic activism. As Salwa Ismail has pointed out, the scope of politics need 
not be confined to government and state; political activism can also seek to redraw 
the norms of how the governed relate to their governors. And the invocation of 
morality is one clear way in which this is done: ‗the pursuit of morality in the public 
sphere can give Islamists power vis-à-vis the state and society, in particular, the 
power to dictate the norm. [...] activism in the social sphere allows Islamists to 
consolidate power and to contest state power‘.49 Acting as it did, the FIS sought 
continuity (in terms of policy and the established—albeit lost—legitimacy of the 
revolution), but also rupture from the previously restricted modalities of political 
expression. 
 A further reflection of the FIS‘ links to the FLN is the level of cooperation it 
offered to the FLN‘s drive towards economic liberalisation, as promoted by Chadli 
under Mouloud Hamrouche and Abdelhamid Mehri.
50
 There was no explicit 
endorsement of this policy, but neither was there any explicit opposition to it, 
perhaps surprising given that such liberalisation, at least in the short term, would 
make life difficult for the urban poor who supported the FIS so vigorously. The shift 
to a market-based economy would after all mean an end to subsidies for basic 
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commodities, and would also bring about unemployment in unprofitable state-run 
companies.
51
 But Chadli‘s economic policies also represented a reversal of 
Boumediene‘s ‗socialist option‘, and as such were compatible with the hostile 
position of Islamism towards a national strategy that had been accompanied with an 
increasingly diminished role for Islam (not to mention the fact that socialism was 
held in suspicion for having developed in notoriously ‗godless‘ parts of the world).  
Section 2 – Strategic cooperation 
 There is more to the FIS‘ apparent acceptance of Chadli‘s liberalisation than its 
willingness to move on from Algeria‘s socialist era, however. It can be read as part 
of an overall strategy of cooperation that benefited both the FIS and Chadli and his 
supporters, very much to the detriment of those within the regime who opposed 
Chadli‘s authority. The reforms had begun long before the FIS came on the scene—
under Abdelhamid Brahimi, Prime Minister from 1984 to 1988—but began to meet 
with significant resistance when Hamrouche published a new package of measures in 
the summer of 1988.
52
 This resistance came from the ‗old guard‘ within the regime 
and threatened to undermine Chadli‘s presidency. Roberts argues that the only way 
for him to eliminate this threat was by outflanking his opponents and cutting off their 
support; this is a central claim underpinning his analysis of the creation of the FIS 
and its later success at the polls.
53
 This could only be achieved by creating an ally 
that would tacitly support the reforms and at the same time rob any potential base for 
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critique of the reforms from within the state structures. In other words, the old guard 
would be unable to engage successfully in a populist attack on the President‘s 
unpopular reforms if the main base for such populist tactics were already taken over 
by a party such as the FIS: 
The Islamists were to be unleashed, legalised and encouraged to take over the populist 
constituency in Algerian politics, by employment of the most hair-raising rhetoric if 
need be, in order to deny access to this constituency to Chadli‘s nationalist-populist 
enemies within the FLN who were not necessarily opponents of sensible measures of 
reform as such but were certainly the political enemies of Chadli & Co. and of the 
Reformers‘ faction with which the President was now identified.54 
 This fits in with the widely-held view that the move towards pluralism was a ploy 
designed to disrupt the channels of opposition within the political establishment. By 
allowing the emergence of new and diverse sources of opposition, Chadli could 
better deflect the challenges coming from within the politico-military regime. Tahi, 
for example, suggests this was a classic divide-and-rule strategy.
55
 Mahfoud 
Bennoune, a historian and veteran of the independence war, offers a similar view, 
arguing that the President established a ‗façade of democracy‘ in order to take 
attention away from his disastrous economic and social policies, and buy time by 
manipulating the different parties nationally and introducing a more complex party 
structure at the level of the FLN itself.
56
 Even Ghazi Hidouci, Minister for the 
Economy under Chadli (1989–1991), describes Chadli‘s move towards pluralism as a 
tactic to maintain the ‗dirigisme d‘Etat‘: ‗Dans son esprit, la démocratie n‘est qu‘un 
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instrument de stabilité politique [...] L‘arbitrage en faveur de la nouvelle constitution 
et des réformes procède d‘une démarche pragmatique, tactique‘.57 Furthermore, as 
well as sowing confusion and thereby undermining internal challenges, Chadli was 
also able to use his democratic ‗overtures‘ to refresh his mandate. Within months of 
the riots, he had secured his role as Secretary General of the FLN, been re-elected as 
President and ushered in a new constitution. This despite earlier rumours that he 
would take retirement and leave his position open to other candidates.
58
 Decidedly, 
Chadli had re-emerged, Phoenix-like, from the ashes of his own disastrously 
unpopular term in office.
59
 Frédéric Volpi explains that the momentous nature of the 
October riots meant that a fresh post-event perspective was possible:  
This breach in the symbolic order that constituted the foundational event of Algerian 
democracy made it possible to assign a posteriori new roles to each social and political 
actor. By putting forward the image of a leader who had ended the state-party system 
and introduced political liberalisation, Chadli re-invented himself as the maker of 
democratic Algeria.
60
 
 The significance of a possible FIS–Chadli alliance cannot be under-estimated, as 
it is perhaps the clearest indicator that the FIS was at the heart of Algerian politics. 
This reinforces the view of Islamist groups, developed in Chapter II, as potential 
agents in shaping rather than necessarily undermining politics. Further details are 
required, however. Just what was the President‘s position going into the events of 
October 1988? And what can we say about the way in which his relationship with the 
FIS developed? And, more importantly, what does it tell us about the nature of the 
Islamist party? 
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Section 2.1 – Black October: manipulation but by whom? 
 One element of Black October that is often overlooked is that the preparations for 
political reform seem to have been made long before the outbreak of violence. Chadli 
himself insisted on this point in his address to the nation on 10 October, and 
continued to refute the view that his plans were a response to the riots, pointing out 
that he had already broached the idea of political reform in a speech as early as 
December 1987, and had actually removed the FLN‘s trusteeship in July of the same 
year.
61
 One apparent anomaly in the President‘s behaviour, however, is his (and the 
FLN‘s) specific attitude to multi-party politics. Asked about the details of the 
reforms, officials were extremely cautious in the aftermath of Chadli‘s 10 October 
speech, offering only vague assurances of greater fairness.
62
 Furthermore, a 
declaration made by the President on 23 October insists that any form of pluralism 
could not be applied to anyone looking to profit from ‗superficial democracy‘ or 
displaying any ‗demagogic excess‘.63 And the same speech included mostly 
references to ways in which the FLN—rather than the state as a whole—could be 
more democratic. Later, in a statement announcing the proposal for the new 
constitution, Chadli made no mention of multi-party politics, although this was 
clearly provided for in Article 40 and was perhaps the single most significant change 
being introduced.
64
 He even explicitly expressed his doubts about the value of having 
several parties in Algeria at that time, but stressed that if the people wanted such 
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representation then they must be allowed it.
65
 So was Chadli taking steps towards a 
pluralist Algeria against his own will, perhaps because, as Laribi suggests, there was 
worldwide momentum towards democratisation at that time?
66
 I think not. It is 
perhaps true that the international pressure to democratise was a factor; the end of the 
Cold War implied a shift away from the external conditions of the defeated Eastern 
bloc, as reflected also in the President‘s drive from socialism towards economic 
liberalisation. However, it is more likely that Chadli‘s actions were part of the 
domestic in-fighting that was crippling the regime. Prior to October, the President 
had only been able to introduce minor reforms, as he was blocked by internal 
opposition: ‗devant, depuis son accession au pouvoir, tenir compte de son opposition 
interne, le Président Chadli Bendjedid [n‘a] probablement pu introduire qu‘à doses 
homéopathiques des réformes encourageant un certain retour à l‘initiative privée, à 
l‘autonomie de l‘entreprise et à l‘ouverture du pays aux investisseurs étrangers‘.67 
Furthermore, the circumstances in which the riots broke out are at least one 
indication that his position towards certain elements within the establishment was 
one of antagonism. 
 Although our knowledge of the specific motives of the actors involved in Black 
October must remain at the level of speculation, one thing is certain: when the 
violence did break out there was nothing spontaneous about it. Industrial action had 
preceded the unrest in many parts of the country, and most significantly, rumours 
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were said to be circulating that the 5 October was a key date.
68
 Laribi, in his account 
of the corrupt and military state of Algeria, emphasises Chadli‘s role in provoking 
the violence, highlighting a key speech the President made on 19 September, in 
which he tacitly provoked public dissent (‗Je ne comprends pas quelqu‘un qui va 
chez le boucher acheter de la viande, qui trouve le prix exorbitant et qui ne proteste 
pas‘).69 This speech was a critical event in the build-up to Black October; in it Chadli 
highlighted many of the state‘s shortcomings and was accused of goading the people 
into expressing their anger. Later he explicitly rejected these claims, arguing on 
several occasions that he was simply facing up to his responsibilities. This line of 
argument had the advantage of portraying him as willing to hold his hands up and 
recognise his mistakes, while implying that others were not quite so inclined: ‗I am 
responsible for all shortcomings in various reforms. I am responsible for them. To be 
clear before you I say: I shouldered responsibility at a time when, perhaps, there was 
not enough political responsibility‘.70 
 The other damning piece of evidence to suggest some level of state machination 
behind the riots is the widely reported absence of the security forces during the initial 
unrest:  
Où étaient donc les forces de police ce mercredi ? Elles avaient reçu des instructions 
précises. Même les agents de la circulation avaient déserté les carrefours. Comme si tout 
était prévu, à défaut d‘être orchestré. Qui avait donc pu, mardi soir, prévenir certains 
commerçants de la rue Didouche-Mourad, en leur conseillant de laisser leur rideau 
baissé le lendemain ?
71
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This would appear highly unusual given that rumours had been circulating to suggest 
there would be trouble beginning on 5 October. And further reports showed that even 
once in place the security forces did not intervene immediately.
72
 When they finally 
did intervene, however, their response was brutal and resulted in further discredit. 
Crucially, Chadli was able to distance himself from this by bearing the flag of 
reform. Whether this proves that he had a hand in stoking the embers of dissent is 
unclear. At the time of the events, one of the more popular theories circulating was 
that it was Chadli‘s opponents who had encouraged the riots in an effort to discredit 
the head of state.
73
 However, there is no evidence to support this, and the aftermath 
(Chadli‘s success at the party congress, his re-election as President and popular 
support for his constitutional reforms) made it clear in any case who emerged with 
the stronger hand. The most convincing theory about how and why the riots took 
place, therefore, is that popular anger was drummed up in order to bring about the 
conditions for sweeping changes under the initiative of the President, and at the same 
time discredit the traditional protectors of the people, the army. Even if it is untrue 
that Chadli knowingly engineered this scenario, then the least we can say is that he 
acted with remarkable political acuity by turning things to his favour, for it would 
appear that the rioters‘ anger was a very personal attack on the man himself. Reports 
suggest that there was direct mockery of the President, who was depicted as being 
hen-pecked by his wife and reproached for having treated his son to a lavish 
wedding.
74
 Hugh Roberts also points out that the slogans being chanted in the street 
emphasised the contrast between Chadli‘s weakness and Boumediene‘s greatness, 
further highlighting the impressive recovery he made in the aftermath of October 
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1988.
75
 This recovery was only made possible, of course, by the attenuation of the 
power of his opponents within the party structures. And this was achieved primarily 
by ensuring successful opposition from outside the FLN, which required him to 
develop a relationship of tacit cooperation—mainly with the FIS. 
Section 2.2 – Post-’88: concessionary politicking 
 We have seen that the early years were by no means uncompromised for the 
Islamist movement: the opportunity to enter the political scene required it to revise 
its position as primarily a religious critic of the body politic, and once the FIS had 
been established it had to grapple with internal divisions between doctrinal loyalty to 
the wider Islamist movement worldwide and the imperatives of domestic politics. 
But, in order to support the view of a politically legitimate FIS, let us now take a 
closer look at how the newly-created party related to the Chadli administration. It 
should first be stressed once again that the nature of this relationship can never be 
known with any certainty: the long-term (and changing) intentions of the 
protagonists belong to the realm of political intrigue typical of any functioning 
democracy. However, certain facts available to us suggest a level of cooperation that 
was anything but official or overt, but nonetheless tangible.  
 The legalisation of the FIS, first of all, is a clear indication that Chadli voluntarily 
opened the Algerian political scene to the arrival of the Islamists. Indeed, he was not 
compelled to do so even by the legal reforms he had himself initiated. Articles 2 & 3 
of the law governing the formation of associations (5 July 1989) made it clear that 
political associations would only be legalised if they respected the democratic 
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process, and Article 5 of the same legislation stated that parties based exclusively on 
religion were not allowed.
76
 Furthermore, Article 40 of the 1989 constitution 
authorised only those political associations which did not threaten, among other 
things, fundamental freedoms or popular sovereignty. It would therefore have been 
very easy for President Chadli to refuse the FIS legal status on the basis that: its 
democratic credentials were questionable as its discourse questioned the legitimacy 
of popular sovereignty; its potential mandate was based exclusively on its religious 
qualities; its highly righteous discourse on morals (and in particular mixité) 
threatened basic liberties; and its stated aim was to form an Islamic Republic (and 
thereby undermine popular sovereignty). Each of these arguments could have been 
refuted (the FIS had not yet been allowed to reveal itself as undemocratic, its 
opposition to popular sovereignty could have been depicted as doctrinal rather than 
actual, it was not based exclusively on Islam as it had very real political ambition, 
and it had yet to threaten any liberties as laid out in the 1989 constitution), but the 
prerogative was Chadli‘s and it is clear that if he had wished to prevent the formation 
of the FIS he could have done so. He is cited by Burgat as saying that ‗it is not 
conceivable to apply democracy to Communists and to deprive the current which 
preaches spiritual teaching‘.77 While this makes perfect sense politically (it would be 
difficult to sanction ‗godless‘ communism while excluding Islamic politics in a 
country where Islam had always been treated with outward reverence by politicians), 
it does not offer a legal defence of the President‘s decision. The fact is, Chadli 
legalised the FIS because he desired its presence on the political stage.  
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 This concessionary attitude continued for quite some time, allowing the party to 
implant itself in society in various ways. Soon after its recognition by the state, the 
FIS was able to show how it could supplant the official role of the state in meeting 
the people‘s needs. The earthquake in October 1989 provided a key opportunity for 
the FIS to operate what Robert Malley calls a ‗political sidestep‘.78 This is possible 
where the ‗basic organizational principle‘, i.e., the state‘s ability to run the country, 
is perceived as dysfunctional, and ‗neglect by or frustration with official channels 
activates parallel ones located at either an infra- or suprastate level‘.79 The most 
common example of such a sidestep is in fact apolitical—the black market economy. 
But when executed in the context of inadequate public services its message is acutely 
political: ―the state has failed you, but never fear: there is an alternative‖. The FIS 
also sent out the same message in other ways: free medical aid, food and clothing, 
legal advice and school equipment, continually laying the groundwork for its future 
role in municipal governance and, it hoped, in parliament.
80
 It even organised dozens 
of its members to clean the streets voluntarily in Algiers when a strike meant that 
public sanitation services were no longer available.
81
 What is most interesting about 
all this, however, is that the state did not interfere, but allowed its authority to be 
eroded. It would have been very easy, if not to injunct the FIS from providing these 
services (which politically would have been very damaging for the ruling party), then 
at least to make a public effort to trump the Islamists with state-sanctioned rival 
services. And there were other ways in which this tacit support for the FIS was 
evident. 
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 Perhaps the most successful strategy of the Islamist movement in boosting its 
nationwide appeal was through its appropriation of the mosque as a religio-political 
base.
82
 This began long before the founding of the FIS and was a crucial factor in 
redrawing the relationship between religion and politics. As I have shown, a central 
characteristic of the Islamist movement was its disapproval of the state‘s monopoly 
over religious expression, and one of the aims in establishing ‗free mosques‘ was to 
reassert the autonomy of the religious from the political. This was successful 
inasmuch as the imams who preached in these mosques were not bound by the state‘s 
guidelines and therefore benefited from greater intellectual (and theological) 
freedom. However, one might argue that it was unsuccessful in that mosques came to 
be used for overtly political purposes, particularly as the movement grew in strength, 
thereby infusing the religious with the political rather than ensuring its autonomy. 
But this argument depends on a refusal of the very essence of the Islamist project, 
which, while not a rejection of modernity as such, does reject the (modern?) 
requirement that the historic role of Islam (as the guiding force in private and public 
life, as the common bond for entire communities, and as the starting point for 
questions about what those communities feel is right or wrong in their society) be 
diminished to one that impacts only on matters of private faith. In other words, the 
fusion of the religious and political, as exemplified in the exploitation of mosques, 
was at the core of the Islamist project. Unlike the earlier reformers, whose activities 
were (officially) apolitical, as we saw in Chapter I, the modern Islamists overtly 
sought to redraw the political boundaries along religious lines. Their use of mosques 
may have been technically illegal, but the emerging political expression it enabled 
was, in my view, of such importance as to justify this transgression.  
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 Furthermore, this tactic cannot be seen as unreasonable in a country which has 
consistently placed Islam at the heart of its national identity, even formalising its 
status in positive law. Not only do successive constitutions and charters state that 
Islam is the national religion, but a Code de la nationalité in 1963 made it clear that 
automatic citizenship was reserved for those belonging to the Muslim community, 
and one of the authors of this legislation described Islam as ‗le noyau sociologique 
de la nation algérienne‘.83 It is therefore a matter of public policy. Defending the 
right to use mosques to address such public political concerns, Abassi Madani asked: 
‗If the mosques are not there for that, what purpose do they serve? [The mosque] is 
the place for all the acts of good, in which all the affairs of the Umma are treated. It 
is in the mosque that the Caliph was designated and pronounced his political 
discourses‘.84 Such an assumption might seem surprising to secular-minded 
Europeans, but the public attitude in Algeria towards places of worship is, 
comparatively, very militant, and the Islamists are not the only ones to subvert state 
policy in this regard. Rouadjia explains that as well as the ‗free‘ mosques initiated by 
the emerging Islamist force, ‗popular‘ mosques (‗mosquées du peuple‘) were 
constructed around the country on vacant plots by local communities who sought to 
circumvent the ‗official‘ Islam of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. The lengthy 
testimony he provides is a clear illustration of the willingness of large swathes of the 
population to flout regulations by building illegal structures, and more especially, 
their well-founded expectation that the state would never consider interfering with 
these faith-based missions: ‗Les autorités sont au pied du mur ; ells ne peuvent 
détruire un sanctuaire comme cela, à moins de le miner, ce qui déclencherait la 
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colère des fidèles‘.85 And yet, the fact that this rebellious attitude was a threat to the 
authority of the state cannot be denied. Chadli himself made a damning speech in 
1986, when he accused the unofficial instigators of illegal mosques of demagogy, 
anarchy and destruction, labelling them as ‗pernicious‘ and accusing them of 
erroneous knowledge of Islam.
86
 Despite this threat, it later became clear after the 
formation of the FIS that the Islamists were being allowed to use mosques across the 
country for highly effective party political purposes, further evidence of Chadli‘s 
accommodating attitude towards his ostensible opponents.  
 Other examples include the non-intervention of the state during the municipal 
elections of June 1990, when FIS members were reported to have ‗monitored‘ 
polling stations in an effort to influence voters, and remarks by both parties that their 
members were encouraged to supported the other party in constituencies where they 
had no candidate themselves.
87
 It is apparent, therefore, that cooperation between the 
FLN and FIS was a political reality, but this should not in my view lead to the 
conclusion that the Islamists did not represent change or political renewal. Politics is 
at its best when parties compete on similar terrain, while at the same time 
distinguishing themselves through subtle but significant shifts. Both the FLN and the 
FIS relied on nationalism and Islam, that much is clear. But the popular Islam of the 
FIS stood in marked contrast to the state-sanctioned Islam of the ruling party. And 
the victory this gave the FIS in the municipal elections meant that Chadli‘s policy of 
cooperation was perhaps too successful. The party‘s new power in local government, 
combined with its combative position on the Gulf War, may have been enough for 
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Chadli to reconsider his relationship with the Islamists. Whatever the cause, this 
relationship deteriorated in 1991. 
Section 3 – An end to the cooperation 
 The climate of cooperation had continued through roughly the first year and a half 
of the FIS‘ existence, but took a clear turn towards hostility in March 1991, when the 
FLN-run parliament adopted new electoral legislation that would heavily penalise the 
FIS. By redrawing the constituency boundaries, and in particular allocating greater 
weight to small rural constituencies, the FLN sought to strengthen its traditional rural 
base and at the same time undermine the FIS‘ advantage in urban areas. The new law 
was voted in on 2 April 1991 and was followed on 23 May by Abassi‘s call for a 
general strike.
88
 As I have said, this move was challenged by many members of the 
party‘s consultative council (Majlis al-Shura) and was a decisive test of Abassi‘s 
authority.
89
 In the event, it proved his popularity: despite the fact that the strike never 
took off as such,
90
 the months of May and June saw thousands of FIS supporters take 
to the streets in a significant show of strength. Touati explains that what interested 
Abassi was not so much to interrupt labour across Algeria, but to occupy the streets. 
This was not a strike as one might traditionally understand it (a group of workers 
seeking leverage in order to negotiate specific demands via a representative body 
such as a trade union); it was an act of political defiance: ‗Le FIS n‘est pas en grève 
[...] il s‘agit bel et bien d‘une action de désobéissance civile [...] il devient clair que 
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la priorité pour les islamistes n‘est pas tant de paralyser les lieux de travail que 
d‘occuper la rue‘.91  
 This show of strength was crucial in order to challenge the treatment of the FIS by 
Chadli, who had so far refused to set a date for a presidential election, despite the 
FIS‘ emphatic victory at the municipal level almost twelve months earlier. This 
refusal was a mockery of the President‘s own earlier resolve to usher in a pluralist 
era. But Abassi had another motive: to set the FIS apart from the rest of the political 
establishment, which had failed to follow through on its threat to strike. This, 
Roberts argues, was a key FIS strategy: in order to maintain its monopoly over the 
expression of political opposition, Abassi had to take drastic action at this stage, 
particularly as credible alternatives were being offered both by former senior FLN 
cadres (Kasdi Merbah‘s MAJD and Ben Bella‘s MDA) and by more moderate 
Islamist parties (Mahfoud Nahnah‘s HAMAS and Cheikh Djaballah‘s MNI).92 The 
final advantage of this show of strength was that the FIS could shake off the 
stagnation of nearly a year in power, a year in which not much had changed (Chadli 
was still in power and there was no promise of a presidential election) and in which 
the party‘s municipal actors struggled to manage their budgets because of harsh state 
funding, presumably introduced to undermine the FIS in power.
93
 By taking a hard-
line stance on the electoral laws and the President‘s failure to call an election, 
therefore, Abassi was able to a) reinforce his authority within the party via support 
from the thousands of activists across the country, b) avoid a perceived weakening of 
the party via its ‗normalisation‘, i.e., by being similar to other parties, and c) 
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regenerate momentum in the FIS‘ electoral strategy by attempting to move on from 
the diluted power of its municipal base. Furthermore, I would argue that the actions 
of the FIS at this crucial time are indicative of its political legitimacy, but this 
requires further analysis. We need therefore to ask: How did the state respond? And 
what was the nature of the party‘s ‗désobéissance civile‘?  
Section 3.1 – La « grève générale » 
 On the morning of 4 June 1991, the security forces evacuated the Place du 1er 
mai in Algiers, which hundreds of FIS supporters were continuing to occupy. It is 
unclear just where this order came from: was it the initiative of the President or an 
independent move from the military? In his account of events leading up to the 
military intervention of January 1992, General Khaled Nezzar, who was appointed 
Minister of Defence in June 1991, speaks of how the military had been ordered by 
Chadli to intervene so as to ‗réparer ses dégâts‘.94 Both Roberts and Volpi also report 
that the order did indeed come from the President,
95
 but behind Nezzar‘s official line 
would appear to be a presumption that it was up to the military to take charge, that 
without its intervention Chadli‘s weak leadership would ‗damage‘ the state. In this 
regard, Touati offers a convincing insight into the nature of relations between the 
Presidency and the military authorities at that time. He explains that then Prime 
Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, who resigned on 5 June, did so because he had been 
circumvented by Nezzar, who was beginning to take on a strong role in events, 
largely because he resented the increased powers granted to Hamrouche under the 
revised constitution:  
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Entre le chef du gouvernement et le ministre de la Défense, le courant ne passe pas. 
Hamrouche concentre dans ses mains l‘essentiel des prérogatives du Président, ce qui ne 
plaît pas à l‘armée. En outre, en nommant pour la première fois depuis 1965 un ministre 
de la Défense, il entend visiblement domestiquer l‘ANP.
96
 
 At a meeting held on 2 June, Touati reports that Nezzar was the only one present 
to push for the military option, in particular by asking Chadli to decree a state of 
siege, while the others (FLN Secretary General, Abdelhamid Mehri, Chief of police, 
General Major Ghezaiel, Head of the Presidential cabinet, Larbi Belkheir, and 
political advisor, Aït Chaâlal) all recommended a political solution.
97
 Ultimately the 
state of siege was granted for a period of four months, which allowed the 
intervention in the early hours of 4 June. Soon after this clash, relations broke down 
between the FIS and the authorities, despite (or perhaps because of) signs that the 
Islamists had emerged successful from their actions. On 7 June, two days after the 
resignation of Hamrouche, Abassi Madani was received by the new Prime Minister, 
Sid Ahmed Ghozali, in order to discuss amendments of the new electoral laws and 
dates for both parliamentary and presidential elections. Satisfied with the terms of 
this agreement, the leader of the FIS called an end to the ‗strike‘.98 However, this 
satisfaction was perhaps precisely what troubled the military, who continued to take 
an aggressive line in dealing with the Islamist opposition. Roberts suggests that a 
weakened FLN (with the reforms effectively defeated, the party would need time to 
rebuild a viable alternative to the FIS) meant the FIS was perceived in military 
circles as an even greater threat, and also that the show of strength represented by the 
public demonstrations needed to be negated by a reassertion of the state‘s authority.99 
In any case, the security forces began to arrest violent militants associated with the 
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wider Islamist movement, a move that was not resisted by the FIS‘ political 
leaders,
100
 and then proceeded to undermine the authority of the party at a municipal 
level, replacing Islamist posters in FIS-run town halls with FLN posters.
101
 This 
clampdown culminated in the arrests of the FIS‘ two leaders, Abassi and Belhadj, 
along with several hundred party activists, on the 30 June, leaving the FIS to 
reorganise itself and devise a strategy for the December elections.
102
 But was this 
treatment justified? How had the FIS behaved during the months of May and June? 
What was the nature of its public demonstrations? 
 In the immediate aftermath of Abassi‘s call for peaceful action on 23 May,103 he 
had been in contact with Hamrouche and his representatives in order to discuss how 
and where the demonstrations would take place.
104
 Then, as events unfolded, 
communication was maintained with the President. On 2 June a meeting between 
Chadli and Abassi was scheduled to take place late in the evening, but the President 
made a televised address in which he referred disparagingly to the activists 
(‗quelques éléments perturbateurs‘) and announced the beginning of the electoral 
campaign. This angered Abassi, who resented being belittled and argued that the 
opposition had not had time to prepare for the beginning of the campaign. He called 
off the meeting.
105
 The next day, however, the President of the National Assembly 
was in contact with the FIS leaders, who were willing to negotiate the end of the 
demonstrations in return for a modification of the electoral laws and an 
announcement confirming the date for the presidential elections. The President 
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agreed.
106
 Was this a step too far for Nezzar and his men? Is this what led them to 
intervene on the morning of 4 June? Perhaps, but whether legal or illegal, the order to 
evacuate the activists from public squares in Algiers would appear to have been 
unnecessarily heavy-handed. The demonstrations had up to that point taken place in 
peaceful conditions, with the exception of some aggressive behaviour on the part of 
non-FIS militants, in particular from Takfir wa Hijra.
107
 Indeed, during a public 
meeting on 24 May, Abassi had specifically asked activists to respect public order 
and demonstrate peacefully.
108
 And on the night the security forces intervened, it is 
reported that the ‗grévistes‘ were actually asleep.109 It would perhaps be naive to 
imagine that the security forces met with nothing but passivity when they intervened, 
but it would seem to me that any judgement of principle in this case should relate 
more to why the intervention occurred in the first place. In other words, did the 
behaviour of the FIS and its supporters exceed the norms of public protest? Addi 
argued at the time that the ‗strike‘ was a menace to public order and appeared to 
justify the military intervention:  
[L]a faiblesse de la présidence et le laxisme du gouvernement avaient permis au FIS de 
troubler impunément l‘ordre public, de défier l‘autorité de l‘Etat et de fouler aux pieds 
les symboles de la République. L‘armée est donc intervenue pour marquer les limites à 
ne pas franchir sans pour autant remettre en cause la marche vers la démocratie.
110
 
 It is perhaps a bit too easy to refute Addi‘s view now, knowing that the army 
intervened in January 1992 and most definitely did undermine the ‗march towards 
democracy‘. But it nonetheless seems surprising that mostly peaceful protests should 
require the army to ‗set the limits‘ of what is and is not allowed. One suspects that 
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because the FIS did not represent the kind of potential government that Addi may 
have desired, his judgement (as a democrat) of what should be tolerated was clouded. 
Similarly, Omar Carlier depicts the strike of 1991 as violent and subversive, 
comparing it to the armed uprising of 1945 and para-military activism of the PPA 
(Parti du peuple algérien) under Messali Hadj, and mentioning in the same vein the 
maquis of Bouyali, all apparently comparable forms of resistance.
111
 The comparison 
is grossly misleading: violence in 1945 between police and PPA activists resulted in 
hundreds of deaths, including 103 Europeans who had been targeted by militants.
112
 
Perhaps comparable was the heavy-handed approach of the police, who clamped 
down on demonstrators protesting against ‗fascism and colonialism‘,113 but this in no 
way places the FIS‘ 1991 demonstrations in the same category. As for the 
comparison with Bouyali, this is entirely unjustified for at least two reasons: 
Bouyali‘s organisation in the 1980s had no legal status and was clearly not a political 
party (and certainly not one that had been elected to represent a substantial majority 
of the country‘s municipalities); and the MIA that emerged post-1992 was formed by 
FIS dissidents and other radicals who had abandoned the political solution favoured 
by the party‘s council and so in no way reflected the political (albeit populist) 
impetus of May/June 1991. I am much more inclined to follow Hugh Roberts‘ 
assessment; he argues that in its conflict with the state in the spring of 1991, the FIS 
did not display any insurrectional behaviour and that in staging peaceful protests 
against unfair electoral laws the party ‗was upholding the principle of fair elections, 
the sine qua non of democracy‘.114  
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Section 3.2 – Post-January ’92: Islamist violence but from where? 
 This brings us up to the crucial event in modern Algeria—the cancellation by the 
military of the second round of elections in January 1992. At this juncture, I would 
like to focus on how the FIS evolved in the aftermath of this move. Although its 
significance as a contemporary political force has been eroded almost completely 
(the army‘s intervention was ultimately a success, in that its opponents in the FIS 
were reduced to a negligible force and successive governments resisted calls for the 
party‘s reinstatement),115 the party‘s continued commitment to political solutions is 
further proof of the regime‘s deplorable record.  
 In the absence of its cadres (Abassi and Belhadj, but also Abdelkader Hachani, 
who had led the party into the December elections, and Mohammed Saïd, who went 
into hiding after the coup, as well as hundreds of political representatives),
116
 the 
party struggled to maintain political coherence, as younger ‗emirs‘ emerged to lead 
the violent radicals who saw no option but to abandon the constitutional path: ‗Au 
lendemain de sa dissolution, notre parti n‘avait pas le contrôle [des membres qui ont 
rejoint des groupes armés] ; il l‘a encore moins eu lorsque ses cadres ont été 
arrêtés‘.117 These men cannot be accurately compared to the political representatives 
who had built up the FIS‘ mandate: they were self-proclaimed leaders who lacked the 
cultural, political and religious knowledge of the party‘s historic leaders.118 However, 
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the army‘s success does not of course mean that its role should be viewed positively: 
as I outline in Chapter IV, much suspicion about its actions remains—and indeed 
carries considerable credibility. It was (and still is) responsible for eliminating a 
political force which, while inexperienced, populist and at times simplistic and 
manipulative in its approach to political gain, had earned the right to represent its 
voters and had distanced itself from the violent fringes of the Islamist movement 
such as Takfir wa Hijra. And what is more, the FIS showed considerable maturity 
from January 1992 onwards, making increasing commitments to a democratic future 
for Algeria and a solution to the conflict based on dialogue and understanding. 
Cynics may argue that they were forced into a concessionary attitude, as they had 
been systematically dismantled by the regime and outflanked by more violent 
Islamist groups who became the real protagonists in the conflict. But this is 
speculative, as it assumes that the ‗true‘ nature of the FIS was once again being 
concealed behind canny (and insincere) rhetoric; what we can do, however, is 
analyse what we know about the party post-January 1992. What did it support? What 
did it denounce? What actions did it take?  
 In 1992, as it became clear that violent resistance was coming primarily from 
groups like Takfir wa Hijra, the re-formed MIA and the nebulous group known as 
―les Afghans‖ (the Groupes islamiques armés (GIA) were yet to emerge), the role of 
the FIS in this resistance remained minimal. Some former members of the party are 
said to have developed close links with some of the rebels, but many of these were 
men who had been dismissed from the party‘s Majlis in July 1991 for their 
opposition to the nationalist and legalist line favoured by the Djaz‘ara.119 Others did 
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adopt close links with the violent resistance, but their relationship with the party‘s 
leadership suffered as a result. Two notable examples are Mohammed Saïd and 
Abderrahim Hocine. Saïd was a leading member of the Djaz‘ara who, upon his 
release from prison in November 1991, helped Abdelkader Hachani convince party 
members that their participation in the December elections was essential.
120
 After the 
coup in January, he went into hiding and was sentenced in abstentia to ten years‘ 
imprisonment on 15 April.
121
 He then became involved in clandestine media 
operations to spread the Islamist message via publications and radio broadcasts that 
appeared to represent the MIA.
122
 However, the party‘s line on this association with 
violence was clear, and Saïd‘s media outlets were rejected as non-representative of 
the FIS‘ ‗legality and public political action‘.123 Furthermore, Saïd‘s claim to speak 
in the name of the FIS was undermined by a message from Abassi Madani that had 
been smuggled out of prison. It endorsed Rabah Kebir as the party‘s sole 
spokesperson.
124
 This position was reinforced the following year, when Saïd tried to 
form an alliance between the FIS and the GIA in May 1994. This failed because of 
the significant differences between the two groups, but was in any case rejected by 
the FIS‘ Executive Bureau, the party‘s recognised representative body.125 Saïd was 
killed the next year by GIA fighters because of increasing disagreement over 
guerrilla tactics.
126
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 Abderrahim Hocine was a close ally of Abassi who joined the MIA in 1982 after 
his mentor‘s arrest. Arrested in 1987 after the regime‘s successful attack on 
Bouyali‘s network, Hocine spent less than three years in prison before benefiting 
from Chadli‘s amnesty.127 He was welcomed into the FIS by Abassi, who nominated 
him to various positions of responsibility (assistant-director for the management and 
promotion of the municipal assemblies (APC – Assemblées populaires communales), 
and later administrative director of the Syndicat islamique du travail).
128
 Following 
Abassi‘s second arrest in the aftermath of the general strike in the summer of 1991, 
Hocine became disillusioned with the FIS‘ legalist path and, as a former Bouyali 
militant, felt alienated from the Djaz‘ara: ‗les impondérables de la politique 
maintiennent à distance les anciens compagnons de Bouyali. La seule vraie famille 
de Abderrahim est en définitive celle-là‘.129 He left the party at that stage to rejoin 
the maquis, and was later involved in a series of bomb attacks on Algiers airport on 
26 August 1992.
130
 What is significant here is that it was only after leaving the 
political fold of the FIS that Hocine and others engaged in such acts of terrorism. 
 The involvement of several one-time associates of the FIS in violent resistance is 
of course a clear indication that the Islamists, generally speaking, represented 
extreme hostility to the state and, in many cases—both before and after January 
1992—resorted to insurrection in order to see through their ‗Islamic solution‘. 
However, what I argue is that from the legalisation of the FIS onwards, there was 
always a current of political will within the movement to counter this violence, and 
that ultimately it was this current that dominated the party at the time of the aborted 
elections and continued to dominate the party‘s choices thereafter. For every 
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example of a FIS militant who took to arms, there is also a story of a split with the 
party at some stage. However, one potentially ambiguous development in terms of 
the party‘s relationship to violence was the formation in 1994 of its armed wing, the 
Armée islamique du salut or AIS.  
 It is impossible to know the nature of the resistance offered by this group, as its 
origins were multiple. Touati reports that a former FIS member, Saïd Mekhloufi, was 
asked in 1991 to form a military branch in support of the Mouvement pour l‟Etat 
islamique (MEI), and that it was this branch that would later form the AIS.
131
 Willis 
reports that several other ‗independent groups and groupings‘ joined forces with the 
MIA (the re-formed group that had operated under Bouyali in the 1980s) in 1994 to 
form the AIS.
132
 However, he also reports that the release (and, separately, escape) of 
hundreds of Islamist activists from prison during the first half of 1994 contributed to 
the formation of this ‗army‘.133 Furthermore, the authority behind the AIS is unclear. 
Hocine Aït-Ahmed, leader of the Front des forces socialistes (FFS) and long-time 
advocate of the reinstatement of the FIS‘ legal status, felt that the creation of the AIS 
must have taken place outside the authority of Abassi and Belhadj and that in any 
case the group was too diverse and nebulous to play a significant role: ‗Je ne sais pas 
si la création de l‘AIS a procédé d‘un travail rationnel, mais je ne le pense pas ; pour 
moi, les dirigeants du FIS ont été dépassés. Et maintenant on ne sait plus qui est qui 
au sein du FIS‘.134 But whatever the extent of the two leaders‘ control over the 
party‘s armed group, one thing is clear: they maintained a position that was open to 
dialogue with the regime and rejected the extremism of the GIA.  
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 Luis Martinez explains that the role of the AIS was to introduce some level of 
order to contrast with the ‗débordements‘ of the GIA, which represented a grave 
threat to the credibility of the Islamist movement generally, but more especially to its 
desire for conditions that would be suitable for negotiations between the regime and 
the movement‘s political representatives.135 Willis provides a similar analysis: 
‗Those in the FIS who continued to hope for a deal with the regime knew that the 
increasing strength of the GIA reduced the chances of such a deal being struck‘.136 
The threat to such negotiations was, of course, the ongoing intensity of the violence. 
As I highlight in Chapter IV, it is this that strengthened the hand of the ‗eradicators‘ 
within the regime (as we will see, this is the foundation for claims that the violence 
was deliberately exacerbated). Despite resistance from these eradicators, however, 
the FIS did manage to enter into negotiations with the regime on more than one 
occasion.  
Section 3.3 – Attempted negotiations 
 1994 began in a climate of some hope, with Liamine Zeroual (about to be named 
Head of State) pushing for negotiations and the prospect of a ‗Conférence nationale 
de surveillance de la transition‘ that would bring the various parties together, 
including the FIS.
137
 In the event, this conference took place without the FIS, as the 
requirement to release the party‘s two leaders proved too risky for the regime, and 
was boycotted by several other parties, including the FFS, FLN, MDA and RCD, 
who argued for the inclusion of the FIS.
138
 Two events around the time of this failed 
conference were significant, however. The first was a meeting on 20 January 
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between senior ulama and preachers close to the FIS at which they called for 
restraint while denouncing the regime‘s illegal seizure of power and the violence 
perpetrated by the armed groups: ‗Il y a deux clans qui s‘entretuent pour le pouvoir, 
un clan qui s‘accroche au pouvoir et défend son droit d‘y rester par la force, et un 
clan qui veut lui prendre le pouvoir par la force‘.139 In particular, their call to 
dialogue (‗épuiser tous les arguments‘) and their refusal to endorse the killing of 
innocent civilians encouraged the réconciliateurs within the regime. The second was 
a secret meeting between the two FIS leaders and Zeroual, who actually went to the 
Blida prison where they were detained.
140
 This overture ultimately led to nothing, as 
the protagonists argued over who should make the first step: should the leaders be 
released in an effort to end the violence or should their attempts to attenuate the 
violence be a precondition for their release?
141
 However, the encounter had set a 
precedent, and later in the year three more meetings were held between Abassi and 
Belhadj and government representatives.
142
 Once again these failed to reach any 
agreement, with Zeroual claiming there was insufficient cooperation and double-
dealing on the part of the Islamist leaders.
143
 However, the main point of contention 
was whether any negotiations could bypass the FIS‘ Majlis. Could the FIS move 
ahead on the basis of what Abassi and Belhadj expressed from their cells? Or could it 
only do so once the two leaders had met with their fellow council members, many of 
whom had gone underground and were considered ‗terrorists‘ in the eyes of the 
regime? It is unclear who was to blame for this disappointment. Was it the case, as 
the Financial Times later argued, that ‗too many people on both sides of the divide 
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[...] had no wish to see it succeed‘?144 Or had the President‘s move been a ruse, as 
suggested by Touati?
145
 It is more likely that the President was subjected to strong 
pressure from the eradicators within the regime to continue with an aggressive anti-
terrorist strategy, just as the FIS leaders were under pressure not to appear too 
conciliatory towards an ‗impious‘ regime. Roberts suggested at the time that the 
army could not countenance the idea of negotiations between Zeroual and members 
of the maquis, i.e., those former Majlis members who had gone underground, but that 
the real reason for their interruption of this positive process of dialogue was that they 
strongly opposed any steps towards the reinstatement of the FIS as a political 
party.
146
 In any case, the potential for agreement had not been exhausted, and the 
momentum towards a solution was maintained by a key initiative involving all the 
main opposition parties: the Sant‘Egidio platform. 
Section 3.4 – Sant’Egidio: the definitive rejection of compromise 
 On 13 January 1995 the main opposition parties of Algeria signed a document that 
was intended as a framework for a solution to the crisis. This was the product of two 
rounds of talks held at the invitation of a Catholic community outside of Rome 
(Sant‘Egidio), the first of which had been held on 21–22 November and the second 
on 8–13 January. The signatories represented the FFS and FLN, former President 
Ben Bella‘s MDA, the PT, En-Nahda (Islamist party headed by Cheikh Abdallah 
Djaballah), the Ligue algérienne pour la défense des droits de l‟homme (LADDH), 
and, most importantly, the FIS. The regime refused to send a representative, 
criticising the initiative as an ‗attack on Algeria‘s national sovereignty‘.147 Indeed, it 
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did its best to bury this significant development, arguing that the ideas expressed in 
Rome were more of the same and that the Islamists had managed to bring the other 
parties around to their position.
148
 What is more, it would appear to have been largely 
successful in defusing the potential of the Rome platform. International responses 
were limited and little has been written in any detail about the significance of this 
move.
149
 This is regrettable, for both the content and tone of the document 
represented a real step forward for Algerian politics generally, and for the FIS in 
particular. 
 The Plateforme pour une solution politique et pacifique de la crise algérienne 
(also referred to as the Contrat national) contains several sections: the principles 
underlying the agreement, the pre-negotiation requirements, and the return to peace, 
constitutionality and popular sovereignty.
150
 It also begins with a preamble that raises 
several more general points, including the country‘s regrettable departure from the 
principles of 1 November 1954, the danger of introducing self-defence groups to the 
conflict, the regime‘s failure to enter into real dialogue, and the urgent need for 
negotiations as the only way to achieve a peaceful and democratic solution. The 
reference to 1954 is significant for at least three reasons. First, it reinforces the FIS‘ 
insistence that the FLN regime had not honoured the spirit of the revolution, and 
thereby attempts to validate the Islamists‘ exploitation of nationalist legitimacy. 
Second, the most salient feature of the 1954 declaration (the only cited extract, at 
least) is considered to be Article 1, which insists upon sovereignty and democracy 
within an Islamic framework (‗la restauration de l‘Etat algérien souverain 
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démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes de l‘islam‘). This is not so much 
an endorsement of the FIS‘s position as it is a reminder of the nature of mainstream 
Algerian politics: after all, this was a declaration made by the ALN, which in the 
form of the FLN went on to rule for 30 years and never missed an opportunity to 
invoke its continuing allegiance to this founding principle. And if there was any 
doubt that this was an expression of mainstream politics, one need only consider that 
the signatories of the Rome platform could not have been much more representative 
of the Algerian electorate: together they had won more than 82% of votes in the 
December 1991 elections.
151
 Third, it is of note that in signing this platform the FLN 
(represented by the party‘s Secretary General, Abdelhamid Mehri) recognised its 
failure in fulfilling the principles of 1954. It had finally evolved, one might say, from 
a party that sought to monopolise nationalism to one that shared the challenge of 
nationalist ideals with others.  
 The preamble was significant symbolically, but the substantive commitment to 
democracy is the key element of this platform. It is explicitly accepted in all its forms 
by all the signatories: a rejection of violence as a means to reach power (and violent 
dictatorship as a means to hold on to it); multi-party politics; human rights as 
enshrined under international law (including both individual and collective freedoms 
regardless of race, sex, language and, crucially, creed); the alternation of power via 
universal suffrage; the primacy of ‗legitimate‘ (man-made) law; and the separation of 
powers (including a politically neutral army). This ‗conversion to democratic 
principles‘152 is highly significant in the evolution of the FIS, which had operated an 
ambiguous discourse regarding popular sovereignty, religious freedoms and 
women‘s rights. We can speculate about the reasons for this evolution (was it 
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because the military had left them with no other option, were they making false 
commitments with a view to later establishing an undemocratic Islamic republic, or 
had they genuinely moderated their approach to politics?), but of course we can 
never be sure about their sincerity as they were denied the chance to govern. 
However, it should be clear by now that the party shifted quite steadily towards 
political cooperation and away from radicalism, as I have shown. What is more, their 
discourse from a position of increasing weakness post-Sant‘Egidio continued in this 
vein. For now, though, let us continue to focus on the content and tone of this would-
be ground-breaking agreement. 
 Having laid out their commitment to democracy, the parties went on to outline the 
steps towards a solution. Without listing each one, those of note include: the release 
of the FIS leaders and other political prisoners (nothing new, as the signatories had 
already called for this) and the party‘s reinstatement; the cessation of all extrajudicial 
acts, including torture; the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry; 
‗unambiguous‘ calls for an end to the violence on both sides; an end to the state of 
emergency (in place since the coup) and respect for the 1989 constitution; and the 
organisation of a national conference that would lead to free elections and greater 
press freedom. There is nothing in here that demanded too much of the regime. After 
all, the signatories had so much political muscle between them that all that was really 
required for it to work politically was for the military leaders to accept this 
framework and negotiate its implementation. The regime‘s explanation thus far for 
the continuing state of emergency was that security risks did not permit a return to 
normality, yet, as Roberts pointed out, it behaved with complete hypocrisy in 
rejecting the platform. It refused a clear opportunity to secure greater peace, and 
actually announced elections despite no improvement in security conditions:  
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[N]ot only has [the Algiers regime] dismissed the Rome platform‘s peace offer, but it is 
notionally intent on organising its own, unilateral, return to the electoral process [...] 
despite the fact that the violence and insecurity is worse than ever and no end is in sight. 
In this way, the essential hypocrisy in the army‘s position has been dragged out into the 
light of day.
153
 
 Nor did the regime have any reason to oppose the initiative as something that was 
excessively hostile to the military. The tone of the final document was one of 
maturity and statesmanship. In the face of societal breakdown and despite 
considerable political heterogeneity, the parties present in Rome recognised the most 
pressing objectives: an end to the killings and a return to constitutional politics. The 
Plateforme was the first public accord reached between Islamists and non-Islamists 
in the Arab world.
154
 This in itself was a worthy achievement, but perhaps most 
commendable is that the talks did not degenerate into an attack on the common 
enemy—the military leadership. It is very critical of the regime‘s failure to open 
meaningful dialogue and its unilateral approach to power (‗politique du fait 
accompli‘), but the final section assures it of ‗mutual guarantees‘ in the event of 
negotiations, suggesting an intention of reconciliation and not recrimination. 
Furthermore, it supports the regime‘s insistence that the ‗internationalisation‘ of the 
crisis was to be avoided at all costs, making the official reaction (that this was an 
‗attack on Algeria‘s national sovereignty‘) seem at odds with the reality of what was 
agreed upon. This epitomised the position of the eradicators: this was their battle and 
they resisted any interference—even when constructive and from within Algeria. 
Yet, by going it alone like this, they were in fact propagating the violent resistance 
from radicals: the main target of the insurgents was the authoritarianism of the state, 
and if this could have been moderated by the inclusion of mediators under the 
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framework of the Rome platform, then the capacity of the radicals to mobilise 
militants would have been greatly reduced.  
 The Sant‘Egidio talks provide a good example of the FIS‘ political maturity and 
the regime‘s political inflexibility. They had the potential to push Algeria towards 
peace and genuine pluralism. They showed that there was no political impasse, but 
only military obduracy. And, from the point of view of this thesis, they marked an 
important step in the continuing evolution of the FIS towards acceptance of a truly 
pluralist, democratic and just politics. This proved to be almost academic, however. 
Abassi and Belhadj remained in prison and were only released on condition that they 
would stay out of politics, leaving the FIS‘ discourse confined to the fringes of 
Algerian political dissent.
155
 For the benefit of this academic analysis, it is 
nonetheless worth noting that the party‘s position on democracy remained true to the 
spirit of the Sant‘Egidio talks. There is no longer any ambiguity in its official 
relationship to democracy, a change that accompanied the transition from the 
disorganised but burgeoning movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s to the more 
limited but coherent party-in-exile of the conflict and post-conflict years. The 
executive body that represents the party outside of Algeria (Instance exécutive du 
FIS à l‟étranger – IEFE) asserts its commitment to all the main elements of 
democracy:  
Ce que nous voulons, c‘est un président élu, un parlement élu, une justice indépendante, 
et des partis d‘opposition libres. Nous voulons un pays où le peuple puisse choisir son 
projet de société par la voie des urnes, choisir ses représentants en toute liberté et dans 
le respect de la démocratie.
156
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 Such views are repeated across the spectrum of FIS publications and statements: 
emphasis is systematically placed on the importance of providing the people with a 
choice as to how best to model society; the ballot system is unequivocally invoked as 
the only option for effecting change in power; the independence of the judiciary is 
not compromised; and personal liberties are guaranteed.
157
 That this political voice 
has now disappeared almost completely is testament to the success of the military 
campaign, which began after the cancelled elections in January 1992, but was a 
reality as early as the intervention of the armed forces during the FIS demonstrations 
of June 1991, when it would appear that Chadli‘s political authority was definitively 
sidestepped. My final chapter will examine the ways in which this campaign moved 
forward from the formal dissolution of the FIS in order to distort and thereby 
discredit the Islamist opposition. 
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Chapter IV: Islamist Violence, State 
Violence and the Distortion of the FIS 
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We rarely discover the truths of 
history as understood by those who 
have suffered its bitter reality [...] the 
torture of Algeria at the hands of the 
bearers of European civilisation has 
been no exception to this shameful 
rule – Noam Chomsky1 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to highlight some of the controversial claims made 
against the military regime, in order to show that this conflict may be understood as a 
means to undermine, denature and ultimately eliminate the political opposition 
represented by the FIS, as analysed in Chapter III. In the interest of balanced 
analysis, I will also provide some of the background information that might attenuate 
the credibility of such a reading. In Chapter I, we saw how the early development of 
the Algerian state might be read as having served the interests of the FLN rather than 
the nation as a whole. I argued that the ruling party was seen as having failed in its 
mission as its state-sanctioned nationalism and Islam were increasingly unsuccessful 
in appealing to the population. Here, we will see how this logic was brought to its 
most insidious extreme, as the private interests of the military leaders, with their 
stranglehold on political and economic power, were the driving force behind the 
conflict. Of course, they fought ostensibly in the name of democracy and the 
preservation of the state‘s integrity, but in reality democracy had not been threatened 
and it was they who destroyed the integrity of the state when they illegally 
appropriated the powers of the executive, judiciary and legislature. Their actions 
were also the most extreme expression of the barriers to entry that I raised in 
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Chapter II. In an effort to eliminate in the long term the emerging political 
opposition, they sought to depict it in the most anti-democratic light. This distorted 
the reality of Algeria‘s political environment: the distinct political movement 
embodied by the FIS gave way to a chaotic and nebulous amalgam of Islamist 
‗terrorists‘. And if the claims analysed in this chapter are to be accepted, much of the 
violence allegedly committed by these groups was in fact the work of the military. 
 The full extent of the debate on the culpability of Algeria‘s military authorities is 
difficult to ascertain for two principal reasons. First, many of the finer points of this 
debate are raised online in unofficial dialogue and as such have sources of varying 
reliability. The large number of forums where Algerian citizens express their fervent 
albeit uncertain assertions that there has been mass conspiracy between Islamist 
groups and the army does not always serve to make the debate more transparent. 
Furthermore, the comments found online are often threads from discussions that 
began elsewhere in a slightly different context; this means the factual insights they 
provide are limited. However, the blend of informal and more formally academic, 
political or journalistic analysis makes for fascinating reading, particularly when 
some of the key participants in this debate (those who have published books on the 
conflict, for example) respond to remarks made by casual bloggers. The second 
obstacle to transparency in this debate is the sheer scale of the allegations made by 
those who seek to inculpate the military authorities. The completely damning nature 
of the claims is such that there has been no cooperation whatever from the state. 
This, one assumes, is because even to entertain the possibility that these are credible 
would in itself call into question the ability of the state to continue to function: its all-
important military apparatus would be irreparably undermined, many high-profile 
figures still in positions of authority would be publicly questioned, and the political 
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apparatus would also lose all credibility (although now pluralist, this apparatus is in 
fact completely dominated by pro-military parties, with the FLN and RND holding a 
majority of seats in parliament).
2
 
 Given these difficulties, we cannot hope to come to any sound conclusions about 
the exact culpability of the regime. However, by looking at the nature of allegations 
made and by explaining the context in which they arose, I hope to reinforce the view 
that the FIS were misrepresented and never allowed to develop politically. Chapter 
III developed this argument by examining the political context of post-1988 Algeria, 
emphasising the legality of the FIS and the obduracy of the military regime. As a 
complement to this political analysis, this final chapter will therefore focus on the 
military dimension of the conflict. As well as providing background references to the 
wider debate on the army‘s exact role, I will refer to five cases where accusations 
were made against the Algerian regime: the first is an account written by a former 
Second Lieutenant, Habib Souaïdia, who argues that widespread manipulation was 
used to discredit the Islamist opposition; the second is the assassination of President 
Mohamed Boudiaf; the third is an account of a village massacre that took place in 
September 1997 and in which the army is accused by one of the villagers of having 
participated; the fourth relates to a defamation trial opposing Souaïdia and a senior 
Algerian General; and the final analysis is of the Algerian state‘s interaction with the 
UN Human Rights Committee.  
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Section 1 – Souaïdia: La sale guerre 
 The 1990s and early 2000s saw the publication of several books and reports 
related to the civil conflict in Algeria.
3
 Some of these brought charges against the 
military for disinformation, torture, summary executions and the deliberate 
instrumentalisation of the growth of political Islam in order to ensure that the ANP 
(Armée nationale populaire) and its political allies remained the true driving force 
behind the country‘s governance. Habib Souaïdia‘s La sale guerre is probably the 
most high-profile of these publications—for several reasons.4 It sold more than 
70,000 copies and was translated into seven languages; it was published in 2001, at a 
time when the horrors of the war had been seen across the globe; and it indirectly 
gave rise to a case for defamation between the author and the former Minister for 
Defence, General Khaled Nezzar.
5
 
 I will return to the details of this case a little later, as the trial proceedings are a 
valuable source of information about the role played by the Algerian army in the 
conflict of the 1990s. For now, however, it is necessary to understand the sheer scale 
of the claims made by Souaïdia‘s book. Unlike—although not in opposition to—the 
claims made by Luis Martinez, who as we have seen argues that the war was a kind 
of inevitable manifestation of the Algerian psyche or public perception of war 
(‗imaginaire de la guerre‘), Souaïdia goes much further to suggest that the military 
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deliberately started and then propagated the war by massacring civilians and blaming 
the Islamist ‗terrorists‘, the motive being to reinforce both the perceived threat of the 
Islamist rise and the concomitant need for protection by a state with a powerful 
military.  
 Souaïdia, who joined the forces in 1989, claims that preparations for the 
elimination of the Islamist ‗threat‘ were well under way prior to the coup in January 
of 1992. Included in the 8,000 arrests of Islamist supporters in the summer of 1991 
were the two FIS leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj.
6
 Souaïdia, who refers to 
their arrest as a ‗kidnapping‘, cites the charge brought against them as the 
proclamation of jihad against Algeria, for which they were sentenced by a military 
court in Blida to twelve years‘ imprisonment.7 Many of these arrests were justified 
by real attacks, such as that on the military base in Guemmar (November 1991), but 
there prevailed a sense that the regime was preparing for more than the immediate 
threats posed by such incidents. Guemmar, in the south-east of the country, was the 
location of a border post that was attacked by a small commando unit of Islamist 
militants led by Tayeb Al-Afghani.
8
 They managed to flee with significant arms and 
also killed three soldiers (Souaïdia says the real number of victims was closer to 20).
9
 
General Nezzar did not hesitate to exploit the indirect links between this group and 
the FIS and ordered a vicious clampdown that killed 25 of its members. The 
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Financial Times commented at the time that the scope of this operation was intended 
to stretch well beyond the incident itself and in reality targeted potential FIS 
supporters in the upcoming elections: ‗The incident comes at a convenient time for 
those wishing to scare people off supporting the FIS and underlines the army‘s key 
role‘.10 Around this time, Souaïdia says the regime began to adopt a particularly 
virulent discourse to counter the perceived threat (‗La société est gangrenée, il faut 
donc procéder à des amputations‘)11 and boosted military recruitment as if in 
preparation for war: ‗L‘armée s‘était lancée dans une campagne de recrutement sans 
précédent. Le type de conscription que des armées effectuent généralement à la veille 
de proclamer l‘état de guerre‘.12  
Section 1.1 – Military designs on power 
 December of 1991 came and, despite an abstention of around 40%, the FIS won a 
majority of votes (48%) in the first round of elections and looked set to have an 
outright majority in parliament after the second round. Souaïdia tells us that the 
military generals, together with the regional leaders and historic figures of power 
(caciques) from the regime, immediately went into conclave to discuss what was to 
be done.
13
 Like many of his claims, this is difficult to confirm, although General 
Nezzar does describe a meeting organised in the wake of the elections that was 
attended by ‗les grands dignitaires de l‘armée, les commandants des divisions de 
combat, une trentaine d‘officiers en tout‘, but not by the President himself.14 Does 
this amount to a conclave? And if so, does it imply that the attendees were acting 
inappropriately? Souaïdia does not explicitly say so, but much of the book relies on 
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his powers of suggestion and the reader‘s corresponding powers of deduction. We 
can assume, however, that the decision-making at this stage was increasingly rooted 
in the senior military channels. General Nezzar is widely considered to have been the 
‗brains‘ behind the January coup.15 Also difficult to confirm is Souaïdia‘s contention 
that the fate of President Bendjedid was determined by blackmail. He contends that 
the authorities had information indicting Chadli‘s son in a case of misappropriation 
of funds (the ‗Mouhouche affair‘) and were willing to hand over the file in return for 
the President‘s cooperation.16 He cites the involvement of several generals, including 
Khaled Nezzar. For his part, Nezzar has categorically denied that Chadli was in any 
way forced into resignation. While he makes it clear that he did not consider him a 
suitable President and suspected him of excessive sympathy towards the rising 
Islamist figures, General Nezzar suggests that the decision came from the man 
himself: ‗il me dit […] qu‘il ne voyait pas d‘autre issue que de « confier encore une 
fois la situation à l‟armée »‘.17  
 Further information is required to elucidate these events. What exactly opposed 
General Nezzar and the President? As I have suggested, the General felt that Chadli‘s 
stance in relation to the impending Islamist threat was overly tolerant, but more 
specifically resented the influence of Chadli‘s Prime Minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, 
whose ‗attitude‘ (‗le port du burnous, le cigare, les cours accélérés d‘arabe‘)18 Nezzar 
held in suspicion. The General describes him as a conniving politician with only his 
own, short-term interests at heart, and depicts Chadli, meanwhile, as an 
impressionable and weak leader who succumbed to Hamrouche‘s designs on power. 
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However, it was the military that had designs on power. Nezzar‘s tone suggests that 
he was impatient with the Presidency for not reacting harshly enough to the 
imminent gains in the Islamist camp. He writes of ‗laxisme‘ on the part of the 
administration and suggests there were limits to what the army could and could not 
‗envisage‘. His account of a private meeting with Chadli in the aftermath of the first 
round of elections describes how he feared that the President would wait until after 
the FIS had secured a majority before dissolving the National Assembly, a scenario 
that for Nezzar and his fellow officers was unthinkable and must be prevented by 
swifter action: ‗Nous ne pouvions, nous militaires, envisager un seul instant qu‘il 
prendrait le risque d‘ordonner pour la troisième fois à l‘armée de réparer ses 
dégâts‘.19 The General and his fellow officers had therefore decided that intervention 
must come before, and not after, the second round of elections—before Chadli had 
the chance to cause any more ‗damage‘. They secured that possibility with the 
President‘s resignation, which Nezzar himself describes as ‗l‘élément matériel 
indispensable à l‘arrêt du processus électoral‘ and which was made official when 
Chadli signed a letter that had been drafted by an army general, Mohamed Touati, 
and a lawyer, Ali Haroun, who had been nominated as the Minister for Human 
Rights under Hamrouche‘s successor, Sid Ahmed Ghozali.20 Haroun‘s credibility in 
drafting this letter, however, must be considered tarnished by his later role in the 
Haut comité d‟Etat (HCE), the emergency executive branch that replaced the 
government after Chadli‘s departure.21  
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 While this cannot lead us to conclude definitively that Chadli did not resign of his 
own free will, nor can we accept Nezzar‘s word as sufficient to refute accusations of 
undue pressure from the army generals. What it does reveal at the very least is that 
the military wielded a degree of power that cannot place it completely beyond 
suspicion. Such will be my endeavour in examining the indictments against the 
Algerian military: it is impossible to confirm with any degree of certainty that they 
are true, but the alarming number and serious nature of the allegations made, together 
with suspicious circumstances and unsatisfying responses from army officials, will at 
least allow me to support the view that the conflict was not as portrayed by the 
military regime, and thereby develop the thesis that the fundamentals of the Islamist 
movement were denatured by the Algerian civil war. This does not imply that the 
fault lies on one side only; indeed, the tactics employed by some of the Islamist 
factions were beyond description. However, my focus is on the pivotal moment of 
the army‘s intervention in January 1992, and the ensuing descent into violence and 
shift away from democracy that ensured the political mandate of the FIS would be 
undermined to the point where a very blurred line was seen to separate the party‘s 
proponents from the radical guerrilla fighters in the conflict.  
 On 9 February 1992, the FIS was dissolved and a state of emergency was declared 
by the HCE.
22
 It was headed by Mohamed Boudiaf, one of the historic liberators of 
Algeria called back from exile in Morocco to lead the country back to stability. His 
status as a hero of the liberation may have been seen as a reliable means to reinforce 
the legitimacy of the state, but as Martin Evans and John Phillips suggest, the 
significance or appeal of this may have been lost on those from the younger 
generation who had been so instrumental in the angry backlash against the self-
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interested elite: ‗Ignorant of the nuances of 1962, all they saw was a cynical ploy to 
drape the coup in the legitimacy of 1954‘.23 In any event, the establishment of this 
body allowed action to be taken with some officialdom, and detention camps were 
soon set up in the south of the country to house the increasing numbers of FIS 
activists and supporters who were arrested following the declared state of 
emergency.
24
 Souaïdia tells us that this repression in the public sphere was 
accompanied even within the military by a clampdown on those seen as having 
sympathy for the Islamist cause. While some officers were arrested for their close 
ties with the FIS or other groups, others were attacked simply by virtue of their pious 
views and practices. This, Souaïdia says, was to worsen throughout the years of 
conflict, eventually resulting in the closure of mosques on military bases across the 
country, and military personnel being forced to conduct their prayers in secret:  
Les purges déclenchées dès 1992 avaient créé dans l‘armée un climat de défiance 
généralisée […] Ceux qui, jadis, accomplissaient leurs devoirs religieux étaient montrés 
du doigt […] On ne savait plus si les généraux voulaient combattre l‘islamisme ou 
carrément l‘islam, pourtant religion d‘Etat.
25
 
 One of the central claims made by Souaïdia is that the military regime contributed 
massively to the ‗production‘ of terrorists, describing it as a machine for their 
fabrication. He explains that the early repression targeted civilians more than it did 
the armed groups, and that this served to build up a climate of hatred and resentment 
towards the security forces:  
En fait, au cours de ces premiers mois de 1992, l‘essentiel de la répression n‘était pas 
dirigé contre les groupes armés, mais contre les civils […] Plus tard je comprendrai que 
c‘est à ce moment-là que s‘est mise en marche la machine à fabriquer des terroristes. 
Ceux qui échappaient aux rafles n‘avaient pas d‘autre choix que de gagner les maquis. 
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Et deux ou trois ans plus tard, ceux qui avaient été arrêtés ont été relâchés : ils avaient 
tellement la rage de ce qu‘ils ont subi que beaucoup d‘entre eux ont pris les armes.26 
 Indeed, he says that a similar effect was felt within the armed forces, where many 
young soldiers felt the same disgust at what they had seen and how they were treated, 
and as a result deserted from the military, while those who remained descended into 
a state of anarchy and debauchery. Souaïdia describes a military in which hygiene, 
order, protocol and discipline broke down completely. Assemblies were disregarded, 
uniforms were unkempt. Drug abuse was rife (Souaïdia estimates that 80% of troops 
indulged daily), with an illegal trade operating even within the military bases.
27
 
Perhaps even more grave is his claim that from March 1993 onwards, written orders 
for missions were abandoned in favour of verbal instruction, thereby making it 
extremely difficult to verify or dispute the claims made either in support or in 
condemnation of the army‘s actions during the conflict.28 This reinforces one of the 
most common depictions of the ‗dirty war‘, a conflict in which everything was 
flouted—rules, dignity, justice. One in which the legitimacy of both sides was eroded 
as valid opposition under a multi-party political system gave way to a bloody 
struggle with blurred boundaries.  
Section 2 – Boudiaf and the search for legitimacy 
 The importance and complexity of the question of legitimacy in this conflict is 
illustrated by the assassination of Mohamed Boudiaf on 29 June 1992. I have 
suggested that Boudiaf might have been considered by the military as a good 
candidate for the job by virtue of his historic role in the liberation struggle.
29
 The 
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hypothesis here was that a ‗clean‘ man such as Boudiaf could repair some of the 
damage the regime had done to itself by hijacking the electoral process, and also take 
back some of the mass popular appeal the FIS had so successfully generated. For the 
FIS had also sought legitimacy on the basis of its historic connections with the 
seminal struggle of 1954–1962. Abassi Madani was portrayed as a hero of the earlier 
conflict, therefore making his party a natural successor to the dominance of the FLN. 
Boudiaf, then, as Hugh Roberts puts it, provided the regime with the ‗trump card‘ to 
entice back some of Abassi‘s electoral base.30 If this is true, then the decision to call 
on Boudiaf was entirely self-serving. Then, when his presence failed to serve the 
regime, it is generally believed the military—and not the Islamists—assassinated the 
new President.  
 Mohamed Boudiaf was killed by close-range gunfire while speaking before a 
meeting of young Algerians at the Maison de la culture in Annaba, in the east of the 
country. The attack was caught live on television and seen around the world. The 
authorities immediately arrested Second Lieutenant Lambarek Boumaarafi, a 
member of the infamous specialist unit, the GIS (Groupe d‟intervention spéciale), 
who soon confessed to the murder. It was claimed that he was an Islamist acting on 
his own behalf. One of the first revelations to arouse suspicion was that this GIS unit 
was not supposed to be part of the President‘s security cortège that day, and had been 
included at the last minute. Many observers have commented that the protocol was 
not observed that day. Souaïdia explains that presidential security was systematically 
handled by a different unit, known as the DSPP (Direction de la sécurité et la 
protection présidentielle), and that Boumaarafi had no place being so close to 
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Boudiaf.
31
 Evans and Phillips report that three of the security agents present had left 
their post moments before the attack took place, and even that one of the other GIS 
agents on the scene shot and wounded the only police officer who was pursuing the 
assailant.
32
 While initial blame was placed in the fundamentalist camp, public 
opinion within Algeria showed that the military elite were not beyond suspicion: ‗the 
widespread conviction was that the assassination had actually been planned and 
facilitated by senior figures within the Algerian regime itself‘.33 Newspapers in the 
West reported how mourners at the funeral were heard shouting accusations that 
Boudiaf had been killed by the regime, or that Ghozali or Chadli had been behind the 
killing.
34
 Whoever was behind it, the popular belief was that it was not the Islamists. 
Even Boudiaf‘s widow felt certain they were not to blame and spoke of a 
‗conspiracy‘ at the burial.35 What is more, in 1998 she requested that the death 
sentence passed against Boumaarafi be suspended and spoke to a Spanish newspaper 
of how her husband had foreseen the attack but had wished to go through with the 
Annaba trip regardless.
36
 In time, the view that Boudiaf‘s assassination was 
organised by the regime would come to be accepted in almost all quarters, to the 
extent that several years later, journalists outside Algeria no longer felt the need to 
speak in the language of allegations: ‗Military factions murdered President Mohamed 
Boudiaf in 1992 after he had ordered inquiries into corruption among senior 
officers‘.37 At an official level within Algeria, despite Boumaarafi‘s admission of 
guilt (‗j‘ai fait une opération de djihad‘), a commission of inquiry could not reach 
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any satisfactory conclusion, but suggested that an ‗acte isolé‘ on the part of the 
young officer was unlikely.
38
 
 If we are to believe that Boudiaf was indeed assassinated by the same people who 
called upon him in Algeria‘s hour of need, then we must establish why they would 
have benefited from such a move. One of the foremost claims is that his assassination 
was provoked by the rigorous attack he was preparing on corruption at the highest 
level of the state. While the regime benefited from Boudiaf‘s presence as a well-
respected civilian, thereby bridging the gap between the people and their rulers and 
lending greater legitimacy to what would otherwise have been seen as a putsch, this 
did not outweigh the risk of seeing high-profile officers and civil servants tried for 
misappropriation of funds and money laundering. A group of dissident officers in 
exile, the Mouvement algérien des officiers libres (MAOL), produced a damning 
report of Boudiaf‘s death in which they provide remarkable detail of the decisions 
made on both sides of the internal feud.
39
 They explain how a few weeks prior to his 
death, Boudiaf had entrusted one of his advisers, Colonel Mourad, with a mission to 
Paris in order to investigate what had become of monies that had disappeared from 
public coffers in suspicious circumstances. Specific names are given of those to be 
investigated, including some of the senior army generals at the time (Nezzar and 
Larbi Belkheir, Minister of the Interior under Ghozali). The French judicial 
authorities were not willing to breach the confidentiality of accounts held on French 
soil, but the MAOL reports that Mourad was nonetheless assassinated upon his return 
to Algeria. Like so many other suspicious murders during the conflict, this killing 
would later be ascribed to ‗terrorists‘. The incident troubled Boudiaf greatly, and the 
MAOL report even claims that he chose to leave his presidential post and return to 
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Morocco in the middle of the night, only to be later convinced to return by a select 
group of army generals.  
 Boudiaf‘s assault on corruption reveals an interesting subtlety in this affair: the 
protagonists on both sides had similar goals—the restoration of the trust of the 
people and greater legitimacy for a corrupt regime. Boudiaf was seen as an asset by 
the military regime for his credentials of honesty and legitimacy, but his own aim 
was to root out corruption within the very group of leaders who had brought him to 
power, thereby bringing legitimacy not to a group of generals but to the state itself: 
‗[Boudiaf] savait pertinemment que le salut de l‘Algérie ne pouvait venir qu‘en 
montrant du doigt les vrais responsables du mal algérien afin de rétablir cette 
confiance perdue entre le peuple et ses gouverneurs‘.40 This made the president a 
nuisance to the authorities, and as one commentator reminds us, the Algerian regime 
had a long history of removing ‗les gêneurs‘ and replacing them with others who 
would offer the least resistance.
41
 So it was with the country‘s first president, Ahmed 
Ben Bella, who was ousted in a bloodless coup when his senior military general, 
Houari Boumediene, felt his clan was under threat. And when Chadli was brought in 
to replace Boumediene in 1978, it was as a compromise candidate, perceived by the 
military leaders to be weak and acquiescent. Boudiaf‘s ‗strategy of rupture‘ was at 
odds with the self-serving strategy of façade adopted by the military: ‗Quelques mois 
lui auront suffi pour afficher une stratégie de rupture, alors que ses commanditaires 
l‘avaient projeté sur le devant de la scène dans le seul but d‘incarner une continuité 
de façade des institutions‘.42 Therefore, while those from the military regime sought 
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legitimacy for themselves, Boudiaf sought legitimacy for something wider—the very 
core of governance which had lost the support of its people. In fact, the effect of 
Boudiaf in office was to exceed the army‘s expectations: where they had hoped his 
revolutionary status would link him to their own glorious past, if anything it showed 
the extent to which their path had become wayward. As the Financial Times 
insightfully commented a few years after the president‘s death: ‗Far from lending 
revolutionary lustre to the military-backed administration, Boudiaf highlighted how 
far it was from the ideals it claimed to represent‘.43 This is an illustration of the fine 
line the military regime sought to tread throughout the conflict—a fine line between 
generating its own legitimacy and avoiding scrutiny; a fine line between eroding the 
electoral base of the FIS and alienating the millions who had voted for the party; and 
a fine line between firmness in tackling the enemy and inadmissible war-time tactics.  
 Another clear effect of Boudiaf‘s violent death was to remind the people of the 
need for severity in ensuring law and order. By (ostensibly) showing what the 
fundamentalists were capable of, and on a stage that would ensure the bloody nature 
of the killing reached as wide an audience as possible, the army hoped to boost 
support nationwide and even internationally for its unforgiving tactics of repression. 
I have mentioned some of the accusations made by Souaïdia of the army‘s increasing 
intolerance of expressions of the Islamic faith (although never publicly: ‗nous 
rigolions entre collègues en voyant les dignitaires du régime accomplir, les jours de 
fête religieuse, la prière à la grande mosquée d‘Alger devant les caméras de la 
télévision‘),44 and also of the public repression (summary arrests and executions, 
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detention camps, torture, illegal interrogation tactics)
45
 that accompanied the conflict. 
However, while this is damning enough in itself, the accusations made against the 
military go far beyond this claim; as we shall see, many parties have accused the 
military of deliberately feeding the terrorist supply chain, making Souaïdia‘s image 
of a ‗machine à fabriquer des terroristes‘ all the more sombre and cynical. This 
chapter develops the view that the military, by virtue of their actions in the conflict, 
sought to deliberately denature the Islamist opposition. However, the claims and 
counter-claims to have emerged in recent years are practically impossible to support 
or refute with any degree of certainty, partly because many of them are based on 
second-hand accounts, partly because many of their authors cannot claim neutrality, 
and finally because of the tight control exercised by the Algerian regime over 
information relating to the conflict. Unable to prove that the military deliberately 
distorted its enemy, we must therefore seek to understand why it might have done so. 
What did it stand to gain from such a tactic? 
Section 3 – Martinez on the instrumentalisation of violence 
 Although he does not offer as radical an assessment as Souaïdia of military 
tactics, Luis Martinez does suggest that the conflict was precipitated by the army. He 
says the authorities turned against their people in a deliberate effort to subjugate 
them into accepting an unfavourable economic and political status quo, or at least 
those sections of society that did not include either the civil or military bourgeoisie, 
or the non-state bourgeoisie (traders, industrialists and businessmen).
46
 Rejecting the 
notion that the rise of the Islamist opposition can be explained by demographics (a 
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rise in population from 11m in 1962 to 28m in 1990) or economic adversity alone, 
Martinez emphasises the key word that emerges again and again in analysis of the 
Algerian conflict—instrumentalisation. He suggests that the army used the threat of 
violence as a political instrument that would safeguard its role at the centre of power. 
In order for the common people to accept the increased upward mobility of those 
well-off members of society, they must be subjugated by attack, whereby their socio-
economic concerns would be outweighed by more pressing concerns about imminent 
violence. This analysis, he says, challenges the view that the conflict resulted from 
the increased degradation, or ‗decomposition‘, of the political system and allows us 
to view the civil war as a ‗ressource économico-politique‘.47 Such a strategy would 
have required a pretext in order to subjugate the potentially vociferous masses. The 
supposed threat of the FIS coming to power provided just such a pretext, he says: ‗la 
crise politique ouverte par l‘interruption du processus électoral en janvier 1992 peut 
apparaître comme un alibi au retournement de l‘armée « contre la société »‘.48  
 This view of the conflict might seem shocking to some; after all, the notion that an 
army would wittingly instigate a climate of such instability and violence in order to 
safeguard its ‗economico-political‘ interests is quite radical. For this, Martinez 
develops his central thesis—what he calls the ‗imaginaire de la guerre‘. He argues 
that the violent history of Algeria, with its many wars (struggles against the French 
during and at the beginning and end of colonisation; participation in two world wars; 
internal power struggles between the FLN and rival factions such as Messali Hadj‘s 
MNA (Mouvement national algérien) in the aftermath of independence; and of 
course the conflict of the 1990s), has installed in certain sections of the population a 
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tendency to associate violence with certain virtues, as well as social elevation and 
ultimately the acquisition of power.  
 Martinez‘s analysis is objectionable. First of all, this view depicts Algeria as a 
nation driven by bloodshed, although he is careful to dismiss this challenge: 
‗Contrairement au concept de culture de guerre, on ne postule pas a priori que la 
société algérienne est imprégnée d‘un certain comportement politique (guerrier en 
l‘occurrence)‘.49 But does he go far enough? After all, is a ‗culture de guerre‘ so very 
different from an ‗imaginaire de la guerre‘, particularly when he uses this 
‗imaginaire‘ to account for the changes in Algeria‘s power structures and the 
behaviour of large sections of the population, both surely reflections of the country‘s 
culture? Furthermore, one wonders whether his thesis does not underplay the 
ideologies at work in the conflict. For if we accept that personal elevation and 
wealth—the alleged fruits of war as perceived by the protagonists—are the 
motivating factors behind the actions of both maquisards and militaires, does this not 
imply that the conflict is vacuous and undermine the ‗official‘ motivations (the quest 
for Islamic governance on the one hand and the protection of democracy on the 
other)? Need we remind ourselves that 48% of voters seemed to favour Islamic 
governance? Or, for that matter, that fears about Islamic governance were clearly 
expressed during mass demonstrations after the first round of elections?
50
 This 
revealed a national division that no ‗imaginaire‘ can explain away. We cannot 
discount the basic opposition between, on the one hand, a secular elite with its ties to 
the French language and culture, its considerable wealth and private interests, and its 
historic monopoly over the country‘s core power structures, and, on the other, a more 
populist, Arabophone movement offering grass-roots intervention in both the social 
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and spiritual spheres and which historically had felt marginalised from governance. 
While Martinez‘ thesis may reflect the motivations of several protagonists, it is 
misguided to underplay this central division. Besides, it is reasonable to assume that 
the quest for power, riches and social elevation are common to all politicians and 
ideologues, albeit to varying degrees. A social democrat participating in the elections 
of any European state may well wish for an improved status as a corollary of his/her 
accession to the organs of power, but we cannot assume that the tenets underlying 
their politics are a mere veil.  
 Martinez also makes an assumption when he writes of the perceived virtues of 
violence and how they have taken hold in the public psyche following the various 
conflicts Algeria has known. He seems to attach these virtues to violence in general, 
rather than to the specific outcomes of the violence employed in each struggle. In the 
context of Algeria‘s many conflicts, perhaps what is in fact perceived as virtuous is 
the struggle against colonial oppression, against imported values, against terrorism, 
against the exploitation of Islam, against corruption, against apostates or against 
elitism, and not the use of violence per se. There is something condescending about 
the view that people are blind to the causes, emotions, values, stakes and ideologies 
of a given conflict, and perceive only the emergence of certain figures who have 
employed violent means to achieve social gains. To add to this blurring of the 
individual and very different incidents of violence in Algeria‘s past, Martinez 
contends that the émirs of the armed groups reflect the ‗imaginaire‘ in that they are 
an extension of the ‗bandit‘ characters of Algeria‘s past—the Barbary corsairs 
(pirates and mercenaries operating across North Africa during the Ottoman era), the 
colonial caïds (indigenous civil servants appointed by the French under colonial rule) 
and the ALN colonels of the liberation struggle. While a tenuous link may be 
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perceived between the earlier corsairs and the modern émirs, it is difficult to imagine 
how French-appointed civil servants could reflect the kind of violent role played by 
the leading figures in the armed factions of the 1990s. Furthermore, it is misleading 
to describe the nationalist leaders of the liberation struggle as ‗bandits‘.51 
 One thing that does emerge from Martinez‘ analysis, however, is the 
transformation that the Islamist movement underwent in the course of the conflict. 
He explains that in certain zones, the émirs were revered as leading entrepreneurial 
figures, particularly by disenfranchised youths who associated the Kalashnikov with 
social standing. Martinez makes it clear that the isolated communities in which the 
émirs held sway represented a break from the original Islamist resistance, with local 
power struggles replacing the nationwide efforts of the guerrilla fighters to topple the 
regime and establish an Islamic state.
52
 This example is indicative of the fractured 
nature of the ‗Islamist camp‘ during the conflict: what had emerged as a relatively 
united, albeit uncertain, political alternative to FLN rule was broken down into 
discrete factions—often direct rivals, as in the case of the GIA and AIS, and whose 
actions no longer reflected the political impetus of 1990–1991. The subtle but 
significant shift I have alluded to in earlier chapters, as illustrated in the FIS‘ new 
brand of nationalism or its politicisation of Islamic reformism, was therefore no 
longer recognisable in post-1992 Algeria, except where the remnants of the FIS 
continued to act towards a political solution, such as at Sant‘Egidio. The question 
which concerns us here is the extent to which this breakdown was fuelled by the 
military and its various security enforcement bodies. They stand accused of adopting 
a dual strategy by which they sought brutally to eradicate the ‗terrorist‘ opposition, 
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but also to infiltrate it and propagate its violent tactics. I will now look at the details 
of accusations made against the state apparatus in relation to one particular incident, 
before considering the testimony and counter-claims provided by the military.  
Section 4 – The dirty war in Bentalha 
 One incident in particular that has been the subject of wide interest is the massacre 
at Bentalha on the night of 22–23 September 1997, a year in which civilian losses 
reached record highs and international attention began to intensify.
53
 Of the Algerian 
violence in the 1990s, this is perhaps the event that attracted the most attention from 
the outside world. It was widely reported in the international press and is said to have 
prompted the question as to who was doing the killing.
54
 This encouraged French 
philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy to visit Algeria and investigate for himself the 
credibility of claims that the regime was complicit in the killing of civilians.
55
 His 
conclusions that there was no basis to such claims are extremely difficult to support, 
given that his short, government-sanctioned stay was entirely inadequate to get 
anywhere near the truth. Indeed, the causes of Lévy and Glucksmann were hardly 
served when General Nezzar commended the two men, who ‗par leur courage ont 
fait connaître la vérité‘, and offered them his ‗plus grand respect‘ and ‗plus haute 
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considération‘.56 But Bentalha is most significant for another key publication that 
emerged in its aftermath and in which the army is accused of complicity: Nesroulah 
Yous, a resident of this small town just south of the capital, published an eye-witness 
account of events that has placed the blame squarely on the military—not just for its 
failure to intervene but for its direct role in the actual killings.
57
 I have chosen to 
focus on this publication as it provides an excellent illustration of some of the 
complexities of the conflict, in relation to the identity of the attackers and the alleged 
collusion between guerrilla fighters and the security forces, and also in relation to the 
attitudes of the different protagonists towards one another. Furthermore, its high 
profile has led me to considerable peripheral material that heightens the significance 
of Yous‘ accusations and elucidates the context in which they were made. 
 It seems to me that broadly speaking two categories of claim can be identified in 
Qui a tué à Bentalha ?: those that are difficult to corroborate (comments overheard, 
second- and third-hand accounts, micro-incidents observed during the night of the 
massacre, etc.) and those that relate to observable facts (military action/inaction, 
large movements of people, public comments, etc.). The former are valuable 
inasmuch as they help to fill in some of the gaps and tie the ‗narrative‘ together, and 
also add a human dimension to the already horrific nature of the account. As for 
those claims that should, in theory at least, be verifiable, their value is that they have 
provided the basis for further investigation, with numerous reports in the Western 
media, as well as from human rights organisations and the United Nations.
58
 While it 
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would not be practical to provide an exhaustive list of the claims made by Yous, it is 
necessary to detail a certain number of them—from both ‗categories‘—if we are to 
appreciate the scale of the accusation and better understand the manner in which the 
events unfolded.  
 There were early signs, according to Yous, that the military were at best reluctant 
to help the villagers of Bentalha during the bloody and nervous period of late 1997. 
Arms had been requested from the local barracks in line with requests successfully 
made by other towns and villages felt to be at risk. However, Yous claims that these 
weapons were deliberately held back until after the massacre as a sinister ploy to 
achieve the dual aim of allowing the assailants to massacre civilians in what would 
be a highly mediatised event, thereby strengthening the state‘s propaganda depicting 
the Islamists as demented killers, and of arming civilians whose sole purpose in the 
aftermath of the event would be to exact revenge on the nebulous entity responsible 
for the attack—the Islamists: 
Ces armes qu‘ils ont refusé de nous donner avant le massacre, ces armes qui nous 
auraient permis de résister aux égorgeurs et de sauver des vies, ils nous les donnent 
maintenant, quelques heures seulement après nous avoir fait massacrer à Bentalha ! À 
nous, qui n‘avons plus qu‘un seul désir : tuer. (p. 8) 
 Reading this citation closely, we can see that the claim goes beyond the failure of 
the military to respond to the needs of its civilians: the words ‗nous avoir fait 
massacrer‘ are a clear indication that the military are being accused of actually 
orchestrating the killings, although perhaps not actually carrying them out. Several 
explicit claims later in Yous‘ account confirm that the military are accused of 
complicity, although it remains unclear whether the assailants were Islamists who 
had simply been allowed to act with impunity, Islamists and military personnel 
acting together, or military personnel acting alone, disguised as Islamists, with the 
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aim of tarnishing the enemy in the eyes of the public and the international media. 
Whichever accusation the reader feels is being made, the testimony is damning.  
 Some of the more specific claims relating to the night of the actual massacre are 
equally alarming. While Yous and some of his neighbours were playing dominoes by 
a shop front, he says they overheard a comment from one of the military personnel 
patrolling the street to the effect that trouble was expected: ‗Ils sont en train de jouer, 
les chiens ! Ils ne savent pas ce qui les attend‘ (p. 158). This marked the beginning of 
a series of incidents in which the security forces allegedly acted mysteriously. Their 
behaviour is described as ‗inhabituelle‘ (p. 160) and their positions are said to have 
been close if not identical to those of the assailants: ‗Quelle n‘est pas ma surprise 
quand je vois quatre ou cinq militaires en tenue de combat de camouflage clair […] 
qui se déplacent du carrefour en direction des vergers‘ (pp. 163–4).59 This 
observation is made all the more mysterious by second-hand accounts of other 
figures observed around the orchards—not military personnel but civilian defence 
groups (gardes communales), at least in appearance. A total of three distinct groups 
are reported to have been seen entering the orchards prior to the killings, each with 
its own role to play: the first, Yous says, planted explosives at the entrances to some 
of the houses in order to gain access, while being covered by the second; the third 
was responsible for the ‗sale boulot‘ (pp. 207–8). There is confusion, however, as to 
whether the assailants were from the military or the armed Islamic groups. Two 
hypotheses are put forward: either these men were Islamists disguised as military 
personnel so as not to arouse suspicion among the locals (we are told that at the time 
it was positively banal to see soldiers hiding in ambush), or they were military 
personnel participating in the killings. An unclear picture emerges, with Yous 
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admitting that no satisfactory explanation is likely ever to be found: ‗en réalité, on ne 
saisira jamais ce qui s‘est passé parce que, pour un esprit sain, c‘est tout simplement 
inconcevable‘ (p. 208).  
 However, he does suggest that these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
Various elements lead him to believe that the group was not homogenous, but 
contained local Islamists as well as ‗death squadrons‘ from the military. He says, for 
example, that he was surprised to hear some of the men speak with an accent that he 
recognised as coming from the east of the country. Later, he recounts how the 
blasphemous attitude and language of at least some of the assailants convinced him 
that they were military men. When some of the villagers shout to the attackers that 
they should be fighting with the military and not innocent civilians, the response is 
caustic:  
« Les militaires ne viendront pas vous aider ! Nous avons toute la nuit pour violer vos 
femmes et vos enfants, boire votre sang. Même si vous arrivez à nous échapper 
aujourd‘hui, nous reviendrons demain pour vous faire la fête. Nous sommes ici pour 
vous envoyer chez votre Dieu ! » (p. 170) 
Yous remarks:  
Je suis à la fois offusqué, troublé et conforté dans mon sentiment qu‘il y a quelque 
chose qui cloche chez ces individus. Je ne sais pas très bien qui sont ces monstres en 
face de nous. Je veux bien croire que ce sont les terroristes dont on nous rebat les 
oreilles, mais j‘en doute de plus en plus. Et s‘affermit en moi la conviction qu‘il ne 
s‘agit pas d‘islamistes : il n‘y a que les militaires pour blasphémer de la sorte. (p. 171)60 
 The heterogeneity of the assailants was further evident in that many of the men 
had beards while others did not, and their clothes differed, with some even wearing 
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the traditional Islamist kachabia over the dark blue combat gear associated with the 
gardes communales. Another striking revelation is that several of the inhabitants 
claim to have recognised three or four local Islamists among the group of killers, but 
this has in no way weakened their conviction that the military were behind the 
massacre. Yous explains this by arguing that local fighters may have been 
deliberately used in order to convince the villagers that the attack was indeed carried 
out by armed Islamic groups, and even that these same fighters would later be 
displayed in the media as the perpetrators of the crime (pp. 210–1). This question is 
also raised by a former Colonel with the Algerian army, Mohamed Samraoui. He 
claims that the deliberate use of recognisable Islamists was a ploy to take attention 
away from the military and further discredit the resistance: 
Ainsi, pour démontrer que les massacres de civils sont bien le fait des islamistes, le 
DRS a mis au point une technique presque infaillible, consistant à inclure de vrais 
islamistes dans les groupes des forces combinées chargés de ces « opérations » (il s‘agit 
d‘individus préalablement arrêtés et « retournés » sous la torture ou « tenus » par des 
promesses de clémence pour des crimes commis antérieurement). Et lors des massacres, 
les habitants des premières maisons de la localité visée étaient volontairement épargnés, 
de manière à permettre aux survivants de témoigner ensuite qu‘ils ont reconnu des 
islamistes.
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 One symbol of Islamist involvement—real or otherwise—is the beard so often 
associated with more traditional or radical elements of society. Yous tells us 
repeatedly that he felt, on the night of the Bentalha massacre, that many of the 
assailants‘ beards were false: ‗On me demandera plus tard ce qui m‘a fait penser que 
ce n‘étaient pas des islamistes. Je crois que certaines barbes et certains cheveux 
étaient artificiels‘ (p. 169). A deserter from the military, in exile in the UK, also 
suggests that this was common. In an interview with Libération in October 1997, 
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Omar (his real identity is not revealed) relates the story of a massacre committed by 
military personnel in the month of June of the same year. Several junior soldiers 
from his unit were allegedly called upon to wait on the outskirts of a small town 
while a group of around 25 of their colleagues proceeded to massacre some 30 
innocent civilians. His description of their return, several hours later, is as follows:  
Ils étaient grimés, avec des fausses barbes et sentant le musc comme des islamistes. Ils 
avaient gardé les pantalons de treillis mais ils avaient des T-shirts civils, ils 
ressemblaient vraiment à des islamistes typiques. Certains avaient du sang sur leurs 
pantalons et leurs couteaux de paras étaient aussi ensanglantés. Ils ont enlevé leurs 
barbes. On n‘a rien demandé, on ne demande rien dans l‘armée et je ne me suis pas posé 
de question.
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For his part, Souaïdia alleges that the use of real beards to inculpate the ‗tangos‘ was 
also common practice: ‗je savais que quand les hommes du DRS se laissaient pousser 
la barbe, c‘est qu‘ils préparaient une « sale mission » où ils se feraient passer pour 
des tangos‘.63  
 Most of the accusations I have alluded to so far belong to the ‗category‘ of claims 
that are difficult to corroborate. However damning they may be, it is difficult to 
interpret them as airtight evidence that the military were behind the killings. When 
they are taken together with some of the more irrefutable testimony, however, the 
case is strengthened. The single most damaging—and most widespread—claim about 
the Bentalha massacre is that the military were present in massive numbers but did 
not intervene. An Amnesty International report noted that many of the massacres 
took place in the most heavily militarised part of the country: 
In many cases massacres, often lasting several hours, took place only a very short 
distance, a few kilometres or even a few hundred metres away from army and security 
forces barracks and outposts. However, in spite of the screams and cries for help of the 
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victims, the sound of gunshots, and the flames and smoke of the burning houses, the 
security forces have not intervened – neither to come to the rescue of those who were 
being massacred, nor to arrest those responsible for the massacres, who got away on 
each occasion.
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 The appendices of Yous‘ testimony show detailed maps of the village and 
surrounding area. They reveal two military bases and one unit of gardes communales 
within 1km of the site of the massacre, six permanent barricades on the main access 
road leading north and south, a further two military bases within around 10km of the 
village, as well as one police station, one anti-terrorist unit and one gendarmerie. 
And yet, despite this security presence, the inaction of the military is universally 
recognised. In fact, even General Nezzar himself admits that the security forces did 
not respond to the three infamous massacres (Raïs, Beni Messous and Bentalha) as 
the people might have expected them to do, but attempts to provide a justification for 
the events that unfolded. In his memoirs he offers an explanation that is at best 
tentative. While recognising various failures (‗les délais prolongés des exactions, la 
présence de forces de sécurité quadrillant les secteurs et l‘évanouissement dans la 
nature des terroristes une fois leurs forfaits accomplis‘), he goes on to suggest five 
factors that would have contributed to the difficulty of the task. It is worth citing his 
comments in detail: 
Les raisons qui expliquent ce qui, à première vue, semble inexplicable, reposent sur les 
facteurs suivants : 
1) la présence au sein de la population ciblée de complices actifs totalement sous 
l‘emprise des terroristes ; 
2) la présence de groupes terroristes implantés dans un tissu urbain à l‘intérieur 
d‘infrastructures aménagées facilitant leurs exactions et leur fuite une fois celles-ci 
commises, toujours au bénéfice d‘un écran de complicité ; 
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3) l‘urbanisation sauvage et très dense, rendant encore plus difficiles et plus lentes les 
interventions de secours ; 
4) la fetwa rendant licite, non seulement l‘assassinat de civils, mais légitimant aussi le 
butin (el ghanima), donnant une onction religieuse à ces crimes ; 
5) les lieux, pendant les attaques, étaient plongés dans l‘obscurité à dessein, engendrant 
une mêlée entre les victimes et leurs bourreaux. 
 Dans ces conditions, quand bien même une unité se trouverait à proximité, 
l‘intervention devient très contraignante en raison de l‘obscurité, des pièges parsemés, 
au préalable, sur tous les accès d‘intervention possibles et, surtout, de la mêlée 
entraînant la confusion totale. 
 Une attitude pour le chef de l‘ordre dans ce cas, consiste à se manifester par la 
présence et par les feux, afin de limiter les pertes sans risques pour les civils et tenter de 
neutraliser les terroristes en leur coupant le chemin de repli.
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 Perhaps the most insidious suggestion to emerge here is that the villagers, by 
virtue of their complicity, are in some way themselves to blame for the atrocities. 
This reflects allegations made by Yous about comments made by other officials who, 
both prior to and following the attacks, showed little compassion for those they saw 
as erstwhile supporters of the enemy. One such example stands out. The Minister for 
Health visited the village of Bentalha on the morning after the massacre and, when 
challenged about the military‘s failure to intervene by one of the victims, whose 
mother and four-year-old sister had been butchered and whose two other sisters had 
been abducted, he is alleged to have responded: ‗Vous êtes les racines du terrorisme, 
vous le nourrissez, alors il faut assumer‘ (p. 199). 
 Other points need to be raised about Nezzar‘s remarks. Aside from the fact that 
the proposed strategy (‗se manifester par la présence et par les feux‘) is clearly not 
the best way to defend civilians from an onslaught, there appears to be some 
inconsistency in the claim that intervention was made difficult by the darkness 
despite the use of lamps. This appears all the more bewildering—and audacious—by 
the suggestion that such a tactic might ‗limiter les pertes sans risques pour les civils‘! 
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The issue of military lighting is raised by Yous in his testimony. He describes how 
lighting was visible from two sources and at two different times. Forty-five minutes 
after Yous says the massacre began (23:30), headlights from armoured vehicles were 
seen nearby. They were to remain stationary throughout the attacks. Almost two 
hours after they arrived, Yous asks: ‗Que font les militaires ? Pourquoi mettent-ils 
tant de temps à intervenir ? Pourquoi les blindés installés dans la maison de 
vieillesse, à 1,5 km d‘ici, ne sortent-ils pas ?‘ (p. 183). Later still (around 03:10), 
Yous claims that massive projectors were lit, bringing hope to the villagers that the 
military would finally intervene, and temporarily destabilising the attackers. 
However, the alleged collusion between the attackers and the military meant that 
hope was short-lived:  
Subitement, des projecteurs s‘allument derrière la maison d‘Aïtar, et nous éblouissent 
[…] Les voisins s‘écrient les uns après les autres : « Les militaires arrivent ! Les 
militaires arrivent ! » Apparemment ils ne sont pas très loin. Les assaillants aussi 
semblent déroutés et se retirent de la terrasse en face, ce qui nous permet de souffler un 
peu. Mais les chefs, des brutes, arrivent en courant et hurlent aux éléments du groupe 
armé : « Continuez ! Ne vous laissez pas dérouter ! Prenez tout votre temps, les 
militaires ne viendront pas. Allez, au travail ! » (pp. 184–5) 
 Nezzar also mentions that the land around the village had been laid with mines 
(‗pièges parsemés‘) to block the route for anyone wishing to provide assistance. It is 
surprising that this should serve as a justification for not intervening to defend 
innocent civilians. Furthermore, the claim is rejected categorically by Yous:  
[N]ous n‘avons vu aucune mine. Nous sommes absolument certains qu‘il n‘y en avait 
pas dans le coin, ni dans les vergers, ni du côté du grand boulevard, où étaient stationnés 
les militaires. […] Et il n‘y a eu aucune opération de déminage dans notre quartier. En 
fait il s‘agit d‘une invention pure et simple des autorités pour essayer de justifier la non-
intervention des militaires. (p. 229)
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 He also makes a number of valid points to refute Nezzar‘s claim. How, he asks, 
could several inhabitants have managed to escape across the allegedly mined plot of 
land without coming to harm? Equally, how is it that the inhabitants from 
neighbouring villages were able to cross the same area in the early hours of the 
morning? (Yous claims that the only assistance they received was from these 
civilians, who were prevented by the military from entering Bentalha until the 
massacre was over – see pp. 191–2.) And when the military finally did enter the 
village, Yous says they too came to no harm. Sarcastically, he suggests the attackers 
perhaps thought to remove the mines as they were fleeing.  
 The final element of interest in Nezzar‘s remarks is his suggestion that the 
military tactic was to ‗neutralise the terrorists‘ by cutting off their retreat. No matter 
how we look at this claim, it is difficult to find in the General‘s favour: either the 
tactic was an unmitigated failure (of the attackers who perpetrated the three 
massacres, one was taken into custody)
67
 or the claim is untruthful. Yous‘ testimony 
in this regard is particularly damning. He says that the assailants had to retreat by the 
very route that was barricaded in several places and which passed by more than one 
military base. His assertion is that the army vehicles were in fact used to transport the 
goods that had been pillaged during the attack, and even that local children were 
forced to assist in this operation before being slaughtered (pp. 213–4).  
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Section 4.1 – What makes these claims credible? 
 The claims and counter-claims that I have so far discussed are useful in 
understanding the extent of the violence in the Algerian conflict, particularly during 
the infamously bloody year of 1997. However, because of the impossibility of 
proving or disproving any of these claims, we must consider how it is that such 
claims could ever have come to be credible. What had changed in the relationships 
between the different protagonists (civilians, military and Islamists) for there to be 
such mistrust? Tension had reigned in the village of Bentalha for some time prior to 
the night of the massacre; this was due to the upsurge in violence in Algeria 
generally throughout 1997, but in particular as a result of the two other massacres 
that had taken place shortly beforehand in the surrounding area of Algiers (Raïs and 
Beni Messous). An unusual scenario is depicted by Yous for this period. He explains 
that the security forces displayed surprising confidence in their operations despite an 
increase in attacks, as if they were assured of their safety:  
L‘atmosphère commence à se détendre, parce qu‘il n‘y a plus cette présence 
quotidienne des groupes. Et pourtant, étrangement, à Alger comme dans sa grande 
banlieue, nous subissons de plus en plus des attaques à la bombe ou armées. Ce qui 
nous frappe, c‘est que les policiers qui se sont terrés dans leurs postes pendant des 
années se permettent désormais, alors que la population civile vit une recrudescence de 
la violence de la part des GIA, de circuler dans la rue sans escorte, à pied ou en car. […] 
Tout se passe comme si ces dernières étaient assurées de ne rien risquer de la part des 
« terros ». C‘est à n‘y rien comprendre. (p. 114) 
 Yous explains that the Bentalha villagers had requested firearms with which to 
defend themselves, a process that had already begun in other parts of the country in 
cases where the military decided that civilians no longer posed a threat as supporters 
of the Islamist movement and indeed were under threat from those they had 
previously fed, sheltered and generally abetted in their struggle. This decision to 
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begin to arm civilians is indicative of the change that had taken place in the civil 
conflict and can help us to understand much about the claims and counter-claims 
made in relation to the civilian massacres of the autumn of 1997. In the early years of 
the conflict there was still considerable support among certain communities for the 
Islamist cause. It is debatable whether this support was given for ideological reasons, 
or because civilians felt threatened: ‗Que pouvions-nous faire? Ils menaçaient de 
nous enterrer vivants ! Vous, vous passez ! Demain, vous serez partis, mais nous, on 
vit ici !‘.68 Regardless of the reasons behind their support, it placed some civilians 
very much on the side of the enemy in the eyes of the military, which in turn explains 
some of the reported indifference among officials upon learning of the massacres. 
However, the increasing barbarity of the tactics employed by certain elements of the 
Islamist resistance, as well as their exploitative treatment of civilians (protection 
taxes, racketeering), meant that support among the population waned, leaving them 
exposed to the kind of revenge killings—if that is indeed what they were—seen in 
1997. Abdelkader Tigha, a deserter from the Algerian secret services who fled the 
country and later published his account of the corruption and illegalities of the 
conflict, tells us that the army saw villages such as Raïs and Beni Messous as 
‗villages retournés‘ or ‗villages libérés‘: they had endured enough suffering at the 
hands of the ‗terrorists‘ to turn them against those they had once seen as their 
saviours, or, as Tigha puts it, ‗La peur avait changé de côté‘.69  
 This goes some way towards explaining several elements of the behaviour on both 
sides of the conflict in 1997. The first is that, perhaps despite themselves, the 
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villagers who supported Islamist rebels during the early stages of the war had placed 
themselves in a far more partisan position than they could have known: their decision 
to cut off their support for violent groups inevitably angered these same groups, but 
did not necessarily win the immediate favour of the armed forces, who continued to 
resent the earlier hostility of the FIS electorate. Whether this resentment was 
sufficiently strong for the army to stand idly by while women and children were 
being butchered cannot be ascertained with any certainty. Or for that matter whether 
the army would have in fact contributed to the orchestration of the killings, as Yous 
has claimed. But it does explain the isolation of the population, and the image of the 
civilian as hostage
70—bound to offer protection and support to the mutated successor 
of the FIS they had sought to elect, while equally repulsed by the increasingly violent 
tactics it employed, and later bound to look to the state for protection, while 
(justifiably) fearful that they would not receive this protection from the very organs 
they had sought to depose. The people, it would seem, were blamed for the growth of 
terrorism. There are numerous examples of officials showing no sympathy for 
survivors of massacres, remarking that it was the people who voted for the 
‗terrorists‘ in the first place and that they should now sort out their own mess.71 
 To accuse victims of bloodshed of having brought violence upon themselves via 
the ballot box is callous enough in itself, but it reflects a more deep-rooted and 
sinister approach to the conflict. For the Islamist project to be defeated unequivocally 
it had to be perceived as unequivocally damaging to society as a whole; this meant it 
had to be associated with unforgivable violence. Hence the deliberate blurring of 
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terrorism and Islamism. That this was advantageous to the regime is made clear by 
the words of one official, who, during her appearance before the UN Human rights 
Committee, described how the initial support for the FIS was eroded as the 
movement‘s ‗constitutive‘ violence disgusted voters: 
En 1992, la population était certes favorable à l‘idéologie du Front islamique du salut et 
au message trompeur des islamistes, mais elle a largement modifié son point de vue 
depuis et a compris de quoi se nourrissait cette idéologie. Elle a compris également que 
la violence des groupes islamistes, nullement réactionnelle, était au contraire 
constitutive de leur idéologie.
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 This blurring of Islamism and violence is at the core of perceptions in the modern 
world generally. The larger electoral base of Islamist parties tends to be obscured by 
excessive focus on their (loosely) associated extremist elements. François Burgat 
blames Western analysis for this misdirected focus,
73
 but it can of course also be 
found among those secular proponents in the Muslim world whose worldview is 
informed by Western values and who know that they will find a sympathetic ear in 
the West when they reproduce echoes of this obscuring analysis in relation to their 
own problems at home. And this intellectual relationship is mutual, as Burgat has 
elsewhere pointed out:  
Les médiateurs de notre perception du phénomène islamiste [...] sont souvent ceux dont 
il menace les convictions et, parfois, le statut. […] L‘Occident inquiet préfère […] 
s‘adresser à ceux dont la voix rassure. Qu‘il est tentant de faire dire par le frère de 
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l‘autre tout le mal dont on le croit capable et de jouer comme en d‘autres temps la carte 
rassurante d‘une hypothétique troisième force !74 
 This blurring tactic was clear in Algeria, where, as political opposition, the 
Islamist movement initially was not enough of a threat for it to be demonised in 
terms of public perception. I have outlined the ways in which the FIS approached the 
political contest, challenging the state on its nationalist credentials, politicising the 
legacy of Islamic reformism, and largely respecting the constitutional process ahead 
of the elections. The only threat this represented was to the existing balance of 
power. What was needed, therefore, was a way to depict political Islam as a violent 
threat, which in turn required actual violence. The cancelled elections provided just 
such an opportunity. The violent response to this event was the initial impetus the 
state needed to highlight the emerging political power as illegitimate; however, more 
was needed to ensure that the actions of its representatives and their supporters 
would not be remembered simply as an angry reaction, and that violence and 
Islamism would be seen as going hand in hand. In order for a long-term hold on 
power to be secured, the aim of the military would not have been to create the 
conditions for re-elections as early as possible, but rather to tarnish the opposition in 
such a way that the re-emergence of a credible Islamist movement in the foreseeable 
future would be most unlikely. In other words, the violence had to be encouraged, 
accentuated and prolonged. Or so the claims of Souaïdia, Tigha, Yous and others 
would appear to suggest.  
 If we accept this analysis, then we can understand why the Algerian security 
forces might have infiltrated the armed Islamic groups—not to destroy them from the 
inside, but rather to direct their violence towards events that would be certain to 
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generate the maximum repulsion among observers, both at home and abroad. We can 
also understand—if not accept unconditionally—the claim that army personnel, 
disguised as Islamists, carried out staged attacks on innocent civilians. And that they 
would have stood by and watched as ‗terrorists‘—real or not—ransacked and 
murdered. This, the FIS has argued, is the regime‘s way of seeking a ‗psychological‘ 
end to the war: 
Selon toute vraisemblance, c‘est [l‘issue psychologique] qui a été choisie par le pouvoir 
parce qu‘elle favorise la violence, les événements sanglants et les horreurs. Son but est 
de marginaliser, d‘isoler, de discréditer et de démonétiser l‘adversaire aux yeux de 
l‘opinion publique nationale et internationale.75 
 Whether accurate or not, the view that the military were at least complicit in the 
crimes being committed was not uncommon among the people. This makes sense if 
one considers the suspicion that already reigned in the early years of the conflict, as 
we saw in my analysis of Boudiaf‘s assassination in Chapter II. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that this suspicion pre-dated the conflict and had long been a feature of 
Algerian politics: ‗by the late 1980s, an increasing number of Algerians were no 
longer simply suspicious of the government‘s motives and deeply disenchanted with 
its nationalist project, but were convinced that it was working against them‘.76 
During the conflict, so widespread was mistrust of the military, Yous tells us, that 
people felt no need to even explain it: ‗Le plus choquant, c‘est que, à l‘unanimité, 
tous disent que ce sont les militaires qui nous ont tués. C‘est tellement évident que 
personne ne demande comment nous en arrivons à cette conclusion et pourquoi nous 
en sommes si sûrs‘ (p. 201). For their part, the military felt resentment towards those 
civilians who had worked against them by assisting local resistance fighters. What 
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appears to have emerged from this climate of mutual mistrust is a situation in which 
no-one was safe. Why? Because no-one was seen as being beyond the conflict; 
almost everyone had reason to fear retribution. Consider the following two citations 
from Tigha‘s account, the first in which he telephones the Colonel responsible for his 
unit in the middle of the night to inform him that the massacre at Raïs is unfolding, 
and the second in which he later interrogates one of the assailants captured after this 
same massacre: 
 – Les premiers messages parlent d‘un massacre de civils dans le village de Raïs. Les 
barbus seraient descendus et auraient tué de minuit jusqu‘à 4 heures du matin. 
 – Qu‘ils aillent se faire foutre. Laissez ces chiens se faire massacrer ! 
 On a un peu tiqué, mais on comprenait ce qu‘il voulait dire. Le village de Raïs était en 
pleine zone GIA, acquis totalement à la cause des islamistes. On n‘allait pas pleurer 
parce qu‘ils s‘étaient fait massacrer.77 
 La colère m‘est montée d‘un coup. J‘ai hurlé : 
 – Mais pourquoi des innocents, des civils, pourquoi ? 
 – Ils n‘étaient pas innocents ! Les muftis du GIA les ont condamnés à mourir parce 
qu‘ils ont arrêté de nous aider. C‘est des Kharawidjs. Nous, on exécute ce que disent les 
muftis. 
 – Mais c‘étaient des musulmans, non ? Des innocents ? 
 Il a baissé la tête sans répondre. 
 – Ils n‘étaient pas innocents. Plus personne n‘est innocent…78 
Section 5 – Nezzar v Souaïdia 
 The question remains, however, as to whether we can indeed accept this analysis. 
Did the military really feed the violence? Did it disregard its civilian population in 
favour of its propaganda? Did it deliberately eschew the conditions necessary for 
early elections in order to discredit its opposition in the long term? Unfortunately, 
military sources relative to the massacres are few in number, so I have had to rely 
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more on those who denounce the inaction of the state than on the regime‘s defenders. 
There is one case, however, where testimony in favour of General Nezzar—and the 
security forces generally—is well documented. I mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter the defamation trial that took place in Paris between the General and the 
author of La sale guerre, Habib Souaïdia. On 27 May 2001, Souaïdia appeared on a 
televised debate in which he accused various generals from the ANP of widespread 
corruption and of having committed massacres and summary executions. In 
particular, Nezzar launched a legal challenge against the following remarks:  
Cela fait dix années qu‘il n‘y a pas de président [en Algérie], plus même. Il y avait des 
généraux, ce sont eux les politiciens, c‘est eux les décideurs, c‘est eux qui ont fait cette 
guerre. C‘est eux qui ont tué des milliers de gens pour rien du tout. C‘est eux qui ont 
décidé d‘arrêter le processus électoral, c‘est eux les vrais responsables. [...] Je ne peux 
pas pardonner [...] au général Nezzar, ex-ministre de la Défense. Il faut qu‘on juge les 
coupables. [...] Ce sont les ex-déserteurs de l‘armée française qui ont mené le pays vers 
l‘anarchie, vers la faillite.79  
 In the event, the charges brought by General Nezzar were nonsuited by the court, 
but this trial is nonetheless very useful in our consideration of military culpability 
during the conflict. The evidence from both sides of the dispute provides many pages 
of fascinating reading, as witnesses are indulged by the court to offer their wider 
views of the conflict and of military power in Algeria generally, but I have chosen to 
focus on the General‘s side of the story to see if any real challenge can be made to 
the claims made by parties like Souaïdia, Tigha, Samraoui, Yous and others. 
Nezzar‘s case is made in a book, co-written by him, detailing the court proceedings 
and the background to the trial. Un Procès pour la vérité includes a lengthy section 
detailing his personal involvement in the war and events leading up to it, as well as 
attacks on the credibility of the various actors who have invested so heavily in 
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discrediting him. Given the peripheral detail (and speculation) admitted by the court, 
this case has the advantage of serving as a kind of substitute trial for the military role 
in the conflict as a whole.
80
  
 Of interest here is the way in which Nezzar sets about attacking the credibility of 
his detractors. If we look closely at his tactics in highlighting the methodological 
shortcomings of Souaïdia et al., we see that it is a rather fragile thesis that develops. 
One of the strategies he employs is to reiterate the attacks made against the Algerian 
security forces in a way that is intended to make them appear ludicrous in 
themselves. In other words, he himself raises very little substantive evidence to show 
the allegations to be false. For example, in an attack on La sale guerre, Nezzar 
remarks that the similarities between it and Le livre blanc sur la répression en 
Algérie (1991–1994) are striking.81 The intention is to suggest that one is merely a 
copy of the other, but the General seems not to consider that readers might see these 
similarities as proof of consistent and well-founded claims. Elsewhere, citing an 
interview that François Burgat gave to La libre Belgique, Nezzar makes no attempt 
even to deny the claim that a fax sent by the GIA claiming responsibility for certain 
massacres had been sent from a machine located on a military base; it would appear 
that the use of an exclamation mark suffices to disparage such a claim: ‗Le 
02.02.1998, dans une interview accordée au journal belge La libre Belgique, [Burgat] 
affirme que « le dernier fax du GIA revendiquant certains massacres provenait d‘une 
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caserne algéroise de la sécurité militaire » !‘.82 Similarly, in his analysis of the first 
round of elections in December 1991 and the opposition to the subsequent military 
intervention, he derides the view put forward by the FIS that the tightly controlled 
military power was acting against the wishes of the people. Again, the exclamation 
mark is the only means he has of denouncing the party‘s ‗argument politique 
redoutable pour faire apparaître « le pouvoir d‘Alger » comme « une junte militaire » 
opposée au « choix du peuple » !‘.83 
 Another curious choice made by Nezzar in his defence was to cite lengthy 
passages by Mohamed Sifaoui, Souaïdia‘s co-writer, which show Sifaoui‘s hostility 
towards the security forces. Sifaoui makes it clear from the outset, when giving his 
testimony, that he has nothing but contempt for the manner in which power is 
distributed in Algeria, although two things pushed him to testify: the gravity of the 
claims made by Habib Souaïdia and his eternal gratitude to the army for having 
interrupted the electoral process in January 1992.
84
 But while Nezzar had no control 
over what Sifaoui would say during his testimony, he made the unusual choice to 
include in his own publication the following citation from that testimony:  
L‘intérêt majeur du témoignage de Habib n‘est pas de refaire pour la énième fois 
l‘histoire de ces années-là, mais d‘apporter des faits précis et irréfutables sur le 
déroulement concret de la guerre, les exactions des groupes armés et la folie des 
généraux. Ce livre doit être vu comme une déposition qui pourra peut-être servir un jour 
devant un tribunal qui jugera les responsables.
85
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 While these methods of refutation are clearly ineffectual, the General does raise 
one point that should not in my view be lightly discarded. He develops the view that 
there is a widespread attempt to discredit the very core of Algerian governance, and 
that the means employed to do this are unethical and even self-delegitimising. He 
tends to see, in the diverse groups and individuals who have been working to expose 
the Algerian authorities to international reproach, a homogenous whole, responsible 
for destabilising Algeria since the 1980s:  
Il serait un jour intéressant de savoir comment ces journalistes, ces « experts », ces 
défenseurs des droits de l‘homme, ces historiens de nationalités et d‘horizons si divers, 
ces militants passionnés de la grande cause du peuple algérien, réislamisé et gouverné à 
la taliban, se sont retrouvés et attelés à la même cause dans un savant partage des tâches 
[…] ils ont été les tâcherons quotidiens de la grande œuvre de déstabilisation de 
l‘Algérie commencée au début de la décennie 80.86 
 Such a position can be seen in different ways. It might be seen as a refusal to 
engage with the potentially damaging attacks on the army and him personally, 
thereby disregarding them as unworthy of detailed debate. One might argue that this 
is insufficient, that the army‘s culpability is all the more probable if parties such as 
Nezzar will not deign to take on their detractors. Yet it is not so uncommon for state 
authorities to ignore the many and diverse critiques of their actions, except where 
compelled to respond by political or legal imperatives. And, as we will see in the 
final section of this chapter, despite pressure from the United Nations, the Algerian 
authorities preserved this tradition by resisting outside ‗interference‘. 
 Alternatively, Nezzar‘s decision to portray his critics as a homogenous whole may 
be seen as an astute observation—an observation that there is something about the 
way in which criticism has been organised that should raise one‘s scepticism. This 
cannot be discarded. It is worth outlining in a little more detail the kinds of 
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reservations that Nezzar and others put forward regarding the ways in which the case 
against the military has developed. While I do not necessarily endorse the General‘s 
accusations, it is in the interest of balanced inquiry that we should at least consider 
the possibility that the thesis of military corruption is all too easily adopted by certain 
parties. 
Section 5.1 – François Gèze and the ‘conspiracy theory’ 
 One target of Nezzar‘s attacks is François Gèze, Director of Editions La 
Découverte, the publishing house responsible for many of the publications hostile to 
the Algerian military, including: La sale guerre;
87
 Qui a tué à Bentalha ?; Algérie, le 
livre noir; La nouvelle guerre d‟Algérie; and Souaïdia‘s account of the defamation 
trial, Le procès de « La sale guerre ». Gèze‘s involvement in so many publications of 
this sort is striking in itself, but even more pertinent are the active contributions he 
has sometimes made to actual content. A ‗postface‘, for example, is included in 
Yous‘ Qui a tué à Bentalha ? This lengthy section of the book (about one quarter) is 
written by Gèze and Yous‘ co-author, Salima Mellah, who together reinforce the 
primary accusations made in the main body of the book. The length of this section 
alone is enough to raise questions about the editor‘s role. Is it appropriate for Gèze to 
add weight to a publication that is under his professional auspices? This is a question 
for the individual reader, but it is easy to see how the editor‘s apparently partisan 
stance might cause some readers to be wary of the information being put forward. 
Elsewhere, Gèze plays a key role in the compilation of data: again with Salima 
Mellah, he writes the footnotes in Souaïdia‘s account of the defamation trial. The 
importance of this cannot be underestimated, as the notes in such a publication are 
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what single it out; after all the transcripts of the different testimonies and summations 
that make up the trial are accessible by the public. By compiling these notes, 
therefore, Gèze chose to guide the reader through the proceedings using references 
that would ensure the case for the defence was strengthened and that that of the 
claimant was weakened. Such acts have convinced those who reject the accusations 
made against the military that Gèze is more of an activist than an editor.  
 This is probably true, as Gèze has himself been the author of several publications 
detailing the role of the security services in propagating Islamist violence. Again 
collaborating with Salima Mellah, in 2007 he produced a long study of the rise of 
Algeria‘s main terrorist group, Al-Qaeda au pays du Maghreb islamique (AQMI).88 
This document argues that the rise of this group, formerly named the Groupe 
salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), is directly linked to inter-clan 
conflict in the upper echelons of the Algerian state, namely between the ‗clan‘ of the 
incumbent President Bouteflika, who the authors argue is diplomatically closest to 
France and Russia, and that of General Mohammed Médiène (or General ‗Tewfik‘), 
who is head of the security services (Département de renseignement et de sécurité – 
DRS) and allegedly favours greater alliances with the US with a view to generating 
higher oil-based revenue. The theory presented is that General Médiène sought to 
bolster Algeria‘s pro-American status by heightening the need for its role in the ‗War 
on Terror‘. This would have required the growth of a radical terrorist group in the 
aftermath of Bouteflika‘s 1999 concorde civile, when so many militants from the 
conflict were awarded an amnesty. The GSPC—and subsequently the AQMI—
provided just such a context, and also had the corollary effect of undermining the 
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President‘s historic concord. It is not within the remit of this thesis to explore this 
publication in greater detail, but I refer readers to the considerable debate it has 
provoked.
89
 
 Gèze has also produced several articles on his own.
90
 These are thorough and 
consistent with his assertion that senior military officers are responsible for 
orchestrating much of the violence in Algeria. Indeed, were it not for his parallel role 
as editor, Gèze would be seen in the same light as any other commentator on Algeria. 
It is clear, however, that his neutrality as an editor is undermined by his personal 
interest in disseminating views that undermine the integrity of the Algerian military. 
This ambition is perhaps not in itself reproachable, for there is strong evidence that 
the military has indeed displayed illegality, injustice and intolerance in its effective 
rule of Algeria since 1962. Besides, what editor can claim true neutrality? It is 
common knowledge that publishing houses often display a preference for work of a 
certain nature; La Découverte is simply an example of unusually partisan support in 
what is an unavoidably emotive subject area. The editor has been accused of much 
graver offences, however. The trial in Paris heard evidence from Mohamed Sifaoui, 
co-author of Souaïdia‘s La sale guerre.91 He claims that there was manipulation on 
the part of those who contributed, directly or indirectly, to the publication. He depicts 
a rather naive Souaïdia, who, having arrived in France with little money or 
knowledge of his new surroundings, developed links with certain parties who appear 
again and again as the authors or promoters of pamphlets, website articles and other 
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publications that speak out against the Algerian military and broader state structures. 
Sifaoui highlights Gèze as the key figure who manipulated Souaïdia‘s story to put 
forward his own version of how events had unfolded in Algeria. In line with 
Nezzar‘s assertion that La sale guerre was ‗le point culminant de la campagne menée 
par François Gèze‘, his testimony suggests that for years the editor from La 
Découverte had been waiting for solid evidence to confirm what he already 
suspected—that the violence in Algeria was the product of army generals and not of 
Islamist terrorists: ‗Monsieur Souaïdia a apporté ces soi-disant preuves qui 
manquaient à Monsieur Gèze‘.92 Sifaoui also accuses Gèze of actually modifying the 
manuscript with a view to strengthening the case against the army and diluting the 
case against the Islamists. He says, for example, that where he, Sifaoui, had written 
‗terroristes du FIS‘, he later found in the finished text that the reference to the FIS 
had been deleted: ‗Cela veut dire qu‘on veut jeter le doute sur l‘identité des assassins 
parce que c‘est un livre militant, parce que c‘est un éditeur qui ne respecte pas ses 
auteurs‘.93  
 The antagonism between the two men did not only emerge during the trial, 
however. Gèze had taken legal action against Sifaoui in February of the same year, 
for allegedly defamatory remarks made against him in relation to his handling of the 
publication of La sale guerre. On the day following this publication (8 February 
2001), Sifaoui issued a statement to the press in which he accused Gèze of 
deliberately deleting elements of the text (e.g., passages referring to the violence 
committed by Islamist groups) in order to place the blame squarely on the shoulders 
of the army generals. Later, Sifaoui actually published his own account of the 
debacle, arguing that he was mistreated by La Découverte and that his work was 
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misrepresented.
94
 Gèze correctly rejects the accusation that La sale guerre exculpates 
the Islamists (it is filled with passages that make it clear the extent to which the 
author abhors the acts and ideology of the Islamists), and also argues that the 
intention was never to represent the views of Mr Sifaoui, but solely those of the 
author: ‗[le contrat] concernait, exclusivement et précisément, l'édition du 
témoignage personnel de M. Souaïdia, qui serait recueilli et mis en forme par M. 
Sifaoui‘.95 He goes on to counter that it was in fact Sifaoui who was guilty of 
manipulation, as he radically amended the facts as presented to him by Souaïdia, 
offering his own political analysis of the Islamist movement. These additions were 
deleted from the published version, says Gèze. Interestingly, he also rejects Sifaoui‘s 
implication that he took sides, saying this would be incompatible with his duties as 
an editor: ‗cette allégation porte gravement atteinte à mon honneur et à ma 
considération en ce qu‘elle m‘impute un parti pris inconciliable avec mes devoirs 
d‘éditeur‘.96 This would appear to be at odds with the contributions Gèze has made to 
publications under his editorial responsibility: after all, how can one write a lengthy 
postface explicitly reinforcing the arguments put forward by the primary author, or 
carefully compile footnotes for the proceedings of a legal trial that clearly 
corroborate the evidence given by the defence and undermine that of the claimant, 
and not consider that one has adopted a ‗parti pris‘? In his acknowledgements for 
another La Découverte publication, L‟Islamisme à l‟heure d‟Al-Qaida, François 
Burgat offers special thanks to Gèze, who he says proved to be ‗bien plus qu‘un 
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éditeur‘.97 Does this imply that his contribution was more than professional? I 
hesitate to judge, but it would be interesting to hear a comprehensive explanation 
from Gèze himself of exactly how he sees his role. Unfortunately, he did not give 
testimony at the Nezzar v Souaïdia trial, much to the disappointment of the counsel 
for the plaintiff;
98
 however, in his publication of the court proceedings, he does 
provide an explanation for his personal involvement and the background to his 
decision to publish so many books related to the Algerian question. It is all too brief, 
regrettably. In it he does not account for the lengthy contribution he made to Qui a 
tué à Bentalha ?, nor does he defend his decision to compile the footnotes for Le 
Procès de « La sale guerre », saying simply that he is doing his job as a publisher by 
giving voice to those on both sides of the Mediterranean who seek the truth about the 
‗real‘ distribution of power in Algeria.99  
 What, then, is the significance of Nezzar and Sifaoui‘s attacks on the methods 
behind their detractors? Their case is that the example of François Gèze is not an 
isolated one, and that much of the public hostility towards the army generals has 
been framed either directly by or with the help of a small community of people intent 
on propagating the same message—that the violence in Algeria is primarily the 
product of a military elite intent on staying in power—and who are willing to neglect 
the rigours of proper research to this end. There is no clarity in this ‗dirty war‘, even 
more than ten years on from the height of the conflict. What the Nezzar v Souaïdia 
trial shows is that we must exercise great caution in reading any material that takes a 
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clear position about the truth of what happened during the conflict. There is evidently 
cause for concern about the potential role played by the military in exacerbating and 
even perpetrating some of the most horrific violence seen during the conflict, but 
equally there are legitimate questions to be asked about the motives and methods of 
those who seek to denounce the military leaders for their perceived abuses of power. 
Ultimately, however, Nezzar‘s accusation that the defence in this trial are ‗militants 
pour une cause‘ and that the counsel for the defence were ‗blinded‘ by their 
ideological stance is hardly sufficient to discredit the widespread reports of military 
abuses.
100
  
 In Chapter III, I highlighted the political intentions of the FIS and showed how it 
was ultimately denied political expression by the military coup of 1992. This 
offensive was then reinforced by the repression of the conflict, when political 
opposition quickly turned to apparently chaotic violent resistance. There can be no 
doubt that much of this violence came from angry Islamists. It is reasonable to 
assume that many of these welcomed the military repression, as it provided an 
invitation to take up arms and thereby forge a substantial stratum in society that 
depended on war as an ‗economico-political resource‘. This kind of resistance, with 
its dark network of émirs and brutal subjugation of the population, is the source of 
Martinez‘ analysis, but did not represent the wider Islamist movement. It had neither 
the political foundation nor the majority support that the FIS enjoyed, and because it 
was not representative of the Islamist movement, the regime could not depend on it 
alone to discredit that movement. This analysis, quite apart from the specific 
evidence they provide, is what makes the testimony of people like Souaïdia, Tigha, 
Yous and others so credible: without a wider, generically ‗Islamist‘ network of 
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violence, the regime would have been placed under enormous pressure in the short 
term to readmit the FIS to the political sphere.  
 At least three elements of my analysis so far show how the political nature of the 
FIS was stunted and even disfigured by the military regime: the decision to deny the 
FIS‘ electoral victory of December 1991, despite its legalist (albeit populist and at 
times provocative) behaviour; the regime‘s refusal to consider the FIS‘s proposals in 
the Sant‘Egidio platform; and the suspected tactics of the regime during the conflict, 
when the Islamist movement as a whole was tarnished by illegality and violence. 
Nonetheless, I have emphasised caution in any assessment of the regime‘s 
culpability. While there can be no doubt that the intervention of January 1992 was 
unconstitutional and unjust, and criticism of the regime for this need not be 
restrained, it would be preferable that the allegations of mass murder by a sovereign 
state be made in a more legal (or at least a more rigorously academic) framework 
than is currently the case. The informality of the debate, with its reliance on blogs, 
online publications and semi-journalistic writing, ultimately undermines the 
seriousness of the accusations and makes it less likely that those responsible for the 
killings will be held accountable. The example of François Gèze highlights this 
problem: the case against the regime would better be served by La Découverte 
publications that made no mention of the editor personally and did not include his 
work. He would then be free to contribute his own views in the form of articles and 
books, but perhaps through another publisher. Furthermore, the strength of his 
convictions is cause for concern: in a conflict where historical accuracy is so difficult 
to achieve, such a complete and unerring explanation of events is unconvincing. A 
more cautious and nuanced reading would be preferable. 
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Section 6 – Resisting UN pressure 
 The Algerian authorities were the subject of some formal scrutiny, although this 
was limited. It mainly came in the form of a United Nations panel, which visited the 
country from 22 July to 4 August 1998. This visit came in the aftermath of Algeria‘s 
second periodic report to the Human Rights Committee, an obligation incumbent on 
all states that have signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).
101
 The Committee‘s concluding observations were made on 29 July 
1998.
102
 Before looking at these observations in more detail, I would first like to look 
at the ways in which the delegation tried to deflect responsibility for the crisis. 
Section 6.1 – Deflecting responsibility 
 The function of periodic reports to the UN Human Rights Committee is to assess 
the extent to which signatories to the Covenant are upholding their obligations. States 
are requested to submit their own reports assessing the progress made and the status 
of any current difficulties, and these are then challenged by a panel of independent 
experts. In the case of Algeria, the report was submitted with a delay of two years, 
and the Committee ‗observes that [the Algerian government] does not provide 
sufficient specific data on the prevailing human rights crisis‘.103 That it identified a 
‗human rights crisis‘ is highly significant, as this was expressly denied by the 
Algerian authorities in their report.
104
 This was a recurrent feature of official 
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responses to international pressure for independent inquiries into the violence. By 
offering a reading of the violence as the product of terrorism alone and by insisting 
that an independent inquiry would infringe upon Algeria‘s sovereignty, the 
authorities frustrated the UN High Commissioner, Mary Robinson, who refused to 
see the Algerian violence as a matter of internal security:  
Je n‘accepte pas que sous le prétexte de ne pas violer la souveraineté algérienne nous ne 
puissions rien dire, alors que des gens sont massacrés. Je me suis heurtée la semaine 
passée sur ce point avec le ministre algérien des Affaires étrangères. [...] Les massacres 
et autres atrocités à l‘encontre des civils innocents ont pris une telle ampleur en Algérie 
que je refuse de considérer cette situation comme exclusivement interne. Les droits de 
l‘homme ne connaissent pas de frontières‘.
105
 
 As I have already suggested, the problem of methodology and truth pervades 
analysis of the Algerian conflict; the example of François Gèze shows that greater 
care is needed in assessing the responsibility of the authorities. The Algerian 
delegation in Geneva were mindful of this problem and emphasised it in their 
defence: ‗Le propos du débat entre le Comité et la délégation doit être de soumettre à 
un esprit critique les sources utilisées, afin de sortir du domaine des allégations pour 
se situer sur le plan de l‘établissement des faits‘.106 However, a member of the panel 
challenged the delegation‘s tendency to distance the authorities from responsibility, 
arguing that even if the culpability of the security forces could not be established, the 
government was obliged under the ICCPR to take action on all human rights 
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violations committed on its territory, irrespective of who was behind such acts.
107
 
Crucially, this was later supported by the Committee chairperson:  
L‘État partie porte également une responsabilité vis-à-vis des activités criminelles, 
quelle qu‘en soit l‘origine, ainsi que des activités des autorités au pouvoir durant la 
période couverte par le rapport. Dans ce contexte, le Comité a constaté, à partir 
notamment des renseignements communiqués par la délégation algérienne, que la 
protection de la population par l‘État souffrait d‘insuffisances.108 
 The attempt by the authorities to deflect responsibility for the crisis is also clear 
from their insistence that in January 1992 they were forced into action by ‗terrorism‘, 
and also that it was not the democratic process, but the electoral process, that was 
interrupted.
109
 The implication that they were taken by surprise is later made explicit: 
‗at the beginning of the emergency, the Algerian security forces had been relatively 
unprepared to deal with a form of violence until then unknown in the country‘.110 
This appears disingenuous for at least two reasons. First, the level of repression 
operated against the FIS and the wider Islamist movement during the summer and 
autumn of 1991, detailed earlier, would suggest that preparations were well under 
way for the conflict. This is supported by Souaïdia‘s claim that recruitment was 
boosted ahead of the war. Secondly, to say that the kind of violence experienced at 
the beginning of the conflict was unfamiliar is clearly misleading. Not only had 
guerrilla violence been the modus operandi of the liberation struggle, but in the 
1980s the authorities had had to fight Islamist militia in the form of Bouyali‘s MIA.  
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 The delegation‘s reliance on terrorism as the cause of the conflict is a means of 
relinquishing responsibility. This was identified by members of the panel, who 
criticised Algeria‘s excessively broad definition of terrorism: ‗under a new definition 
[in the Algerian report], terrorism included acts designed ―to hinder traffic or 
freedom of movement on the roads and fill public places with crowds‖, or ―to hinder 
the functioning of public services‖. That definition seemed unduly broad‘.111 Another 
delegate supported these remarks, adding that this definition ‗seemed to violate the 
basic principles of law‘.112 And finally, it was suggested that the definition allowed 
for far too much interpretation on the part of the authorities:  
Under that definition, any act whatsoever which, in the opinion of the prosecutor or the 
police, had been carried out with any of a wide range of different intentions would 
constitute terrorism. [...] That formulation was so broad as to constitute an infringement 
of articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.
113
 
This is perhaps the most important point here: that a loose definition of terrorism 
allowed the authorities to justify massive repression, even where, as during the FIS 
demonstration of June 1991, the ‗terrorists‘ were guilty of no more than ‗hindering 
traffic‘ or ‗filling public places with crowds‘. Such repression completely 
undermined the legality and legitimacy of the authorities:  
[U]ne modification des dispositions de la loi définissant le terrorisme permet à présent 
aux autorités de prendre pour cible n‘importe quel comportement public voire privé et 
tout porte à croire que ce sont les fondements même de l‘état de droit qui sont remis en 
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cause. Il est tout à fait légitime de combattre le terrorisme, mais ce combat doit être 
mené dans le strict respect de la légalité.
114
 
Section 6.2 – Concluding observations of the UN Human Rights Committee 
 In its report, Algeria made it clear that the only obstacle between it and progress, 
well-being, solidarity and social justice was the ‗dérive terroriste‘, which it said 
exploited the ‗sacred values of the Algerian people‘.115 When read in light of the 
atrocities committed against Algerian civilians, this ‗aspiration‘ rings hollow. Indeed, 
the arguments put forward by the delegation generally did not convince the 
Committee of the regime‘s good intentions. In its concluding observations, while it 
commended the Algerian government for its compliance with procedures and 
emphasised its full solidarity with the Algerian people, it highlighted a number of 
concerns relevant to the state‘s respect for the ICCPR.  
 Perhaps chief among these is the uncertainty surrounding the massacres, in terms 
both of the lack of support from the security forces and the identity of the attackers. 
The Committee said it was ‗appalled‘ by the level of the violence and was 
‗concerned at the lack of timely or preventive measures of protection to the victims 
from police or military officials in the vicinity and at the persistent allegations of 
collusion of members of the security forces in terrorist attacks‘.116 In this regard, it 
urged the authorities to establish independent inquiries in order to determine who 
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was behind the killings, including investigations within the security forces, ‗from the 
lowest to the highest levels‘.117 This does not amount to an endorsement of the 
allegations analysed in this chapter, but the fact that the Committee would urge 
internal investigations shows that they are reasonably credible.  
 This is consistent with the Committee‘s reaction to other allegations made against 
the Algerian authorities. As well as highlighting the state‘s apparent failure to protect 
its citizens, it expresses concern over the ‗less than satisfactory responses‘ to the 
‗innumerable reports‘ of extrajudicial executions (section 7). Similarly, extrajudicial 
detention is identified as an area where allegations appear credible (section 12). 
State-sponsored torture (section 9) and disappearances (section 10) are further 
singled out as phenomena that undermined the state‘s adherence to the ICCPR. 
Finally, the regime‘s firm hold on power and abhorrence of any threat to that power 
are highlighted in the Committee‘s criticism of two inadequacies: freedom of thought 
and freedom of association. At section 16, one reads:  
[I]n practice numerous restrictions still persist with regard to freedom of expression 
dealing with, for example, coverage of allegations and discussion of corruption and 
criticism of government officials and of material regarded as an expression of sympathy 
or encouragement of subversion, all of which gravely prejudice the right of the media to 
inform the public and the right of the public to receive information.
118
 
This, combined with the liberally invoked ban on political parties (section 17), was a 
key strategy in the denial of legitimacy: by passing opposition off as subversion, the 
regime could claim that it was protecting the state from harmful influences. 
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Conclusion 
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 President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was re-elected in April 2009, having amended the 
constitution to allow for a third consecutive term. His continued presence at the head 
of the Algerian state reinforces what I have learnt from my research: that any 
changes to the distribution of political power in Algeria will be resisted fiercely. 
Bouteflika very nearly made it to the top much earlier in his career. He served as 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Ben Bella administration, where his occlusion by 
the President is said to have been one of the motivating factors behind the 1965 coup 
staged by Boumediene, one of Bouteflika‘s closest allies.1 He continued in this role 
throughout Boumediene‘s long term in office, and was set to contest a tight 
Presidential election to replace his mentor in 1978 when the military decided to end 
the deadlock between him and Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui by opting for a compromise 
candidate in the form of Chadli Bendjedid.
2
 Bouteflika was nonetheless included in 
Chadli‘s administration as a Minister of State, and it was only when he was pursued 
on charges of corruption by the Cour des comptes in 1981 that he left the political 
stage, seeking exile in Switzerland and the Gulf until 1987.
3
 His accession to the 
Presidency in 1999 is widely seen to be a reflection of the military‘s mistrust of 
President Zeroual‘s overtures, and after ten years in office little has been done to 
redress this military dominance of politics.
4
  
 More than anything else, it was this state of affairs that the FIS challenged. Its 
removal from the political game had little to do with its moral posturing or its 
attitude to women or personal liberties. These were used to depict the FIS as an 
intolerable threat to democracy, but actually at stake were privilege and power. The 
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fact that these were threatened by the FIS is indicative of the party‘s main strength: it 
was radical enough to alter the nature of government, yet familiar enough to offer a 
credible, viable alternative. There can be no doubt that a FIS-led government would 
have depoliticised the military, undermined the long-standing privileges of the 
Francophone elite, and modified Algeria‘s international diplomatic relations, perhaps 
displeasing many of the country‘s Western allies. Albeit at the risk of instability, this 
would have transformed the political sphere, depriving the historic bearers of power 
of the channels that had kept them in positions of privilege. However, the party‘s 
wide electoral base meant that it could not sustain a model that departed excessively 
from the operability of existing state infrastructure. It is inconceivable that such a 
large percentage of the electorate voted for revolution; much more reasonable is to 
assume that they wanted a change from the corrupt, tired representatives of old, but 
expected the state to function more or less normally. This was not Afghanistan. 
There, the Taliban rulers did not have to tear down sophisticated infrastructure after 
the Soviet defeat in order to adopt a primitive style of governance, which is exactly 
what the FIS would have had to do if it had decided to govern ‗à la Taliban‘, as 
ostensibly feared by the authorities responsible for the 1992 coup.
5
 That the FIS was 
not a retrograde party is highly significant in my reading of it as a balanced political 
force: intelligent enough to tap into tried-and-tested legacies such as nationalism and 
Islamic reformism, while at the same time redrawing the boundaries of politics in a 
way that promised voters innovation and change.  
 I have argued that this balance manifested itself in many ways. By challenging the 
statist nationalism of the FLN in favour of a ‗vertical‘ expression of Algerian 
identity, it sought to refresh rather than supplant an existing form of legitimacy. 
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Similarly, by politicising the combative but apolitical legacy of the earlier reformers, 
the FIS offered itself as an extension of that movement, bowing to the work already 
done while taking it to the next level. In Chapter III, we saw how the party ultimately 
opted, via the Djaz‘ara, for representation that was moderate, respected legality and 
favoured compromise. Furthermore, this was clearly recognised by elements within 
the regime, given the level of cooperation that was apparent between Chadli‘s 
administration and the Islamists. In fact, I would suggest that it was precisely 
because the FIS was perceived to be a representative and viable alternative to the 
status quo that the military waged such a violent campaign against it. If, as portrayed 
by the authorities during the struggle, the FIS had represented radicalism and 
disregard for Algerian integrity, then it would never have garnered so many votes. 
Yet, even when faced with repression and hostile propaganda, what remained of the 
party continued to favour a political solution, as we saw in Chapter III.  
 My decision to refer to the FIS as balanced is deliberately polemical. I know that 
it is difficult to find balance in a party that upsets the democratic paradigm, employs 
fiery rhetoric invoking God, and uses anti-Western sentiment to appeal to voters. But 
I would argue that we need to revise our assumptions in the current global political 
climate. It is clear, I think, that a great imbalance affects world politics, with those 
nations that are acquiescent towards US and European dominance more likely to find 
approval and accommodation in the hierarchical interplay between nation-states. The 
only factor powerful enough to trump this state of affairs is economic might, as the 
notable exception of China now shows. But for most countries, tolerance of new and 
‗subversive‘ political forces means denial, on the international stage, of respect and 
privileges. In such a scenario, the imbalance of world politics can only be redressed 
by, on the one hand, persistent challenges from forces like the FIS, and on the other, 
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a reappraisal by politicians worldwide of what is fair, of what is democratic. For if 
democracy is to be truly representative, it cannot exclude movements like that 
represented by the FIS. By cancelling the elections in January 1992, the Algerian 
state did not only exclude that particular party, but effectively outlawed a massive 
segment of its own population. The support generated between 1989 and 1992 cannot 
be ‗disappeared‘ in the same way that so many citizens were during the conflict. The 
feeling of dissatisfaction felt by the electorate did not go away.  
 Seen in this light, the FIS was balanced in two ways: domestically and globally. It 
displayed political maturity, flexibility, and respect for legality in its domestic fight 
for power, as I have argued throughout this work, particularly in Chapter III. But it 
also offered one of the most poignant examples in recent times of a party that sought 
to redress the imbalance of what constitutes respectable political expression—and, 
through no fault of its own, failed spectacularly. The current landscape of party 
politics in Algeria is completely dominated by the RND (founded by the military), 
the FLN, which switched its allegiance back to the military in the aftermath of the 
Sant‘Egidio platform, and a handful of other parties who supported the coup in 1992. 
Notable exceptions include Hocine Aït Ahmed‘s FFS and Louisa Hanoune‘s PT. 
However, the tactics employed by the regime during the conflict are widely believed 
to have been unacceptable, so while it was successful in defeating its Islamist 
opponents, it failed to recover the faith of voters who had opted for the kind of 
change offered by the FIS.  
 At this stage, I would like to clarify my personal views in relation to the FIS, and 
Islamism more generally. There is a perception that writers who appear favourable to 
the emergence of political Islam are in fact seduced by the otherness of Islamic 
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solutions to political problems. Gilbert Achcar has even spoken of a kind of reverse 
Orientalism (‗Orientalisme à rebours‘), which operates an essentialist vision of the 
Muslim world in which Islamism is ‗érigé en facteur de la modernité‘.6 Borrowing 
from the work of a Syrian writer, Sadik Jalal Al-‗Azm, who identified reverse 
Orientalism as an essentialist vision of the West as operated by Arab intellectuals,
7
 
Achcar identifies six standpoints that characterise Western reverse Orientalists. It is 
worth citing these in detail: 
1 – L‘Orient islamique et l‘Occident sont antithétiques ; il ne s‘agit pas, ou pas 
seulement, du constat que les peuples orientaux s‘opposent à l‘impérialisme occidental, 
mais de l‘idée que les idéologies occidentales dans leur ensemble, y compris les plus 
critiques comme le marxisme, sont inadéquates à cette fin. 
2 – Le degré d‘émancipation de l‘Orient ne doit pas et ne peut pas être mesuré à l‘aune 
de valeurs et de critères « occidentaux », comme la démocratie, la laïcité et la libération 
des femmes. 
3 – L‘Orient musulman ne peut pas être appréhendé avec les instruments 
épistémologiques des sciences sociales occidentales, et aucune analogie avec des 
phénomènes occidentaux n‘est pertinente. 
4 – La force motrice fondamentale de l‘histoire islamique, le facteur principal qui meut 
les masses musulmanes, est culturel, c‘est-à-dire religieux, et son importance dépasse 
celle des facteurs économiques et sociaux qui conditionnent les dynamiques politiques 
occidentales. 
5 – La seule voie des pays musulmans vers leur renaissance passe par l‘Islam – 
autrement dit, en empruntant à l‘Église catholique une formule célèbre : « Hors de 
l‘islam, pas de salut » (pour les musulmans, s‘entend). 
6 – Les mouvements qui brandissent l‘étendard du « retour à l‘islam » ne sont pas 
réactionnaires ou régressifs comme ils sont perçus par le regard occidental, mais sont, 
au contraire, des mouvements progressistes qui résistent à la domination culturelle 
occidentale.
8
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 The extent to which I identify with these positions is limited. I do not feel that 
there is an inherent antipathy between East and West, or even that Western 
ideologies are inadequate tools for Muslims to express opposition to imperialism. My 
argument is not about showing why there is a need for Islamism specifically; it is 
intended to show that where such a popular movement develops within the 
constitutional framework, it is unjust for it to be rejected. I would agree that Western 
‗criteria‘ such as democracy, secularism and women‘s liberation are not necessarily 
the only gauges of freedom, but I would not suggest that they ‗must not‘ or ‗cannot‘ 
be used. I avoid such rigidity: it is not a question of what is absolutely needed or 
absolutely not needed, but of what is chosen as a means of political expression. If an 
electorate seems to identify more with ‗endogenous‘ criteria, to borrow from 
Burgat‘s lexicon, then it is only fair to respect that. Besides, in a country like Algeria, 
which has had such exposure to French values, the reality is that it will always 
preserve a certain balance between Western and non-Western references. Therefore, 
to say that ‗no analogy‘ with Western phenomena is pertinent would be just as unfair 
as to say that only Western analogies are pertinent. With regard to Achcar‘s fourth 
point, there can be no doubt that the religio-cultural dimension is a central influence 
in most if not all Muslim countries, and Algeria is no different. But once again, it 
would be wrong to insist that this trumps any socio-economic influences. Such an 
approach in my view would undermine the viability of political Islam, as it would 
imply that the sacred is in competition with the profane, when in fact political Islam 
is an expression of both. We must not fall into the trap of depicting an either/or 
scenario, where the Islamists are either zealous and irrational, as they were portrayed 
during the conflict, or really just hiding behind a religious discourse in order to effect 
profane change, as Burgat‘s analysis sometimes suggests. It is not for me to suggest 
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just how necessary Islam is in the politics of Algeria. I will never insist that it is the 
‗only path to renewal‘, but I will defend its popular (and in my view sincere) 
mobilisation in an effort to redefine political boundaries and renew the people‘s faith 
in its representatives. Finally, I find myself largely in agreement with the last point, 
which is that movements representing a ‗return to Islam‘ are not regressive. I would 
add a cautious ‗not necessarily‘, however. This thesis is not about defending 
Islamism per se, but about showing one individual party to have been worthy of 
admittance into democratic politics. And not only was the original decision to 
exclude it unjust, but it has had nothing but negative effects—for the Algerian 
people, for regional stability and for the advancement of politics worldwide. 
Future research perspectives 
 I would like to conclude by reflecting on what this subject area has to offer in 
terms of future research perspectives. Two paths are possible: there are significant 
possibilities for researchers wishing to take a different approach, i.e., less explicitly 
political; and there are further political perspectives that I have not been able to 
incorporate into the present work. Of course, any study of the FIS is necessarily 
political to a certain extent, but one may place greater emphasis on different elements 
of the party‘s emergence and subsequent decline. In Chapter I, for example, I 
suggested that the FIS‘ challenge to the FLN‘s control of nationalist sentiment was 
an important element in the party‘s credibility, as it was clearly engaging with rather 
than subverting state legitimacy. This raises the potential for historiographical 
perspectives to be explored. I touched on this when I evoked the importance of 
documents like the Charte d‟Alger, which laid out the state‘s official attitude towards 
the liberation war or the early expansion of Islam into the Maghreb. Further study of 
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this would be useful, specifically in relation to the FIS. For example, the ways in 
which history is taught in the Algerian education system would provide insights into 
the FLN‘s self-generated legitimacy. It would be interesting to see whether this 
extends into the recent conflict or whether it is largely dependent on the conflict of 
the 1950s and 1960s. Also, to what extent, if any, has the FIS been included in recent 
Algerian historical writing? My research would suggest that work published in 
Algeria is of little use except to find perspectives that broadly support the regime. 
Almost all of my Algerian sources that are critical of the regime were published in 
France or elsewhere in Europe, with the exception of a FIS-sponsored online 
publication (Le FIS du peuple).  
 Another question of interest is the exact relationship between the FIS and the 
Islamic reformers, again raised in Chapter I. I also identified this relationship as an 
important element in the FIS‘ credibility, as it reveals both the party‘s legacy and its 
progression into modern politics, thus showing the FIS to have significant links with 
long-standing and legitimate forms of opposition, and not simply represent rupture. 
Further study would be useful here. I only account for the influence of Cheikhs Ben 
Badis, Soltani and Sahnoun, but it would be interesting to extend this analysis to 
others, such as Malek Bennabi, whose philosophical contributions are not contested 
but whose relationship to Islamism is.
9
 
 In terms of further political research on the FIS and the civil conflict, I would like 
to see three issues explored further: the motivations of the FIS electorate, the 
                                                     
9
 See Nour-Eddine Boukrouh, L‟Islam dans l‟islamisme : vie et pensée de Malek Bennabi (Algiers: 
Samar, 2006), Chapter X, pp. 485-520, where the author describes Bennabi as a ‗penseur musulman‘ 
but not a ‗penseur islamiste‘ (p. 516). It should be pointed out, however, that Boukrouh had been a 
political rival of the FIS, having established the Parti du renouveau algérien (PRA) ahead of the 1991 
elections, and considered himself to be the inheritor of Bennabi‘s philosophy. Rouadjia, however, 
refers to him as a ‗vulgarisateur des idées bennabistes‘ (p. 143). 
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international dimension, and the state‘s accountability for the violence of the 1990s. 
The level of support for the FIS is beyond question, as the election results in 1990 
and 1991 showed. However, in order to assess the quality of the party‘s mandate, it 
would be interesting to determine the primary motivating factors behind its success 
at the polls. Was this simply a protest vote against the FLN? Was it a vote for Islam? 
Or was it a vote for the political manifesto of the FIS? How significant did voters 
feel the Islamic credentials of the FIS were? Did they see the FIS as the heirs (fils) to 
the FLN or did they seek rupture? To my knowledge, no sociological study has been 
carried out that might determine the answers to some or all of these questions. Yet 
such a study would in my view be essential in assessing the long-term potential 
strength of Islamism in Algeria. While it would appear that the FIS itself has been 
definitively removed from the political scene, these questions remain of great 
pertinence to any future Islamist opposition that would be distinct from the Islamist 
parties currently in parliament, all of whom are largely acquiescent to the ongoing 
bureaucratic-military dominance.  
 In terms of the international dimension, there is evidence to suggest that both 
France and the US were key players in the events that took place in Algeria from 
October 1988 onwards.
10
 For a global understanding of the political dynamic in 
Algeria—indeed in any country—one would have to take into account the extreme 
pressure exerted at a diplomatic level by the world‘s major powers. However, my 
focus in this work was domestic. The fact that France, the US and others were 
                                                     
10
 See for example: Lounis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, Françalgérie, crimes et mensonges 
d‟Etats : histoire secrète, de la guerre d‟indépendance à la « troisième guerre » d‟Algérie (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2004); Jeremy H. Keenan, ‗Security & Insecurity in North Africa‘, Review of African 
Political Economy, 108/33 (June 2006), pp. 269–96; Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: 
Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Ch. 7; 
Tamara Cofman Wittes, Freedom‟s Unsteady March: America‟s Role in Building Democracy 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), Ch. 7. 
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influential (for example by initially backing the coup and the subsequent repressive 
strategy) does not alter my assessment of how actors like the FIS, President Chadli or 
the military behaved. Regardless of who the real decision-makers were during this 
period, the fact remains that the FIS appeared as a legitimate participant on the 
political stage, and the authorities ultimately ensured this legitimacy was denied. It 
would nonetheless be interesting to see further analysis, in particular of American 
influence, as it is US attitudes to emerging political opposition worldwide that has 
the most impact on the kind of barriers to entry that I discussed in Chapter II. 
 The final element I would like to see further explored is the Algerian state‘s 
accountability for the violence it is accused of having committed during the conflict 
of the 1990s. My work in Chapter IV, in particular the analysis of General Nezzar‘s 
statements and the state‘s interaction with the United Nations, goes some way 
towards developing this. While the question of the state‘s legal responsibilities under 
international law naturally falls to legal scholars, it is my view that there is greater 
scope within French Studies (or political science) to exploit the publicly available 
information on how the state defended its case before the UN. This could be 
combined with the reports produced by human rights organisations to assess the 
viability and legitimacy of the state as it currently functions, given that the dominant 
parties in Algeria today are loyal to the military forces accused of ‗dirty‘ tactics. 
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Appendix 1 – Main Algerian political parties 
 En-Nahda: founded in 1989 by Cheikh Abdallah Djaballah, this moderate Islamist 
party can be compared to the MSP in that it opposed the return of the FIS to 
politics and was largely supportive of the administration. Djaballah was replaced 
as party leader by Lahbib Adami in 1998, and went on to found a rival structure, 
El-Islah. Neither party is a major force, with five and three parliamentary seats 
respectively. 
 Front des forces socialistes (FFS): founded in September 1963 by Hocine Aït 
Ahmed, who was one of the founding members of the FLN but resigned from the 
GPRA in 1962 in protest against the internal power struggles. He continues as 
party president today and enjoys particularly high support in his native Kabylie. 
The FFS has been the country‘s main opposition party since independence, 
campaigning for pluralism and political transparency since its creation. Although 
officially a secular party, the FFS supported the readmittance of the FIS into 
politics and was one of the signatories of the Sant‘Egidio platform. It has 
boycotted the last two parliamentary elections (2002 and 2007). 
 Front de libération nationale (FLN): founded in October 1954 in an effort to 
consolidate opposition to the French occupation, the FLN came to the fore with its 
call to revolution on 1 November of that year. Together with its armed branch, the 
Armée de libération nationale (ALN), it is credited with the success of the 
liberation struggle and formed the country‘s first government in the wake of 
independence, having forcibly dissolved the provisional government formed 
during the war (Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne – GPRA). 
Its monopoly of political power was absolute until the constitutional changes 
introduced in 1988, but it continued to dominate until the coup of January 1992, 
when the party opposed the military intervention. It remained in opposition to 
military rule until 1995, when the Secretary General, Abdelhamid Mehri, who had 
signed the Sant‘Egidio platform, was replaced by Boualem Benmouhada, who 
quickly rejected it. This re-alignment of the FLN with the military led to a climate 
of political cooperation, as reflected in the current FLN-RND-MSP coalition.  
 Mouvement de la société de la paix (MSP): founded in December 1990 by 
Mahfoud Nahnah (1942–2003) as the Mouvement de la société islamique (or 
HAMAS under its Arabic acronym), the MSP is now the country‘s main Islamist 
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group and the country‘s third largest party, with 51 seats in parliament. It has 
presented itself as moderate and legalist, opposing the Sant‘Egidio platform in 
1995 as an attempt to return the dissolved FIS to politics. The MSP has served in 
the last three governments, having offered its support to presidential candidate, 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika. 
 Mouvement démocratique et social (MDS): founded in January 1966 as the Parti 
de l‟avant-garde socialiste (PAGS), re-formed as Et-Tehadi in 1993 and renamed 
the MDS in 1999, this left-wing group was an influential voice of opposition via 
the country‘s main trade unions. However, its strength waned with the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and the rise of the Islamists, and it currently holds just one seat 
in parliament. 
 Parti des travailleurs (PT): founded in 1990, the workers‘ party has sought a 
mandate on the basis of its secular, socialist opposition to the regime, claiming 
ancestry in the anti-imperialist Etoile nord-africaine and Parti du peuple algérien. 
Like the FFS, it supported the readmittance of the FIS onto the political scene. 
The party‘s leader, Louisa Hanoune, was a candidate in the 2004 and 2009 
presidential elections. Together with the FFS, the PT has been one of the most 
influential voices of (legal) opposition in Algeria, and is currently the fourth 
largest Algerian party, with 26 seats in parliament. 
 Rassemblement national démocratique (RND): founded in February 1997 by the 
military administration, the RND is at the forefront of Algerian politics, having 
won the parliamentary elections of 1997, largely believed to have been rigged, 
and having served in two successive coalitions with the FLN and MSP. As the 
country‘s second largest party, it is symbolic of the continuing influence of the 
Algerian army in domestic politics. 
 Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie (RCD): founded in February 
1989 under the leadership of Saïd Saadi, this secular party has traditionally 
enjoyed its highest popularity in the country‘s Berber regions, where it has 
campaigned for greater recognition for the Berber language and culture. It fiercely 
opposes Islamism, and aligned itself with the ‗eradicators‘ in the regime during 
the civil conflict. It is currently the country‘s fifth largest party, with 19 seats in 
parliament. 
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Appendix 2 – Sant’Egidio Platform 
Le Contrat National 
Plateforme pour une solution politique et pacifique de la crise algérienne 
 
Les partis de l’opposition algérienne, réunis à Rome auprès de la Communauté 
de Sant’Egidio, déclarent en ce 13 janvier 1995 : 
L‟Algérie traverse aujourd‟hui une épreuve tragique sans précédent. 
Plus de trente ans après avoir chèrement payé son indépendance, le peuple n‟a pas 
pu voir se réaliser les principes et tous les objectifs du 1er novembre 1954 et a vu 
s‟éloigner progressivement tous les espoirs nés après octobre 1988. 
Aujourd‟hui le peuple algérien vit un climat de terreur jamais égalé, aggravé par 
des conditions sociales et économiques intolérables. Dans cette guerre sans images : 
séquestrations, disparitions, assassinats, torture systématisée, mutilations et 
représailles sont devenus le lot quotidien des Algériennes et des Algériens. 
Les conséquences des événements de juin 1991 et du coup d‟Etat du 11 janvier 1992, 
l‟interruption du processus électoral, la fermeture du champ politique, la dissolution 
du FIS, l‟instauration de l‟état d‟urgence et les mesures répressives et les réactions 
qu‟elles ont suscitées, ont engendré une logique d‟affrontement. 
Depuis, la violence n‟a cessé de s‟amplifier et de s‟étendre. Les tentatives du pouvoir 
de créer des milices au sein de la population marquent une nouvelle étape dans la 
politique du pire. Les risques de guerre civile sont réels, menaçant l‟intégrité 
physique du peuple, l‟unité du pays et la souveraineté nationale. 
L‟urgence d‟une solution globale, politique et équitable s‟impose afin d‟ouvrir 
d‟autres perspectives à une population qui aspire à la paix et à la légitimité 
populaire. 
Le pouvoir n‟a initié que de faux dialogues qui ont servi de paravents à des décisions 
unilatérales et à la politique du fait accompli. 
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Une véritable négociation reste l’unique moyen de parvenir à une issue pacifique 
et démocratique. 
 
A - Cadre : valeurs et principes 
Les participants s‘engagent sur la base d‘un contrat national dont les principes sont 
les suivants et sans l‘acceptation desquels aucune négociation ne serait viable : 
 La déclaration du 1er novembre 1954 : « la restauration de l‘Etat algérien 
souverain démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes de l‘islam (art. 1) » ; 
 Le rejet de la violence pour accéder ou se maintenir au pouvoir ; 
 Le rejet de toute dictature quelle que soit sa nature ou sa forme et le droit du 
peuple à défendre ses institutions élues ; 
 Le respect et la promotion des droits de la personne humaine tels qu‘énoncés 
par la Déclaration universelle, les pactes internationaux sur les droits de l‘homme, la 
Convention internationale contre la torture, et consacrés par les textes légaux ; 
 Le respect de l‘alternance politique à travers le suffrage universel ; 
 Le respect de la légitimité populaire. Les institutions librement élues ne 
peuvent être remises en cause que par la volonté populaire ; 
 La primauté de la loi légitime ; 
 La garantie des libertés fondamentales, individuelles et collectives quelles que 
soient la race, le sexe, la confession et la langue ; 
 La consécration du multipartisme ; 
 La non implication de l‘armée dans les affaires politiques. Le retour à ses 
attributions constitutionnelles de sauvegarde de l‘unité et de l‘indivisibilité du 
territoire national ; 
 Les éléments constitutifs de la personnalité algérienne sont l‘islam, l‘arabité et 
l‘amazighité ; la culture et les deux langues concourant au développement de cette 
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personnalité doivent trouver dans ce cadre unificateur leur place et leur promotion 
institutionnelle, sans exclusion ni marginalisation ; 
 La séparation des pouvoirs législatif, exécutif, et judiciaire ; 
 La liberté et le respect des confessions. 
B - Mesures devant précéder les négociations 
 La libération effective des responsables du FIS et de tous les détenus 
politiques. Assurer aux dirigeants du FIS tous les moyens et garanties nécessaires 
leur permettant de se réunir librement entre eux et avec tous ceux dont ils jugent la 
participation nécessaire à la prise de décisions. 
 L‘ouverture du champ politique et médiatique. L‘annulation de la décision de 
dissolution du FIS. Le plein rétablissement des activités de tous les partis. 
 La levée des mesures d‘interdiction et de suspension des journaux des écrits et 
des livres, prises en application du dispositif d‘exception. 
 La cessation immédiate, effective et vérifiable de la pratique de la torture. 
 L‘arrêt des exécutions des peines capitales, des exécutions extrajudiciaires et 
des représailles contre la population civile. 
 La condamnation et l‘appel à la cessation des exactions et des attentats contre 
les civils, les étrangers et la destruction des biens publics. 
 La constitution d‘une commission indépendante pour enquêter sur ces actes de 
violences et les graves violations des Droits de l‘homme. 
C - Rétablissement de la paix 
Une dynamique nouvelle pour la paix implique un processus graduel, simultané et 
négocié comprenant : 
 d‘une part, des mesures de détente réelle : fermeture des camps de sûreté, levée 
de l‘état d‘urgence et abrogation du dispositif d‘exception ; 
 et d‘autre part, un appel urgent et sans ambiguïté pour l‘arrêt des 
affrontements. Les Algériennes et les Algériens aspirent au retour de la paix civile. 
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Les modalités d‘application de cet engagement seront déterminées par les deux 
parties en conflit avec la participation active des autres partis représentatifs. 
Cette dynamique exige la participation pleine et entière des forces politiques 
représentatives et pacifiques. Celles-ci sont en mesure de contribuer au succès du 
processus en cours et assure l‘adhésion de la population. 
D - Le retour à la légalité constitutionnelle 
Les partis s‘engagent à respecter la Constitution du 23 février 1989. Son 
amendement ne peut se faire que par les voies constitutionnelles. 
E - Le retour à la souveraineté populaire 
Les parties prenantes aux négociations doivent définir une légalité transitoire pour la 
mise en œuvre et la surveillance des accords. Pour cela, elles doivent mettre en place 
une Conférence nationale dotée de compétences réelles, composée du pouvoir 
effectif et des forces politiques représentatives. 
Cette conférence définira : 
 les structures transitoires, les modalités et la durée d‘une période de transition 
la plus courte possible devant aboutir à des élections libres et pluralistes qui 
permettent au peuple le plein exercice de sa souveraineté ; 
 la liberté de l‘information, le libre accès aux médias et les conditions du libre 
choix du peuple doivent être assurés ; 
 le respect des résultats de ce choix doit être garanti. 
F – Garanties 
Toutes les parties prenantes à la négociation sont en droit d‘obtenir des garanties 
mutuelles. Les partis, tout en gardant leur autonomie de décision : 
 s‘opposent à toute ingérence dans les affaires internes de l‘Algérie ; 
 dénoncent l‘internationalisation de fait qui est le résultat de la politique 
d‘affrontement menée par le pouvoir ; 
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 demeurent convaincus que la solution de la crise ne peut être que l‘œuvre 
exclusive des Algériens et doit se concrétiser en Algérie ; 
 s‘engagent à mener une campagne d‘information auprès de la communauté 
internationale pour faire connaître l‘initiative de cette plateforme et lui assurer un 
soutien ; 
 décident de lancer une pétition internationale pour appuyer l‘exigence d‘une 
solution politique et pacifique en Algérie ; 
 appellent la communauté internationale à une solidarité agissante avec le 
peuple algérien ; 
 décident de maintenir les contacts entre eux en vue d‘une consultation et d‘une 
concertation permanentes. 
 
Les signataires : 
 Pour la Ligue algérienne de défense des droits de l’homme, Abdenour Ali 
Yahia 
 Pour le Front de libération nationale (FLN), Abdelhamid Mehri 
 Pour le Front des forces socialistes (FFS), Hocine Aït Ahmed et Ahmed Djeddaï 
 Pour le Front islamique du salut (FIS), Rabah Kebir et Anouar Haddam 
 Pour le Mouvement pour la démocratie en Algérie, Ahmed Ben Bella et Khaled 
Bensmaïn 
 Pour le Parti des travailleurs, Louisa Hanoune 
 Pour le Mouvement de la renaissance islamique (En-Nahda), Abdallah 
Djaballah 
 Pour Jazaïr musulmane contemporaine, Ahmed Ben Mohammed 
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